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Abstract  
 
Syria’s peaceful uprising turned into an armed conflict with Assad’s lethal response to 
demonstrations demanding dignity and freedom. Looking for an oppositional Syrian 
political power who might have influenced dynamics on the ground, light was shed on 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB). As dictatorships toppled in 2011 in the region 
and were replaced by MB-related parties such as in Egypt and Tunisia, the interest into 
the previously exiled SMB increased as a Syrian alternative. Research in this area was 
predominantly concerned with SMB’s history, and did not examine how the SMB’s 
shaped the ongoing events in Syria, and how in return, the conflict shaped the SMB. 
 
This thesis analyses, mainly through exclusive interviews, the SMB’s evolution as a 
prominent Syrian opposition group both on the domestic and international level. 
Findings show a shift in priorities within the organization from the hierarchal system to a 
wide-spectrum approach through various charitable, social and political activities 
enabling the SMB’s reintegration into the Syrian society. Nevertheless, due to pressures 
from international and domestic powers, the SMB diluted into the wider opposing bodies 
and lost the forefront position within the political stage. 
 
The international scrutiny facing the SMB increased as the Egyptian MB experienced 
political damage following the military coup in 2013. This was followed by the threat-
driven apathy from the Gulf states towards the MB. Western Governments also did not 
support the SMB despite the democratic and pluralistic vision for a future Syria being 
inherent in the SMB’s principles. Eventually, the SMB kept itself over water as Turkey 
and Qatar acted as a lifeline.  
 
The above-mentioned issues including wider historical links and the internal structures 
of the SMB creates a fascinating angle to the Syrian crisis which had not been researched 
before and provides the basis for future research on this ever-evolving situation.  
  
 5 
Table of Content  
Acknowledgment ...................................................................................................................... 2 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 4 
Table of Content ....................................................................................................................... 5 
List of Charts: ........................................................................................................................... 7 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................ 8 
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................. 9 
1.1 Research Objectives, Questions, and Contributions ..................................................... 11 
1.2 Research Design and Methodology ................................................................................. 17 
1.3 Thesis Structure ................................................................................................................ 23 
Chapter 2 Literature Review .................................................................................... 26 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 26 
2.2 The Muslim Brotherhood as a Socio-Political Actor ..................................................... 26 
2.3 The SMB, as a Moderate Islamic Organization, and its Democracy Rhetoric ........... 27 
2.4 Literature on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood ............................................................. 29 
2.5 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................ 30 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework ......................................................................... 32 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 32 
3.2 Key Terms and Concepts ................................................................................................. 32 
3.2.1 Social Movement Theory as Applied to Islamic Movements ..................................... 32 
3.2.2 Political Opportunity Structure ................................................................................... 38 
3.3 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................ 39 
Chapter 4: The History and Organization of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
(SMB) .......................................................................................................................... 41 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 41 
4.2 The Founding and Evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Ikhwan Al-Muslimin 
in Egypt .................................................................................................................................... 42 
4.2.1 Hassan Al-Banna and the Birth of the Organization ................................................... 43 
4.2.2 The Muslim Brotherhood under Gamal Abdul Nasser ............................................... 46 
4.2.3 The Nasser Suppression of the MB and the Radicalization of the Organization ........ 48 
4.2.4 The MB under Sadat ................................................................................................... 48 
4.2.5 The MB under Mubarak .............................................................................................. 50 
4.2.6 The Arab Spring and the Post-Revolutionary Period .................................................. 55 
4.3 The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria .................................................................................. 56 
4.3.1 Origin, Founding, and Connection with the Egyptian MB ......................................... 56 
4.3.2 The SMB, the Education System and the Colleges of Religious Studies in Syria ...... 59 
4.3.3 The SMB and Politics at the Time of Mustafa Al-Sibai ............................................. 60 
4.3.4 The SMB During the Baathist Era, 1963-1980 ........................................................... 63 
4.3.5 The SMB in the Post-Hama Era .................................................................................. 65 
4.4 The SMB in Europe .......................................................................................................... 66 
4.5 The SMB post-2011 and the Demise of the Egyptian MB: Lessons Learnt from the 
Egyptian Situation .................................................................................................................. 68 
4.6 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................ 74 
Chapter 5: The SMB’s Organizational Internal Discussions and Responses to the 
Syrian Crisis ............................................................................................................... 76 
5.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 76 
5.2 Organizational Discussions Surrounding the Syrian Uprising .................................... 79 
5.3 The SMB’s Internal Statutes pre-2011 ........................................................................... 80 
5.4 The SMB’s Internal Statutes post-2011 .......................................................................... 83 
5.5 The Modest ‘Fast Track’ Option versus a Reflective Change Option ........................ 94 
5.6 Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................... 109 
 6 
Chapter 6: Discursive and Behavioural Responses to the Syrian Uprising: Domestic 
Level .......................................................................................................................... 111 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 111 
6.2 The SMB’s Humanitarian Outreach and Social Service Activities ........................... 115 
6.3 The SMB’s Democracy and Rights Discourse ............................................................. 120 
6.4 The SMB and the Foundation of ‘Wa’ad’ Party: ‘The National Party for Justice and 
the Constitution’ (Hesb al Adala wa al Dustour) ................................................................ 137 
6.5 The SMB and the Non-State Brigades in Syria ........................................................... 156 
6.6 Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................... 160 
Chapter 7: The SMB’s Organizational, Discursive, and Behavioral Responses to the 
Syrian Crisis: Regional and International Level .................................................. 165 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 165 
7.2 The Syrian Regime and their Allies Fighting on Syrian Soil ...................................... 167 
7.2.1 The Shia Allies: The Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah ................................. 169 
7.2.2 The Russian Federation ............................................................................................. 172 
7.3 The Relationship between Russia, Iran, and the SMB ................................................ 176 
7.4 International Responses to the ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ ...................................... 178 
7.4.1 Human Rights Bodies, Humanitarian Organizations, and other NGOs .................... 178 
7.4.2 Responses from Western States ................................................................................ 184 
7.5 The Role of the SMB Within Political Opposition Bodies and their Engagement with 
the International Community .............................................................................................. 185 
7.5.1 The Syrian National Council ..................................................................................... 187 
7.5.2 The Syrian National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces ........... 189 
7.5.3 The Syrian Interim Government ............................................................................... 191 
7.6 The SMB and Regional and International Actors ....................................................... 192 
7.6.1 The Friends of Syria Group ....................................................................................... 192 
7.6.2 The Relationship Between Turkey and the SMB ...................................................... 194 
7.6.3 The Relationship between Arab Gulf States and the Muslim Brotherhood .............. 195 
7.6.4 The Future of the SMB in the Gulf Region ............................................................... 199 
7.6.5 The Relationship Between the USA and Western European Democracies, and the 
SMB ................................................................................................................................... 201 
7.7 Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................... 207 
Chapter 8: Conclusion ............................................................................................. 212 
9.0 References ........................................................................................................... 224 
Appendix1 Sample of Interview Questions ........................................................................ 238 
Appendix 2 ............................................................................................................................ 239 
Appendix 3 List of Interviewee ........................................................................................... 242 
 
  
 7 
List of Charts: 
Chart 1: Places were interviews were conducted. ............................................................ 18	
Chart 2: Intended interviews in percentage. .................................................................... 19	
Chart 3: Shows the conducted interviews from segments of the Syrian society ............. 21	
  
 8 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AI          Amnesty International 
CRM     Civil Rights Movement CRM 
DAESH Al Dawla al Islamia fe al Iraq wa al Sham  
EMB     Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
FOS       Friends of Syria Group 
FSA       Free Syrian Army 
HRW     Human Rights Watch 
ICM       International Constitutional Movement 
IDP        Internally Displaced Persons 
IRGC    The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
ISIL       Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
ISIS       Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
JIM        Joint Investigate Mechanism 
MB        Muslim Brotherhood 
NGO     Non- Governmental Organisation 
NCC     National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change  
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
SDF       Syrian Democratic Forces 
SMB      Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
SMT      Social Movement Theory 
SNHR    Syrian Network for Human Rights 
SIG        Syrian Interim Government 
SSNP    Syrian Social Nationalist Party  
SWP     Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik SWP. 
UNO     United Nations Organization 
Wa’ad   The National Party for Justice and the Constitution 
 
  
 9 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The “Arab Spring” of 2011 was fuelled by the uncontained emotions of the Arab people. 
Ordinary citizens and political organizations made calls for freedom of speech and 
dignity. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was active in this call for human rights from the 
onset (Al Jazeera, 2009). Considering their history of repression (Human Rights Watch, 
2010) coupled with their lack of governmental experience 1, the MB’s decision to enter 
unexplored political territory can be described as that of initiative and resolve. They 
entered the public arena by mobilizing major demonstrations throughout the streets, 
spreading nation-wide slogans after Friday prayers in numerous Arab states. Having 
observed these unprecedented region-wide events, Middle East analysts reported a direct 
correlation between the dramatic falling of the resistant autocratic Arab leaders and the 
political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
After protests broke out on March 15th 2011 (Telegraph, 2014), and following the events 
of Tunisia and Egypt, Syria was expected to follow the same pattern; Assad was thought 
to step down and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) was predicted to rise into the 
political limelight (Rafael Lefèvre, 2013). Though the SMB was an exiled organisation, 
non-existent in the public sphere for three decades, their re-awakened public appearances 
outside the country was an indication of their successful retention of organizational 
structure and grassroots support. It was thus thought to be inevitable that Assad’s 
expectedly imminent download would be swiftly followed by the SMB’s rise to political 
power.  
 
Seven years later, after continuous struggle and an exponentially deteriorating situation, 
the above predictions did not materialise. The revolution2, which once comprised of men 
and women peacefully protesting and children scribbling slogans on their school walls in 
Dara’a (Hanano, 2013), devolved into increasingly violent and complex clashes. The 
disproportionately violent response of the Syrian authorities catapulted the Syrian 
                                                
1 Although the Muslim Brotherhood has representatives in some parliaments, they rarely were considered 
the ruling party. 
2 The term ‘revolution’ is used by the SMB to describe the events occurring in Syria since 2011 and it is 
therefore appropriate for the same term to be used in this thesis. Different parties refer to the situation in 
Syria differently. The analysis of whether Syria is a civil war, revolution, war for independence, proxy 
war, or war on terror is outside the scope of this research.   
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uprising into an unprecedented humanitarian disaster - the most serious case witnessed 
since World War II (United Nations News Service, 2017).  
 
Despite strong criticism from Western nations, Syria's president Bashar al Assad did not 
halt his use of lethal force against his opponents (Deutsche Welle, 2011) . In attempt to 
demolish “terrorists” (The Independent, 16.10.2016), a term he assigned for the Syrian 
rebels, he began by utilizing his sniper forces; thereafter resorting to internationally 
prohibited barrel bombs (dpa/odg: SZ 2013); and most recently ordered the use of 
chemical weapons (McGregor, Aglionby, Carnegy 2013). The highly motivated, yet 
untrained, unorganized, and disunited Syrian youth would thus have no choice but to flee 
or remain and fight for the fall of the Assad regime.  
 
Numerous brigades formed as a result. Great numbers from the Syrian Arab Army 
defected and formed an umbrella rebel group by the name of the ‘Free Syrian Army’ 
(FSA) (Abouzeid, 2012). Alongside affiliated brigades, they showed willingness to 
reduce civilian casualties to the best of their ability (Fortin, 2012). However, over time 
the nature and ideology of rebel groups diversified; militarised and extremist Islamist 
groups formed such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) – also referred to as 
Daesh.3 Once they invaded large parts of “rebel-held” northern parts of Syria (Tuysuz et 
al., 2013), things took a turn for the worst. Due to the wide array for political ideologies 
fighting each other in such a convoluted manner, coupled with external support from 
supporting nations (Pierpet, 2013), it became difficult to envisage a peaceful end. 
Despite the non-violent nature of the initial protests, the Syrian people’s demands for 
reforms were met with brutal force (Lasensky and Woocher, 2011). As hope was lost for 
millions of Syrians civilians, there were mass attempts to flee into neighbouring 
countries (BBC News, 2014). While millions escaped, numerous foreign extremists 
entered and joined the battle (Westcott, 2015) . This volatile mix of events caused the 
mass migration and subsequent influx of Syrian refugees to be the major focus of both 
regional and global politics. A variety of domestic opponents, alongside Western 
supporters, created the ‘Friends of Syria’ (FOS) group (Al Jazeera, 2012). The Syrian 
regime continued to latch onto power. Nevertheless, stakeholders sketched out scenarios 
                                                
3 Daesh stands for: al-Dawla al-Islamiyyah fil Iraq wa al-Sham, which translates to ‘The Islamic State of 
Iraq and al-Sham’ – ISIS. 
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for the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Others devised power-sharing agreements, which could at 
least attempt to stop the inhumanities taking place (Rosiny 2013; SWP 2012; PILPG 
2012).   
 
External states with a vested interest in Syria chose a group on the ground to support in 
the hopes that said group would represent their interests in Syria in the future. However, 
the ‘Friends of Syria’ group did not show any intention to apply the UN’s 
‘Responsibility 2 Protect’ (R2P) regime as carried out in Libya (keeler, 2011). This 
dissent was primarily due to the Russian and Chinese veto at the UN Security Council 
(The Guardian, 2011). This global anti-interventionism created an opportunity both the 
Russian military and Iranian militias to step in to defend Assad’s regime, obtaining the 
biggest chunk of the Levant (Barfi, 2016). This brief analysis outlining the complexity of 
the situation conveys the urgency to develop a better understanding of the main actors 
involved in the on-going Syrian crisis. 
 
1.1 Research Objectives, Questions, and Contributions 
 
The issue of who represents the domestic opposition in Syria is one of the primary 
questions pertaining to the Syrian crisis. In early 2011, analysts looked to the SMB as 
noteworthy components of the opposition. In August 2011, the organization was 
recognized as the primary initiator behind the official formation of the oppositional 
Syrian National Council in Istanbul, Turkey (Al-Droubi,Vinna, 2014). This granted the 
SMB political prominence and media attention, in turn piquing interest amongst 
researchers and analysts alike. The history of the SMB was therefore studied in great 
detail, in particular the organization’s difficulties and path to survival (Lefèvre, 2013; 
Pierret, 2013; Hinnebush, 2012; Landis, 2012; Rubin, 2013; Khatib, 2013). However, 
most research has been observing the past, with little analysis towards the SMB’s 
reaction and development to the current Syrian crisis from 2011 onwards.  
 
Given the aforementioned political interests in the Syrian conflict and its main actors, 
this research is expected to generate academic and political interest by unearthing new 
empirical evidence regarding: 
 
1) The SMB’s internal decision-making 
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2) The SMB’s vision for a post-Assad Syria 
3) The SMB’s relationship within the Syrian opposition body 
4) The SMB’s interaction with crucial regional and external political actors  
 
These four primary signposts will act as the core premises throughout the research, 
guiding an in-depth analysis in order to answer the following question:  
 
How did the Syrian uprising impact the SMB, and how was the organization’s evolution 
as a socio-political player in domestic politics influenced by the on-going revolution on 
Syria’s ground?   
 
This case study is significant, not just due to the unique political opportunities that have 
subsequently arisen, but also due to the SMB’s tragic history; that of oppression and 
grievances as far back as the 1980s. It is firstly argued that the challenges the SMB had 
to overcome as an organization in exile have equipped both the executives as well as the 
regular members to deal with the challenges posed and opportunities opened by the 
Syrian crisis. Residing in a number of countries with varying backgrounds and political 
ideologies, from Arab states to Europe and the USA, they managed to adopt new 
organisational skills in the dynamic processes of political and economic transformation. 
It is further argued that the SMB Old Guard4 succeeded in maintaining the organization’s 
identity throughout the decades. The MB had a distinct hierarchical structure founded by 
Hassan Al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. It was extremely organised with a strong emphasis 
on grassroots development. This structure was only slightly adjusted by the SMB 
founder, Al-Sibai, in accordance to the Syrian circumstances in the mid 1940s. 
 
This research argues that the dynamics of the unprecedented Syrian humanitarian and 
political crisis shape the degree to which the SMB, an exiled organisation, is accepted or 
rejected by the local population. As such, it highlights why it is rather difficult for the 
SMB, as an exiled organisation, to attain prominence and power in the domestic scene. 
Other Brotherhood-linked organisations such as Egypt (See Chapter 4) and parties in 
                                                
4 The term old guard issued by academics alike Lefèvre to describe the SMB’s members of the executive 
board who have been in those positions over decades due to the existing hierarchical internal 
organizational system (See also Chapter 5) 
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other Arab countries were able to build upon decades of grassroots and political activism 
in their countries.  
 
Two further questions are posed: 1) after 30 years in exile, how did the SMB respond to 
the opportunities created by the Syrian uprising? 2) How did the SMB seek to reconnect 
with the Syrian people to gain traction as a leading political player? This study will 
demonstrate that after thirty years of negative and derogatory stereotyping, from school 
books to media channels, the primary, long-term challenge for the SMB will be to 
overcome the resentment and scepticism within Syrian civil society towards the group 
(Akraa, Killis, 2015; Al Bayanouni, Oxford, 2015; Hannoura, Killis, 2015; Salem, 
London, 2014). 
 
Moreover, this study reveals the SMB’s difficulty in achieving an international, or even 
broad regional, recognition as a political player; the SMB’s Islamic-based ideology has 
been questioned by global power states. Due to the wide spectrum of Islamic ideologies, 
the SMB found themselves outside the scope of acceptability from a variety of different 
groups and nations. They are deemed too moderate for the Wahhabi5-influenced Saudis, 
too Islamic for democratically-ruled Western states, too sectarian for the Shia-led Iranian 
Mullahs, and simply too religious for the broad scales of powerful political secularist 
actors such as Russia and China (The Guardian, 2016). This research highlights how and 
why these kaleidoscopic observations took the SMB by surprise, as they may have hoped 
that their socio-political and intellectual identity was used as a basis for potential 
partnerships amongst the opposition. 
 
Having analysed these two major obstacles, this research will also argue that those facts 
affected the organization’s internal understanding of how to efficiently and 
diplomatically handle these emerging multi-layered dynamics. The younger generation 
therefore demanded internal reforms, viewing the internal structure as inflexible, archaic, 
and out-dated. This study sheds further light on the organization’s internal decision-
making processes, which proved to be underdeveloped, forcing ordinary members to 
                                                
5 The term Wahabi belief or Wahabism is a narrow Islamic Sunni belief, which define Islam and Sharia 
law in a strict manner. The name Wahabism originated from its founder Mohamad ibn Abdel-Al Wahab 
(in the 18th century) who fought beside Mohamad ibn Saud to establish the today existing Islamic ruled 
Monarchy of Saudi Arabia. 
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devise plans and make decisions under time-restraints. Reform-oriented members thus 
applied pressure for constitutional reforms in order to react sufficiently to the 
dramatically changing dynamics on the ground.  
 
Building upon this analysis, this research will further assert that in such challenging 
periods, the SMB requires sustainable coordination of both social fabrics: The Old 
Guard’s ‘Wisdom’ and the youth’s dynamic vitality. Explanations are given as to why 
the SMB’s leadership nonetheless decided to postpone key steps towards internal 
reforms, as demanded by reformist sections within the membership. Eventually, it will 
be demonstrated that while the SMB leadership refused to instigate internal reforms, new 
paths have emerged for ordinary group members to engage in political, social, 
educational, and humanitarian initiatives, in turn strengthening the SMB’s ties within 
Syrian society.  
 
This study undertook qualitative research in the form of broad varied testimonial 
interviews. They outlined SMB’s initiative of founding and supporting small agricultural 
projects for rural communities or minor industrial plants. Such projects were intended to 
provide the families with products to cover sufficient nutrients for the communities’ 
daily survival. Due to instability on the ground, from Assad’s attacks to Russian 
airstrikes (The Guardian, 2016), the projects’ outcomes were limited. Moreover, 
questions arose as to how such projects would be financially sustained. Nonetheless, it 
demonstrates the SMB’s focus on healthcare through establishing fundamental medical 
commodities alongside equipped functioning surgeries.  
 
In the educational sector however, the SMB gained noteworthy traction, as they liaised 
with local councils to establish shelters for pupils in abandoned school-buildings. They 
developed those buildings into orphanages and day-care homes. With continuous 
supervision and professional care, these schools provided a first-hand curriculum for all 
levels of school attendees. As tens of thousands of children lost vital years of schooling 
6, it was in everyone’s best interest to provide for the children. The SMB were therefore 
granted permission to offer regular educational programs of varying levels for every age 
                                                
6 The Cost of War: Calculating the impact of the collapse of Syria’s education system on the country’s 
future - Save the Children https://static.guim.co.uk/ni/1427711553264/Save-the-Children-Cost-of-W.pdf 
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group. This developed to the extent that they were able to offer internationally 
recognised high school graduate certificates. 
 
This study further explores the SMB’s vision to set milestones for a post-Assad Syria. 
This in turn demonstrates an undeniably positive impact on the SMB’s relationship with 
the broader opposition, as well as its interaction with important regional and 
international political players. The research explains how these relations evolved and 
how they were shaped by a desire for greater recognition in both domestic and 
international politics. Efforts were made with powerful Arab Gulf states as well as 
possible allies in Turkey. Nevertheless, they fell short in securing positive relations with 
both pro-Assad Russia and anti-Assad Western democratic governments. 
 
By presenting an in-depth account of how the 2011 uprising shaped SMB governance 
structures and external relations, this research seeks to make a contribution to the broader 
theoretical debates in Social Movement Theory on the role and significance of 
opportunity structures. To understand the post-2011 revolution of the SMB, the political 
realities of the state opponents of the Arab world over last half century must be taken 
into consideration. Islamic movements dealt with political opportunity structures that 
were shaped by forms of authoritarianism of varying levels of tyranny. Therefore, any 
changes to the political determinants of Islamic activism were evolutionary at best. 
However, the ‘Arab Spring’ and the challenges to authoritarianism across the region 
presented Islamic movements with their first meaningful exposure to dramatic 
revolutionary change.  
 
This research will explore an empirically challenging concept forwarded by Wickham’s 
analysis, namely that: “Indeed...the portrayal of the mainstream Islamist actors as single-
mindedly bent on seizing power to achieve a set of fixed goals is a gross 
oversimplification - indeed a caricature - that cannot survive close empirical 
scrutiny”(Wickham, 2013). The thesis will therefore focus on the distinction of the 
unprecedented dynamic on Syria’s ground, as well as the regional and international 
political and military interventions in Syria that continue to challenge the exiled SMB 
movement. It encompasses the unique challenges of this organization as an Islamic 
social movement. It will focus upon how crisis-related dynamics influence the SMB’s 
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evolution as a social-political movement, rather than simply an ideological one. This will 
be covered by granting particular focus on the treatment of the SMB as an Islamic social 
movement throughout their exile until today. Multiple dimensions of change within the 
organization are outlined, especially in relation to their relationship with their nation’s 
civil society as well as their dealings with powerful global actors that continue to have a 
vested interest in the region. 
 
An essential part of this research examines the impact of each Brother’s7 individual 
circumstance in exile as well as the subsequent personal learning outcomes of those 
experiences. The analysis follows the history of the SMB as an Islamic social movement 
that primarily attracted intellectuals before its abolishment by Ba’athist law (Law No. 49 
introduced on the 7th of July 1980). The SMB was thereafter labelled a terrorist group, 
and members were stripped of their rights to live freely in Syrian civil society. Many 
SMB members were granted asylum for decades in both Arab and Western countries, 
successfully integrating into those societies(Fattah, 2006)8. The SMB were thus taken 
aback at the negative reaction of those countries following the current uprising. The 
history of the SMB and its relationship with the international community is therefore a 
crucial part of this study.  
 
While maintaining the importance of studying Islamic movements from afar, given their 
complex nature, a large part of this research is based on empirical data collected directly 
from interviews with key stakeholders from within the SMB and from beyond its ranks. 
In-depth information has been gathered in order to explore whether or not the SMB has 
been able to remobilize the urban people. However, the conducted interviews have also 
shed light on the question of whether the Brothers have been able to step forward and fill 
the much-disappointed and clearly underprivileged rural population. Primary methods 
include supplying ad hoc relief and addressing long-term matters which the Assad 
regime previously enjoyed a monopoly over, such as education. This has been upheld as 
an important addition to this study as it appeared to have provided the Syrian Brothers 
with the capability to deal with a variety of upcoming challenges during the revolution. 
 
                                                
7 An official member of the Muslim Brotherhood is called a “Brother” 
8	Many SMB leaders were living in Europe 
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1.2 Research Design and Methodology 
 
This research is comprised of a single case study – the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. 
Findings are comprised of a range of primary and secondary resources collated between 
2013 and 2017. The core analysis is based on broad data collection gathered through 
more than 40 semi-structured interviews. Interviews were not held with people inside 
Syria or in restricted refugee camps due to security concerns and required authorisations 
from relevant host governments. Given that the situation in Syria changed dramatically 
post 2011, it became questionable whether the internal statues of the SMB is still fit for 
purpose since its founding. Thus, the aim is to contribute through primary research to the 
on-going academic discussion about the SMB as a network of members and as an 
Islamic social movement. This is vital as in analysing “Islamist Social Movements”, 
Wiktorowicz noted that “[P]ress reports, organizational charts, and secondary material 
are often insufficient for delineating and studying these networks” (Wiktorowicz, 2004). 
 
Resources at the University of Leeds have been utilised, such as the academic connection 
with the Syrian Brotherhood and other Syrian oppositional actors. Fluency in the Arabic 
language and a strong knowledge of the Syrian culture facilitated the ability to conduct 
interviews in a suitable environment. Not requiring a translator for interviews accelerated 
progress in interviewing Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leaders, spokesmen, and influential 
and widely recognized members within the organization. Knowledge of Islamic tradition 
further facilitated the interview process, as religious requirements were catered to, such 
as prayer times or special occasions (Ramadan, Eid, and so on).  
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Chart 1: Places were interviews were conducted. 
An in-depth understanding of Syrian history in general, and the history of the SMB in 
particular, were appreciated and respected, thereby facilitating openness and 
transparency. These interviews were invaluable in conveying the political vision of the 
SMB not only to international actors, but also to the Syrian people themselves. In order 
to get the widest possible perspective, interviews were conducted in a number of 
different locations where key stakeholders reside. This also addressed the issue of travel 
restrictions some respondents had, due to lack of visa permits as an example.  
 
14% 
45% 
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9% 
9% 
110	INTERVIEWS	(Areas)
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Chart 2: Intended interviews in percentage. 
The research participants have been carefully selected. The approach has three parallel 
paths. The first set of respondents were selected by virtue of them making appearances in 
publications about SMBs or other Syrian oppositions and intellects who either have been 
living inside Syria, but left post 2011 or who have been for years /or decades living in 
exile. The second path involved identifying popular Syrian respondents by visiting 
webpages of newly formed Syrian organizations, mostly NGOs or bloggers , as well as 
the webpage of the SMB organization and political parties. The third path involved 
building upon existing personal connections to Arab journalists, human rights lawyers, 
and prominent Syrian activists in Europe. This was done either by being introduced 
personally at scheduled meetings or lectures in the UK ie .in London, Manchester or in 
Turkey i.e. in Gaziantep. However, through a snowball effect, after providing the 
intended participants with information about my personal background as well as the aim 
and the institution of this research, eventually a wide network of connections were 
formed.  Leaders of the SMB, as well as spokesmen and general members of both 
genders has been identified and contacted. Many of those belonged to groups of different 
diverse background both ideological and ethnical.  Through this access, numerous SMB 
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acceptance form and 
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executives were interviewed in UK, Austria and in Turkey, showing no objection. Such 
transparency proved to be key in achieving a holistic understanding of the situation. 
Younger SMB members were also interviewed, mostly during conferences or lectures in 
Turkey. Over thirty of the interviewees from this segment demonstrated a positive 
attitude towards this research, with no hesitation to take part in it. Other participants 
requested anonymity; primarily due to their serious concerns of safety and treatment of 
their families under the Assad regime. Others were living in countries that do not hold a 
positive attitude towards the SMB.  
 
In order to achieve a holistic and balanced approach, one third of the interviews were 
conducted with other than SMB opposition figures such as, commentators, academics, 
and intellectuals of the Syrian civil society (see semi-structured questionnaire 
appendices). Not all information obtained was a result of formal interviews, were 
participants had to sign certain forms, the research gained great insights from questions 
and discussions at quite informal private invitations, gatherings, or even Ramadan 
Breakfasts. Informal consent was obtained with regards to all information, as it is also 
been built upon mutual trust (see for example appendix 2). This trust lead to valuable 
deep and insider perception eventually leading to the research significant findings 
regarding the SMB’s evolution through revolution.  
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Chart 3: Shows the conducted interviews from segments of the Syrian society 
 
All interviews conducted are based on the University of Leeds’s guidelines for ethical 
research. Approval has been sought and granted from the AREA Faculty Research Ethics 
Committee. All interviews with above-mentioned research participants were conducted 
to the principles of good practice and integrity adopted by the University of Leeds. The 
ethical issues identified in this research pertain first and foremost to the safety and 
wellbeing of the research participants. To ensure this, a number of precautions were 
taken: 
 
First, all interviews were conducted on a voluntary basis. During the interview process, 
the interviewees were not persuaded or urged to answer any of the questions. The 
interviews were terminated as soon as the subject requested. Second, the research 
SMB Executives 
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General SMB 
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14%
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Islamists
18%
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participants were informed, in full, as to the nature and relevance of this research. Their 
involvement was explained before commencing the interview, and a written synopsis of 
the research and its aims was given to them prior to the interview. Furthermore, they 
were requested to sign a participant consent form with their own duplicate copies. Third, 
hard copies of the interview questions were sent prior to the interview in order to ensure 
that they are comfortable with the content. Fourth, if the participant requested to stay 
anonymous, procedures have been put in place in both the research and the to anonymize 
the interviewee. Those will be kept in confidential records. Fifth, as agreed by the AREA 
committee at the University of Leeds, in the case of any politically sensitive issues that 
have risen or might arise throughout the circumstances in Syria concerning the 
participant’s personal safety or his/her family members, the interview will be treated 
with extra care and awareness. The person concerned will be anonymized upon the 
research participant’s request. 
 
Nevertheless, there have indeed been a number of challenges in conducting this research 
that needed to be overcome. First, coordinating meetings with subjects in various 
countries over three years required careful planning. Interviews were conducted in the 
UK (London, Oxford, Manchester, and Leeds), but also in Turkey (Istanbul, Gaziantep, 
and Killis). In order to succeed, discipline and precise schedules were imperative. 
Efficient travel plans were needed to limit travel times and reduce expenses, which were 
self-financed. Second, though interviews with leaders, elites, and numerous members of 
different levels the Syrian society were conducted on the ground in Arabic, translating 
and reflecting those interviews into English in a professional manner has been an equally 
time-consuming task.  
 
Most notably, the biggest obstacle to this research project has been the rapid and 
unpredictable changing political dynamic in Syria as well as the international 
community. As a result, at several instances, the analysis was adapted and reconsidered, 
especially as the role of the SMB in the revolution continued to evolve. The focus of the 
study begins in 2011, the start of the uprising. Since then, a number of significant events 
forced the focus of the study to change or else face inapplicability. Such examples 
include Russian military intervention, the election of Trump, the appearance of ISIS, the 
creation of an interim government, and the disappearance of some armed groups. All of 
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these changes had a significant impact on the SMB, whether directly or indirectly. 
Following the conflict closely was therefore vital to efficiently adapt the thesis while 
maintaining a structured approach. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
  
The above-mentioned issues have been interwoven in a manner that facilitates the 
understanding the Syrian situation post-2011 through the lens of the SMB. This has been 
done by contextualising the present situation through the events of the last thirty years. 
The future of the SMB is also discussed, as the organization continues to be relevant. 
This carefully chosen approach delves into the SMB’s position on domestic, regional, 
and international socio-political issues. Within some sub-topics of this research, a 
broader theoretical framework of Social Movements applicable to the SMB was recalled 
in order to further understand how grassroots movements lead themselves into powerful 
political organizations.  
 
In order to build on already existing material while creating an original contribution, 
Chapter 2 conducts a thorough literature review of social movements in the MENA 
region, with a focus on those movements with an Islamic reference. This then sets the 
scene for Chapter 3, which examines the theoretical framework that will be applied to 
the study of the SMB as a social, religious, and political actor. To understand the present 
dynamics of the SMB, both locally within Syria and internationally, it was important not 
to overlook its history. Chapter 4 therefore briefly analyses the founding of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, the original Brotherhood. This helped contextualise the formation 
of the SMB which transpired thereafter in Syria. It highlighted the ‘Hama massacre’ of 
1982 (SHRC, 2006) as a crucial turning point for the SMB, as it led to the exile of most 
of its members followed by their asylum in Europe.  
 
Chapter 5, 6, and 7 then constitute the empirical heart of the research. Chapter 5 draws 
on a series of in-depth interviews with key actors from within the SMB alongside figures 
outside the SMB in order to study the group’s internal discussions and response to the 
Syrian crisis. As such, this chapter explores all the basic elements of the SMB’s internal 
statutes, followed by a critical analysis of its post-2011 applicability. This is an essential 
procedure for its internal decision-making process. As a result, two potential 
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organizational schemes have been identified to offer an alternative, a fast track option for 
members to join and/or changing the organisation’s form into an NGO.   
 
Chapter 6 then focuses on the SMB’s behavioural responses to the Syrian uprising on the 
domestic level. It explains in detail the SMB’s humanitarian outreach and social service 
activities, attesting to their humanitarian commitment towards their fellow Syrians. The 
chapter also establishes that the social and humanitarian work of the SMB was not the 
only procedure by which they were appreciated in the minds of the Syrian people, but 
that they engaged in a broad range of political activities. The most notable of such 
activities was the launching of the Wa’ad Party in order to advance the SMB’s 
democracy and rights discourse in Syria. It further illustrates how the SMB, by focusing 
on substantial political options for the future of Syria, clearly outline their views against 
establishing non-state brigades in Syria.  
 
Moving beyond Syria, Chapter 7 focuses on the response of the SMB at the regional and 
international level. This is done by indicating how the Syrian regime and its international 
allies reacted to the 2011 Syrian youth uprising. International politicians’ responses will 
be cited, as will humanitarian organizations’ reports and UN statements. Further, this 
chapter will present the SMB within the wider realm of opposition politics in Syria. It 
will illustrate why the SMB have no possibility of accreditation from both regional and 
international powers. Though the organization portrays itself as a political organization 
with self-embodied democratic visions, it nonetheless represents an Islamic ideology 
with strong sharia undertones. It therefore will not be recognized as a partner in the 
political landscape. As a result, the powerful stakeholders in Syria have a significant role 
in deciding the Brother’s political fate. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes the analysis, highlighting the distinct and exceptional journey of the 
SMB. It reviews the socio-political challenges the SMB faced as an organization, 
illustrating the opportunities granted to SMB members to bridge the gap with Syrian 
civil society after decades in exile. The chapter then summarises the group’s evolution 
throughout the Syrian revolution, noting that it could still be described as a ‘success 
story’ of sorts. After highlighting the plight of the SMB members for over thirty years, 
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the research concludes that their achievement of not only remaining relevant but acting 
as major players in the revolution is a noteworthy feat. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 analysed the literature surrounding social movements, which forms the basis 
of this study. It explained concepts that are essential to understanding the SMB’s 
commitment to the cause, as well as its recent evolution. This chapter aims to explore the 
literature surrounding the SMB. It also aims to fill some of the gaps in the existing 
literature regarding Muslim organizations in general, and the SMB in particular, by 
offering a detailed account of how movements such as the SMB react to revolutionary 
upheavals and are shaped by them. The following review will explain more clearly the 
research aims of this study. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first explores publications regarding the 
MB as a socio-political force, which have aimed to examine the organization’s historical, 
social, and political impact around the world (excluding Syria). The second section 
analyzes the existing literature discussing the SMB’s moderate Islamic ideology and its 
democratic agenda. Finally, the third section presents the literature surrounding the SMB 
as an Islamic organization, showing that much of the literature thus far on this topic has 
focussed on the SMB’s survival following the Hama Massacre of 1982. Particular 
attention will be paid to the literature discussing the SMB’s role in the Syrian uprising 
post-2011. The concluding sub-chapter will summarize the findings and the potential 
benefits of this research, including its closing of the knowledge gap regarding the SMB’s 
structure and its role as a socio-political force throughout the Syrian revolution. 
 
2.2 The Muslim Brotherhood as a Socio-Political Actor 
 
Academics have demonstrated a keen interest in the MB since Hassan Al-Banna founded 
the Islamic social movement in 19289 (Commins, 2006; Hamzawy and Brown, 2010; 
Kramer, 2011; Mitchell and Voll, 1993; Pargeter, 2010; Weismann, 1993, 2005) . The 
repression, persecution, and execution of prominent MB members in Egypt was of 
particular interest following the rise to power of Gamal Abdel Nasser and his militaristic 
                                                
9 Richard Mitchell called the organization a “society” (Mitchell, 1969).  
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regime in 1952 (S. Cook, 2013). In the early 1990s, as will be shown Chapter 4, a large 
body of social scientists begun analysing Islamic movements in general across the Arab 
world. 
 
The Arab Spring of 2011 led to a renewed focus on the region, with most scholars 
focussing on identifying its causes and how social media allowed it to progress (Filieu, 
2011; Gerlach, 2011; Gelwin, 2012; Krämer, 2011; Ramadan, 2012; Ramadan, 2013; 
Perthes, 2011). This study aims to explore the SMB’s role in the Syrian uprising, as well 
the effects that the Syrian uprising had on the SMB as an organization and a socio-
political force. By doing so, this research aims to add to existing literature on the topic, 
including Krämer’s (2010) biography of Hassan Al-Banna, the MB’s founder, and 
Zollner’s (2013) biography of Al-Hodaibi, who is often viewed as being a controversial 
MB leader. Thus, this research aims to further the work of those who have begun to 
focus on the changes in structure, aims, activities, and public discourses of the MB and 
its affiliates across the Arab world (Browers 2009; Krämer, 2011; Zollner, 2011; Bush, 
2012; Drieger, 2010). 
 
Some scholars have attempted to explain how the MB’s branches have survived as 
‘clandestine’ organizations within their home countries (Metzger, 2011). The SMB 
utilized the experience and resources that they gained whilst in exile to re-establish 
themselves as a socio-political force in post-2011 Syria. Landis (2012) and Rubin (2007; 
2010) have explored the case of the SMB, but they have not provided an in-depth 
analysis of its evolution in the context of the Syrian revolution - something this study 
aims to do. 
 
2.3 The SMB, as a Moderate Islamic Organization, and its Democracy Rhetoric 
 
To understand the SMB’s evolution throughout the Syrian crisis, as well as its ability to 
handle challenges, the MB’s dogma and principles need to first be examined. John O. 
Voll and claim that, from a global perspective, the efforts of Muslims to develop viable 
forms of Islamic democracy could have a huge impact on the globe with the introduction 
of democratic Islamic institutions. Wolf (2008) states that the MB, as an Islamic 
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organization, makes use of democratic discourse in one way or another. In many cases, 
they have taken part in election campaigns and have contested parliamentary seats. 
 
A difference of opinion exists regarding the motives of this participation in elections, and 
regarding why MB-affiliated organizations are so often successful in Arab countries 
when they do take part. Gudrun Krämer (2010) links the success of Islamic organizations 
in elections directly to their abilities to address the “demand for actions and the 
perceived need to reach some kind of accommodation with the authorities.” The MB’s 
reputation hinges primarily on a long track record of providing social services to citizens 
where governments have failed to do so. There is limited research that has focussed on 
the MB’s integration into the transiently open political arenas of a number of Arab 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s. A growing number of comparative studies have also 
focussed on the MB as an Islamic political party, or on their members as independent 
MPs. Many authors have investigated how the MB and its affiliates have managed to 
join election-orientated political parties (Brown and Hamazawy, 2010; Clark, 2006; 
Langohr, 2001; Ozzano, and Cavatorta, 2013). 
 
In Syria, the regime has openly repressed the SMB; membership of the SMB was 
sufficient to legally incur the death penalty. Therefore, the SMB faced greater challenges 
than their counterparts in other Arab countries. Studies examining the MB’s structure 
and its strategies of civil engagement may offer clues to help understand the SMB’s 
choices post-2011. Though direct comparisons are difficult to make, this research will 
frequently draw on the recent experiences of the MB in other Arab countries, including 
their remarkable rise and fall within the space of one year in Egypt (Wickham, 2013; 
Zahid, 2012; Zollner, 2013; Landis, 2013; Hinnebush, 2013; Ruby, 2013). This is 
essential because, as the analysis will show, the SMB has been paying close attention to 
the actions – and their consequences – of their MB counterparts in other Arab countries. 
 
As well as discussing the SMB’s effect on post-crisis Syria and post-crisis Syria’s effect 
on the SMB, this study also aims to contribute to the debates surrounding how 
governmental actions in Arab countries push MB-affiliated organizations towards 
moderation or radicalization. The analysis in this study shows that this question is not 
easily answerable in the case of Syria due to the SMB’s exile for three decades. This 
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exile meant that the SMB did not interact with local institutions in the same way other 
MB organizations did, and so its exact stances during this time, as well as the Syrian 
population’s past opinion of it, is difficult to gauge. 
 
Kraetzschmar et al. (2013) detail the types and dynamics of cooperation amongst 
opposition groups in response to regime actions ranging from inclusion and tolerance to 
outright repression. Kraetzschmar et al. (2013) show that: “the myriad of ways in which 
opposition groups have sought to coalesce into broader reform coalitions” has challenged 
the governments of both monarchical (e.g. Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco) and republican 
(e.g. Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen) regimes, pressuring them into democratic reform. 
This pressure has included electoral pacts, local government coalitions, broader 
opposition alliances, and networks of resistance. 
 
Schwedler’s (2006; 2007; 2011) in-depth research into the internal decision-making 
processes of Islamic movements has shown how political participation has made the MB 
more moderate in monarchical Jordan, but more radical in republican Yemen. The 
political climate in Syria is a lot less benign that that of the slowly liberalizing Arab 
autocracies of the 1990s and early 2000s. However, the research on cross-ideological 
cooperation amongst opposition groups is still largely relevant when discussing the SMB 
post-2011. 
 
2.4 Literature on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
 
Until 2012, there was little published work shedding light on the SMB. The SMB’s 
evolution post-2011 differed hugely from that of their counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia. 
Compared to other MB organizations, the SMB, until the recent Syrian crisis, had 
received little attention. International and Arab think tanks and analysts are now 
investigating how the SMB emerged as the most influential organization within the 
Syrian National Coalition, despite having been exiled for three decades (GIGA, 2013; 
United States Institute of Peace, 2013; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2013; Carnegie 
Endowment 2013; Rosiny, 2013; Lefèvre, 2013). Some authors have already begun to 
predict what is to happen following the fall of the Assad regime, and the role the SMB 
could play in the aftermath (Heydemann et al., 2013). Analysing the SMB’s actions 
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whilst bearing in mind its unique structure and traits will serve to provide new insights to 
the situation in this analysis. 
 
Hinnebush (2012) mentions that Islamic organizations are able to use religion to attain 
power. He argues that this is true in Syrian society because the majority of the Syrian 
population are devout Muslims. Lefèvre (2013) delineates the obstacle-ridden historical 
path of the SMB, as well as in-depth details regarding its founding leaders, structure, and 
the framework of its political activities; he claims that they are preparing for a comeback 
following their expulsion from Syria after the 1982 Hama Massacre by Hafez and Rifaat 
Al-Assad. Pierret (a2013, b2013) uses a different approach to explain the SMB’s 
position within Syria. He examines the historic relationship between the Sunni Ulama 
(religious scholars) and the Ba’ath Party, which has been governing Syria since 1963. He 
recognizes the SMB as being the most important, contemporary, organized, Islamic 
social movement, and he maps their historic path throughout the political power struggle 
with the autocratic Syrian regime. 
 
Some analysts argue that due to the fact that the SMB functioned as an opposing body to 
the Syrian regime whilst in exile, their actions need to be viewed with an understanding 
of domestic/regional politics in mind (Abdul-Ahad, 2013; Hassan, 2013; Heydemann, 
2013; Landis, 2014; Rosiny, 2013). Their analyses take into consideration the influence 
of well-known, wealthy regional actors, such as the rulers of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, on 
the SMB. Other authors have analysed the Shia Iranian government and the Lebanon-
based ‘Hezbollah’ fighters’ support of the Alawites in Syria, including their supplying of 
war machines and logistics experts to the Assad regime (Shanahan, 2013). However, no 
peer-reviewed publication has covered the relationships that existed between Western 
powers and the exiled SMB. 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Very little research has been carried out to unravel the structure and analyse the 
behaviour of the SMB. Much published literature discusses the Egyptian MB, and the 
small amount that does discuss the SMB focuses primarily on their historical rise to 
power and their relationships with regional powers. Post-2011, however, there has been a 
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large increased in the volume of published literature regarding the SMB, acknowledging 
its regional influence despite its exiled status. 
 
Syria’s current crisis is unique in many ways, bringing with it unprecedented challenges 
and opportunities. No published papers studying the SMB’s evolution throughout this 
crisis were found. This study aims to adopt a novel perspective for analysing the SMB. 
By providing a focussed and structured analysis of the SMB post-2011, it is hoped that 
its regional and international activities, internal structure, and decision-making process 
will be elucidated, as well as the demands placed upon it and its plans for the future. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The term ‘social movement’ is defined as the voluntary and deliberate effort of 
organizing individuals to work as a group to make a change in society. According to 
Denton Morrison, “social mobilization involves two steps: consensus mobilization and 
action mobilization” (Morrison, 1971). Social movements are seen as power-oriented as 
opposed to participation-oriented. This means that the actions of a movement’s members 
serve the movement’s wider goals, which may not necessarily benefit the individual 
member (Morrison, 1971). 
The current literature on Islamic movements does not fully appreciate the complexity of 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB). This complexity allows researchers to broaden 
the study of these types of organizations. Therefore, there is a need for a study that 
analyses the SMB in an appropriate theoretical framework. Using the social movement 
theory (SMT) defined above, this study will analyse how the SMB has operated and 
achieved popularity with the Syrian people.  
3.2 Key Terms and Concepts  
3.2.1 Social Movement Theory as Applied to Islamic Movements  
 
The social movement theory (SMT) provides an appropriate framework to study the 
SMB. The available literature on Islamic movements has allowed this theory to analyse, 
for example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Palestine, and Jordan (Munson, 2001; 
Robinson, 2004; Sohrabi, 2002) . However, the application of this theory on the SMB is 
sparse in the literature. The need to analyse the SMB in this way is vital, especially 
following the 2011 revolution. This section will present why the SMT is a more 
appropriate theoretical approach to this issue as opposed to other frameworks like 
‘rational choice’ or ‘structuralism’(Lindenberg, 1995). Francis Robinson argues that 
using the SMT to analyse Islamic movements allows a balanced approach when 
evaluating instances of their contentious collective action (Robinson, 2004). This 
provides a middle ground between the rational choice and structuralism schools of 
analysis. Both rational choice and structuralism analyse social movements differently. 
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Two important factors distinguish these two frameworks: their unit of analysis, and the 
level of volunteerism acknowledged.  
In explaining collective action, structuralism studies large units in order to understand 
large outcomes such as a social revolution. These large units may include states or even 
the international political system. A change in these units can result in ‘revolutionary 
violence’. Structuralism studies these changes by looking at dependency models as well 
as the impacts of globalization on collective revolutionary violence (Wallerstein, 1989). 
In her book States and Social Revolutions, Theda Skocpol provides a comparative 
analysis of revolutions that have occurred in France, Russia, and China (Skocpol, 1979) 
.Skocpol argues that the factors that bring about social revolutions are few and 
predictable. This is the same for the pathways that these revolutions follow (Little, 
2014). Despite this, Skocpol acknowledges the complexities of Islamic movements after 
witnessing the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s. Several components of the Iranian 
Revolution as well as its causal factors did not fit Skocpol’s argument of the 
predictability of social revolutions. Skocpol thus labels this significant event in Iran’s 
history as “a sort of a social revolution” (Skocpol, 1979). 
The rational choice theory differs from structuralism in that it uses the individual as a 
unit of analysis. Unlike structuralism, it does not view groups, states, and systems as 
decision makers. It is only up to individuals to make the choices that affect a collective 
action such as a revolution (Popkin, 1979).The unit of analysis used in the SMT is the 
social movement group itself. The theory views the individual as a part of the group that 
makes decisions in dynamic contexts and political networks (Davis et al., 2005). At the 
same time, the theory recognizes the importance of the large structures in which the 
movement operates. It also recognizes that changes to these structures can create the 
conditions that allow for a collective action. In Syria – and the Middle East in general – 
communities and family relations play an important part in individual perceptions of 
political movements (Hopwood, 2013). It is therefore important to study social 
movements through the lens of both structural changes as well as individuals that act 
within these changes. In other words, “not all similar structural changes lead to similar 
political outcomes; how groups take advantage of change is critical to understanding the 
difference in outcomes”. Thus, the SMT becomes an appropriate framework to utilize 
when investigating Islamic movements such as the SMB.  
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The second factor in distinguishing sociological frameworks is the level of volunteerism 
considered. Structuralism does not view volunteerism as significant in contributing to 
large political changes: “No single acting group, whether a class or an ideological 
vanguard, deliberately shapes the complex and multiply determined consists that bring 
about revolutionary crises and outcomes”. On the other hand, the rational choice school 
of thought views volunteerism as an important part of bringing about collective action 
and subsequent structural changes (Goldstone 1994).  
The SMT strikes a balance between these two opposing frameworks. It states that, while 
structural changes occur outside the control of individuals, they do not dictate its 
outcomes. The theory acknowledges the importance of individual agency. However, this 
agency is restricted within the dynamic social context in which it develops  (Berejikian, 
1992). The SMT thus accepts the importance of volunteerism in promoting collective 
action (Wiktorowicz, 2001) Chapter 4 will explore the value of volunteerism in 
attracting people to Islamic movements like the SMB.  
Throughout this study, the SMT will be used as a framework to analyse the SMB. Three 
variables from this theory will be used. The first of these variables is the analysis of the 
impact of structural changes on collective action. Changes in political opportunity 
structures arise from different sources. These include changes in international political 
systems, regional regime changes, national legal changes, or within the group itself (Mati 
et al., 2016). Post-2011, Syria witnessed all these changes to an extent. This led to the 
appearance of new political opportunities. This study will explore how the SMB seized 
these political opportunities in a structurally changed Syria. 
The second variable from the SMT focuses on the mobilizing structures used by the 
group being studied. These structures can be mobilized in three ways: through informal 
(e.g. social and family networks), formal (e.g. political parties), or illegal channels (e.g. 
underground terrorist organizations). Social movements recruit like-minded individuals 
through one or more of these channels. Doing so allows them to mobilize contentions in 
a population while solving the free rider problem (Robinson, 2004). However, it must be 
noted that the legality of mobilizing structures differs between Arab and Western 
nations. In Syria, for example, formal mobilizing structures such as political parties were 
outlawed under both Assad regimes. Prior to Hafiz Al-Assad’s regime, however, they 
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were considered legal. Using the above terms to categorize mobilizing structures might 
thus present a challenge when evaluating the SMB.  
The third variable from the SMT is the use of ‘cultural framing’. This variable is not 
used in either the structuralism or the rational choice frameworks. Cultural framing 
highlights the importance of culture in shaping the ideology of a movement and its 
members. Every society’s cultural toolbox contains a variety of stories, symbols, and 
histories (Swidler, 1986). This toolbox is used to construct a set of values which may 
then be interpreted differently by different groups. For example, complete subservience 
to a governor is considered a cultural and religious imperative by some religious groups 
in the Middle East. This notion was promoted by many regimes in the Arab world – 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria – to deter their people from protest (Al-Alawi, 2011). The 
idea of obeying unjust or incompetent governance was challenged by countless 
oppositional movements during the Arab Spring, including those with Islamic ideologies 
like the SMB (Talhamy, 2012).  
In summary, the SMT is an appropriate theory to study contentious collective action by 
the SMB. It stands as a middle ground between the structuralism and rational choice 
schools of thought. The SMT uses groups as its unit of analysis, while acknowledging 
that volunteerism contributes to collective action to an extent. This theory is criticized 
for lacking the accuracy and clarity of the other schools of thought. Nevertheless, it still 
provides a useful tool to robustly analyse contentious collective action (Csecsődi, 2013).  
 
The choice of SMT is informed by two broader considerations: First, social movement 
theory has increasingly been accepted among social scientists as an effective theoretical 
lens for dealing with Islamic movements which have received considerable academic 
and media attention. This is not withstanding the fact that some such as Mejjer’s have 
concerns that those movements “[yet] have been so little understood” (Meijer, 2005; 
p:279). Second, by choosing this popular lens the research could present an important 
contribution by increasing the chance of making the findings of the SMB’ evolution, 
relevant for those scholars more interested in broader regional or even global 
comparisons. The benefits of bringing together SMT and the study of Islamic 
movements are twofold: First, scholars of Islamic movements (e.g. Bayat, 2005; Secor, 
2001; Wiktorowicz, 2004) have recognized the contribution this theoretical lens can 
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make towards ensuring a broader academic rigour and wider academic relevance of the 
remarkable increasing number of studies of Islamic movements. While theory building is 
in and of itself not an objective of this research, Wiktorowicz (2004) has rightly pointed 
out that the tendency of many applications of SMT to Western contexts does limit the 
potential for further theory development. In short, by applying SMT this research of the 
`SMB set apart from the descriptive and/or historical analysis of the SMB offered by 
other academics, alike Lefèvre, Khattib, or Perrier; and instead intends to use a path 
which, according to Roel Meijer (2005), may be used to produce original, “brilliant 
insights” into how contentious politics play themselves out in a Muslim majority 
political context.  
 
As acknowledged above, the challenge for this analysis’ use of SMT has been the fact 
that SMT scholars like Charles Tilly, Dough McAdam, and Sidney Tarrow in the United 
States and later on Hans-Peter Kriesi and Bert Klandermans in Europe designed this 
theory in the context of Western societies (Meijer, 2005; p:280). Yet, Karl- Dieter Opp 
insists that while SMT might have originally been formulated in the context of studying 
specific groups or types of individuals, “like the peace, environmental, anti-nuclear and 
civil rights movements” (Opp, 2009; p:40) it has the potential to “capture a rather wide 
class of very specific esplanade” (Opp, 2009; p:44).  
 
At first thought, this research chose to follow the well-established SMT mainly adopted 
by Tilly (1994, 1995a) and by Mc Adam, Mc Carthy, and Zald, (1996a) which has had a 
significant impact synthesizing the academic’s knowledge for three decades. This 
decision was made as this theoretical framework is applying political opportunities, 
mobilizing, and cultural framings which should be able to explain the phenomenon of the 
post 2011 public reappearance of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) as an Islamic 
Social Movement in exile and the dynamics challenging the organization’s evolution, 
like the on-going revolution, in its home country. Yet, carefully consulting the criticism 
stated by Jeff Goodwin’s and James M. Jasper’s “Rethinking Social Movements” 
(Goodwin and Jasper, 2004), the research will not just follow the dominant theoretical 
structural approach, which emphasizes four main enquiries: a) economic resources, b) 
political structures, c) formal organizations and finally d) social networks. However, 
these four variables have not been systematically applied to the SMB, but “extract[ing] 
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certain mechanism and processes from the existing theory, rather than to adopt[ing] the 
theory as whole’ following Tilly’s recommendation (Tilly in Wictorowicz 2004, 
foreword).  In addition, as this research will focus on the ideological, organizational, and 
operational character of the SMB with an expanded cultural and constructionist 
approach. This approach explains four further variables in SMT: frames. Identities, 
meanings, and also emotions which has been based by realistically examining the 
“Theoretical turmoil among analysts of social movements” (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004; 
vii).  
 
More fundamentally, the application of SMT can also help overcome some of the major 
problems with Western analysis of Middle Eastern and Muslim politics, which is the 
emphasis on Islam as a possible explanatory factor. By studying the cohesion, ideas and 
actions of Islamic movements through the lens of SMT (Bayat, 2005), academics can 
produce an insightful analysis of political mobilization (Secor, 2001) that does not fall 
into the trap of Orientalist reductionism and opens the door toward understanding any 
Islamic movement as a “dynamic movement without focusing on Islam as the determine 
factor” (Meijer, 2005; p:287). Therefore, this research is intending to strengthen Meijer’s 
aspect in creating a more neutral, unbiased set of theoretical tools through analysing the 
dynamics and evolution of the SMB throughout the revolution. In providing an analysis 
of implied essential elements of contention that exceed the specificity of “Islam” as a 
system of meaning, identity, and basis of collective action” (Wiktorowicz ,2004; p:3), it 
will indicate the dynamic, the process, and the framing of the Islamic movement’s 
organization. This outcome could support further researches to avoid mere labelling, 
which so often is a trend in the research on the Islamic movements (Kurzmann, 2004; 
Meijer, 2005).  
 
The research benefits from already existing deep inside knowledge on the SMB, which 
will contribute towards broadening the theoretical applicability of the SMT. In addition, 
it is in line with Quintan Wiktorowicz’s evaluation of empirical research on social 
movements, (originating in the context of democratic and basically liberal societies) 
which he regards as limited in the “generalizability of findings and conclusion” 
(Wiktorowicz 2004, p:4), as well as it hopes to match with Anna Secor’s prospect that 
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“[A]s a result we may come closer to understanding the complexity of the role of Islamic 
movement play, both locally and globally” (Secor, 2001; p:130). 
 
 
3.2.2 Political Opportunity Structure 
 
Professor of sociology Doug McAdam observes that collective action is constructed on 
available political opportunities: “Social movements and revolutions are shaped by the 
broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to national context in which 
they are embedded” (McAdam et al., 1982). Analyses of Islamic movements have 
struggled to fully understand the Muslim Brotherhood’s mobilization since its inception 
in 1920s Egypt. This holds true with the SMB, if not to a greater extent. This study will 
utilize the SMT’s concept of political opportunity to analyse the SMB. The concept of 
political opportunity has been used to understand social movements throughout history, 
including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (McAdam et al., 1982; Munson, 2001).This 
concept focuses on the impact of a specific (political) environment on a social 
movement’s evolution. Different actors in this environment can promote or obstruct 
important political events in the movement’s development. When revolutions and 
protests transpire, changes occur within groups as well as in the political structures they 
inhabit. The political opportunity model theorises that opportune political conditions 
need to be present in order to influence mobilization of a group. Using this model, 
mobilization can also be understood by focusing on the relationship between social 
movements and the institutions they work within (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; McAdam et 
al., 1982).  
 
Political opportunity affects different types of collective action. The activities undertaken 
by social movements depend heavily on the political environment they exist in (Kriesi, 
1995). A parallel can be drawn between 1980s Eastern European democratizing 
movements and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Both emerged under similar 
conditions after changes to the political opportunity structure (Ekiert, 1996) . The 
political opportunity model has previously been used to study the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt as well as Hamas in Palestine (Munson, 2001; Robinson, 2004). This study will 
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demonstrate the utility of this model in analyzing the SMB, which was founded under 
similar conditions – and follows the same ideology – as the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood (Teitelbaum, 2011a). To do this, it is fundamental to scrutinize the socio-
political context in which the mobilization of the SMB has occurred.  
 
Four central aspects of the political opportunity structure are usually discussed: declining 
state repression, increasing political access, divisions among the elite, and formation of 
influential alliances(McAdam et al., 1996; Tarrow, 1992). Distinctly, in the case of the 
SMB, these aspects can be rapidly excluded. The SMB has been repressed and exiled by 
successive Syrian regimes since 1982 (Afanasieva, 2015). It has had no access to the 
Syrian political system besides a brief period in 1963 before the Ba’ath party came into 
power (Lefèvre, 2013). The SMB did not receive much support from Syrian elites. As an 
exiled group, it could not secure support from strong alliances either (Rafael Lefèvre, 
2013; Teitelbaum, 2011a). Despite these concerns, the political opportunity structure 
model may still be used.  
 
This study will identify the core aspects of, and changes to, the political structure that are 
relevant to the SMB. These include significant historical moments such as the 
colonization of Syria by the French, the political conflict with Israel, and the revolts 
against the Assad regime in 1979 and 1982. Post-2011, there have been three political 
opportunities that appeared for the SMB. First, the SMB has been able to freely conduct 
its activities in areas controlled by the Free Syrian Army. Second, it was able to form 
alliances with oppositional parties to create bodies such as the Syrian National Coalition 
and the Syrian Interim Government, and third, the SMB has established the Wa’ad Party, 
its first political party since the revolution (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
 
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
The current thesis aims to provide an analysis of the evolution of the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood, completed from a perspective that was inspired the social movement theory 
approach towards Islamism. The empirical knowledge and the data obtained in this thesis 
from interviews of the Muslim SMB members will be interpreted through the social 
movement theory.  The present thesis has been inspired by those group of experts who 
analysed Islamism with a social movement theory approach. A unique publication 
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(Wiktorowicz, 2004) on the subject edited by Quintan Wiktorowitz that brings those 
scholars together who take a social movement theory approach towards Islamism will 
serve as an essential basis for the current thesis. Inspired by these authors, in the 
followings it will be argued that the key of the Muslim Brotherhood’s successes relied on 
their ability to embrace the operational style of social movements through which they 
have successfully managed to promote their religious and political ideologies 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004). It will look at whether the SMB has explored and utilised the 
political opportunity structure that was presented to it, as a social movement, after the 
Syrian uprising. Therefore, this thesis seeks to contribute to both social movement and 
political opportunity literature by looking at the case study of the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood. As the next chapters will look at the SMB internally, nationally, regionally 
and internationally, these two concepts will be kept as cross cutting issues.  
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Chapter 4: The History and Organization of the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter set out the theoretical basis for this research. This chapter provides 
a detailed analysis of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB), examining how it was 
established, how it has evolved, and how it organizes today. The SMB has its origins in 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), formed in Egypt (Pew Research Center, 2010). 
Following the successful establishment of the Egyptian MB, Muslim brotherhoods were 
formed in many other countries the Middle East and the rest of the world, including 
Syria.  
 
The SMB as it stands today is very different from both the original Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood and even the SMB as it was when it was first established. The MB in its 
original form was accepted as a mainstream political organization, rather than a group of 
religious fanatics, as the group is often characterized now. To understand the Muslim 
Brotherhood, we must understand the political environment at the time of its 
establishment and the role it played in shaping both the Arab Spring and contemporary 
Middle Eastern politics more generally. This chapter will trace the evolution of the MB, 
examining how it moved from being a social and educational body, to a political 
organization with a central role in the politics of the Arab Middle East, North Africa and 
the rest of the Islamic world. 
 
This chapter examines the MB and SMB’s ideological background and the ways in 
which that background influences both organizations’ actions. Since MB’s establishment 
in 1928, political events have shaped its approach as well as its views on concepts such 
as democracy and pluralism. The Egyptian MB and the SMB have developed in similar 
ways, but with some notable differences, which this chapter explores. Some of the 
SMB’s actions are in line with the vision set out by Hassan Al-Banna and Mustafa Al-
Sibai when they founded the movement in 1928. Their vision has remained a reference 
point to this day, but there have been multiple changes in approach, from the social, to 
the radical to the reformist, and much debate within the movement.  
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This chapter will focus on the foundation, social origins and ideological background of 
the SMB. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was established in the mid-1940s and 
continued to develop until the Syrian revolution in 2011. While it has always been 
independent of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, it shared much of its ideology with 
the Egyptian organization at its inception. However, it quickly began to participate in 
mainstream parliamentary politics, which the MB in Egypt did not. The MB was a mass 
movement, working outside of the parliamentary system, and with a widespread popular 
appeal across social classes. It was headed by a charismatic, populist leader in its founder 
Hassan Al-Banna (Mitchell and Voll, 1993). By contrast, the SMB was relatively elitist 
and lacking in popular appeal Weismann, 2005).  
In its early days, the SMB had more in common with other mainstream Syrian political 
parties than it did with the Egyptian MB (Teitelbaum, 2011a). The SMB sought to unite 
Syrians around this message, eschewing the country’s deep sectarian divisions.  
The Muslim Brotherhood offered the Arab region a force to unite behind - a third way 
that was ideologically somewhere between Arab nationalism and radical Islamism. This 
was true especially in the years following the World War II and the creation of Israel in 
1948. During this period, many in the region questioned the ability of nationalists to 
provide effective leadership. Political Islam began to develop and play a greater role in 
the Middle Eastern politics. The Muslim Brotherhood was part of the political Islam 
movement and a major influence in its development. This chapter will explore how the 
ideological development of the MB and SMB was influenced by political changes in the 
Middle East.  
4.2 The Founding and Evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Ikhwan Al-
Muslimin in Egypt 
 
This section will focus on how the phases of the MB’s organizational development went 
on to influence the SMB’s reaction to and role during the Syrian uprising. It will provide 
an understanding of how the SMB became a critical observer of its Egyptian peers and 
learned much about how to respond effectively to its own domestic political challenges.  
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4.2.1 Hassan Al-Banna and the Birth of the Organization 
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded by Hassan Al-Banna in Ismalia, Egypt in 
March 1928 (Mitchell and Voll, 1993; Pargeter, 2010). He was its first General Guide, or 
leader. He established the Brotherhood because he believed that Islamic teaching at that 
time was not capable of increasing the status and reach of Islam in Egyptian public life 
and society. He felt that a greater level of activism was needed among Egyptian 
Muslims. As a student at Al–Azhar University in Cairo, he began to organize students 
and started preaching in mosques and in public places. He was influenced by the Islamic 
ideology of Rashid Rida, Mohamed Abduh, and Ahmed Tymour Pasha (Wickham, 
2013). All three were prominent Muslim scholars known for their articulation and 
dissemination of reformist ideas and their concern with the preservation of Muslim 
identity and culture (Esposito, 2017). 
Following his graduation in 1927, he was appointed teacher of Arabic in the city of 
Ismailia. At the time, many Egyptians lived a relatively secular lifestyle. Of those who 
were religious, the majority were Sufi Muslims. Sufi teaching focused primarily on the 
development of a personal relationship with God and individual religious conduct, rather 
than on politics. The practice of Islam was limited to Mosques and Islamic schools 
(Moussalli, 2013).   
Ismailia was the home of the headquarters of the Suez Canal Company and with it, a 
sizable Western community. When Al-Banna started preaching in the city, he warned his 
audience of workers, students, and civil servants against adopting a Western, liberal 
lifestyle. He taught that Islam was a way of life, with a role to play across society, 
including politics. Al-Banna believed that Islam would prove to be the solution to 
growing social injustice, caused by the weakness of Egypt’s domestic politicians and the 
dominant influence of foreign powers in the country, as was the case with many other 
Muslim countries in the region (Moussalli, 2013).  
In Egypt, this was mainly attributed to the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and its fall 
in 1924, followed by the colonialist approach of Britain and France after World War and 
the signing of the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916. The agreement affected nearly every 
Muslim country in the Middle East, with the exception for the Hijaz and Najd Regions 
(now Saudi Arabia) and Yemen. However, threats to Egypt’s Islamic identity and 
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attempts to shift the country towards the adoption of Western values were rejected by the 
vast majority of the Muslim population (Al-Qaradawi, 1999). 
The Muslim Brotherhood spread rapidly after its establishment in 1928, with its ideas 
becoming influential in Egyptian society. Al-Banna ordered the re-starting of the Al-
Manar Magazine, a monthly religious publication founded by Sheikh Mohammed 
Rashid Rida, the most prominent Islamic scholar in Egypt at the time. The magazine 
helped the MB spread its ideology across Egypt, with articles promoting Islamic values 
and espousing reform of Egyptian society and the Islamic world based on those values 
(Mitchell and Voll, 1993)  
From 1932 to 1933, Al-Banna moved the headquarters of the MB to Cairo. There, he met 
with his brother, Abdul Rahman Al-Banna, who ran the Society of Islamic Culture. The 
society became the first branch organization of the MB. In 1934, word of the Muslim 
Brotherhood had spread to more than 50 towns and villages across Egypt. In each 
location, the organization worked to provide public services including schools, hospitals 
and social welfare (Leiken and Brooke, 2007). Historians refer to the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s early period in Ismailia as its first phase, with its second phase coming 
after its move to Cairo and subsequent spread across Egypt (Ismail, 2010). This second 
phase also saw the movement spread outside Egypt to neighboring countries, with new 
members in those countries helping it spread its message further and cement its position 
in the region (Ismail, 2010). 
The MB began to play an important role in Middle Eastern politics. The year 1936 was a 
particularly significant one. It was in this year that Palestinian resistance and revolution 
against the British occupation began. The MB heavily promoted the Palestinian cause in 
Egypt, keen to help their neighbors fight against British colonialism (Swedenburg, 
2003). In 1938, Al-Banna made an official declaration at the MB’s fifth conference that 
the organization would be involved in politics. This was unprecedented among Egyptian 
religious movements, which had until then avoided political involvement in completely 
(Ismail, 2010). 
The strength of the MB’s political involvement became evident during World War II. 
The organization worked to establish a salvation front, alongside other Egyptian political 
movements and parties. All members of the front shared a common goal: to force the 
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removal of the British from Egypt by disrupting their lines of supply and subsistence. 
The front attempted to establish ties with Germany, whose armies were at the time 
marching towards North Africa on the back of a successful European campaign. When 
the US joined the war, Germany’s fortunes turned and the Allies were victorious, 
damaging the front’s plans (Abdul Halim, 1978). 
The MB continued to promote resistance to the British within Egypt. Under the 
government of Ismail Sidqi Pasha, Egypt retained close ties with the British. Sidqi Pasha 
advocated a formal Anglo-Egyptian alliance, and signed the Bevin-Sidqi agreement in 
1946. This was met with revulsion among many other Egyptian politicians and parties, 
including the MB (Doran, 1999). The British began to crack down on anti-colonial 
demonstrators and in response, the MB stepped up their campaign. They demanded the 
British leave Egypt from 21st February 1946. They declared this a day of public grieving 
and announced a general strike, led by a committee formed of all major parties in Egypt, 
except the Al Wafd Party, which refused to participate (Kraemer, 2014). 
The MB under Al-Banna and subsequent leaders including Hassan Al-Hudaybi and 
Umar Al-Tilmisany did not advocate violence (Bae, 2011).Instead, the organization saw 
involvement in the political process the most effective way to bring about change. Bae 
states: “The Brotherhood recruits members from lay professionals instead of clerics, and 
its guiding ideology affirms the belief that an ideal politics will follow, not lead, a 
society polished by Muslim values, belying the idea of a government that will strong-arm 
its people toward more overt expression of faith” (Bae, 2011). 
 
Barabara Zollner (2009:9) points out in her work on Hassan Al-Hudaybi that official 
statements made by the Muslim Brotherhood “clearly emphasize non- violence, with an 
occasional reference to Du’at la Qudat (Preachers, not Judges) (Zollner, 2009). 
Al-Banna ran for election twice. The first was in 1942, but he withdrew his candidacy 
after reaching an agreement with the Wafd party. The second was in 1945, but he found 
himself defeated (Zollner, 2009). Despite his lack of electoral success, Al-Banna 
established the basis for an ideological reconciliation between Sharia and the principles 
of procedural democracy, including pluralism and individual rights, within the MB. For 
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example, he considered democracy to be compatible with the Sharia principles of ikhtilaf 
(difference of opinion), Al huquq al-shariah (legal rights) and Shuraa (consultation) 
(Esposito, 2013). However, as Zollner (2009:11) points out, the MB’s official stance 
towards party politics was negative, labelled pejoratively as ‘hizbiyya’ (rule of party 
politics). Al-Banna believed that party politics served to advance the interests of the 
parties themselves and their members, rather than ordinary people and Islamic teaching.  
The Muslim Brotherhood’s approach was heavily influenced by the Palestinian uprising. 
The Brotherhood established a secret military arm, which began sending volunteers to 
Palestine to join the uprising. Some of these volunteers became involved in acts of 
violence without direction from the movement’s leadership ((Zollner, 2009). This lead to 
clashes with the Egyptian government, most notably during the government of Prime 
Minister Mahmoud Al-Nuqrashi in 1948. The Muslim Brothers were linked to a number 
of assassination attempts and accused by the government of inciting terrorism. This led 
to the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1948 and the assassination of Hassan 
Al-Banna on 12 February 1949 (Zollner, 2009:13). 
The assassination of Al-Banna led to uncertainty and power struggles in what was left of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. This uncertainty continued until Hassan Al-Hudaybi was 
appointed leader. Al-Hudaybi was a retired judge who lacked charisma but had good 
connections within the Egyptian hierarchy. Under him, the MB was able to reform and 
continue its work. Soon, a new ideology was to emerge in the movement, led by Sayyid 
Qutb, who joined the MB in the early 1950s.  
 
4.2.2 The Muslim Brotherhood under Gamal Abdul Nasser  
In July 1952, a military group calling itself the ‘free officers’ staged a coup against King 
Farouq in Egypt (Gordon, 1999). The coup toppled the Egyptian parliamentary 
monarchy and established full independence from the British. Although the British had 
granted Egypt formal independence in 1922, they had retained power in four areas: the 
security of Imperial communications in Egypt; the defense of Egypt against all foreign 
aggression; the protection of foreign interests and minorities in Egypt; and the Sudan 
(Vatikiotis, 1991). The Muslim Brothers played a significant role in that coup  
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(Crompton, 2014) .Crompton quotes from King Farouq’s memoirs, first published in 
October 1952 in the British Empire News a few months after his abdication:   “Who are 
the men behind Naguib? I will tell you! They are a secret politburo of the Muslim 
Brotherhood… and that efficient coup d’état which cost me my throne was not planned 
by Naguib in the candlelight of his simple army tent, but was worked out for him by a 
group of foreign military advisers” (Crompton, 2014). 
Following the coup and the abolition of the monarchy, Gamal Abdul Nasser came to 
power in 1953, establishing a single-party republican regime. He banned all political 
parties other than his own. Nasser’s charisma resonated with many across Egypt and the 
rest of the Arab world (Fürtig, 2012). Nasserism was driven not by a single vision for the 
future, but by a number of ideological components. They included opposition to the 
British and to the Egyptian monarchy (Awadi, 2004), and the elimination of social 
injustice. Nasser promised an end to the monarchy and colonial rule, and greater fairness 
and equality across the country (Fürtig, 2012). Socialist elements (Ayubi, 1996) were 
mixed with pan-Arab Nationalism and Third Worldism (Zubaida, 1993). Nasser 
deliberately reached out across the Arab world for support, speaking of the Arab entity, 
sharing a common language and culture as well as a common goal in the struggle against 
Western colonial powers (Fürtig, 2012). In 1956, he nationalized the Suez Canal, 
affording him even greater popularity in Egypt and much of the rest of the Arab world 
(Ranko, 2015) 
 
The MB was allowed to remain active under Nasser, but it quickly became clear that the 
MB and Nasser held conflicting views. The MB was offered a cabinet post in Nasser’s 
government, and a leadership position in the Liberation Rally, Nasser’s first project for a 
single party system. The MB refused, unwilling to grant legitimacy to a regime that 
would not implement Islamic law or retain a multi-party system. The MB believed that 
the army’s power should have ended when the coup was finished and the presidency 
handed to a civil authority. They had agreement in this from Muhamad Naguib, who 
performed the coup alongside Nasser. The MB offered him considerable support 
(Ibrahim, 2004).  
 
The relationship between Nasser and the MB deteriorated quickly. Alongside the 
communists, the MB organized demonstrations against the regime, demanding a return 
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to civilian rule. The crisis came to a head when a young member of the MB tried to 
assassinate Nasser in October 1954 (Scharfe, 2014). The attempted assassination boosted 
Nasser’s popularity and gave him the opportunity to move against the MB, banning it 
(Cook, 2013, pp. 60–61). Tens of thousands of MB members were arrested, tortured, and 
placed on trial. Many received lengthy jail sentences with hard labor. Seven, including 
Hasan Al-Hudaybi, were condemned to death, although Al-Hudaybi’s sentence was 
commuted to life imprisonment (Ibrahim, 2004). Despite this, the MB in Egypt retained 
a membership of between 250,000 and 300,000. Under the presidency of Anwar Al-
Sadat from 1970-1981, the group was made legal once more.  
 
4.2.3 The Nasser Suppression of the MB and the Radicalization of the Organization  
 
Nasser’s move against the MB continued throughout 1955. The majority of its members 
were executed, arrested, or exiled to other Arab countries. Those in prison or in exile 
continued to stay in contact with each other, and the movement retained some of its 
power base as a result. Sayyed Qutb began to emerge as leader during this time (Cook, 
2013, p. 86). This period of persecution brought about new lines of intellectual thought 
in the MB, influenced by their treatment at the hands of the government. It also meant 
that the MB looked further outward, away from Egypt and towards the rest of the Arab 
world. It established branches in Syria, Sudan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Algeria. During the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, MB members were released from jail under the leadership of 
Anwar Sadat. Sadat himself was executed in 1981 by militant Islamists.  
 
4.2.4 The MB under Sadat  
 
In 1971, Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt. He immediately felt the force of 
opposition from both Nasser’s supporters and those on the left. He turned to Islamic 
groups, including the MB, to help balance this opposition and cement his own position. 
He gave the MB and other Islamic groups greater freedom of expression, as part of his 
process of “de- Nasserization” (Edgar, 1987).  In general, the MB and other Islamic 
groups welcomed their new alliance with Sadat. However, some began to move against 
the regime as early as 1972. In 1977, the Islamic Liberation Organization attempted a 
coup against Sadat, which failed. Its leaders were executed and most of its members 
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imprisoned. Later in 1977 another group, Gama’at Al-Muslimin (also known as Al-Takfir 
Wa al-Hijra) moved against Sadat with violence (Esposito, 2013, p. 239).  
 
The MB itself was not involved in the violence from either group. The leaders of both 
groups were former MB members, but with no evidence of any formal connection, the 
MB was allowed to continue operating under greater security. Sadat was still anxious to 
oust supporters of Nasser and to allow opposition parties to organize, in the hope that 
they would offer a counter against the leftist Nasserist parties that were still operating. In 
this context, the MB was able to operate freely, though they were not yet legalized.  
 
Sadat wanted to move away from Nasserist domestic policies and cut Egypt’s ties with 
the Soviet Union. This met with considerable opposition, and in 1972-73, he faced 
protests from students. As a counterweight, Sadat encouraged the formation of Islamic 
societies in Egyptian universities, believing that they would naturally help drive out the 
leftist, Nasserist groups behind the student protests(Wickham, 2013, p. 20). This strategy 
worked, with Islamic groups thriving and weakening the left. Sadat’s success in 
defeating the left helped raise his personal popularity and led to the legitimization of 
Islam in Egyptian politics. Sadat continued to release MB members from jail, and 
allowed them to publish religious papers once again. However, the organization 
remained officially illegal, and by the late 1970s, there was a return to conflict between 
the MB and the government. 
 
Both the MB and other Islamic groups, including those that Sadat had helped to create, 
began to turn against Sadat, in disagreement with many of his policies. With tension 
increasing throughout the country, the gradualist approach of the MB was rejected by 
many. More radical, militant Islamic groups began to gain influence and members. Sadat 
recognized the threat that they presented, and implemented Sharia law in an attempt to 
placate them. It was not enough, and Sadat was assassinated by militants in October 
1981. He was succeeded by Hosni Mubarak. 
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4.2.5 The MB under Mubarak 
 
80s accommodations  
 
Mubarak adopted a policy of accommodation towards the MB (Campagna, 1996). He 
released the organization’s leader Omar Al-Tilmassani and others arrested by Sadat 
during his "Autumn of Fury" in September 1981. Mubarak was keen to establish a 
friendlier relationship with the MB, although the organization was still not legal. With 
Mubarak facing a thread from radical Islamic groups, the MB was seen as a 
counterweight and given some freedom to organize and publish (Campagna, 1996).   
The MB used its newly-found freedom to focus on social welfare, and avoided openly 
criticizing the Mubarak regime. They held a moderate stance politically, opposing 
violence and advocating peaceful change. According to Kepel (1995): "As long as they 
did not directly challenge the state in political matters, but saw in the sharia (Islamic law) 
the opportunity to improve society morally, restraining deviant behavior, they were 
welcome." (Kepel, 1995:115).  
The Egyptian political analyst Dia’a Rashwan states that the Mubarak government was 
"Convinced that the Brotherhood posed no real threat, the regime continued to overlook 
its growing presence till (sic) 1984 when the group scored impressive gains in 
parliamentary elections through its alliance with the secular Wafd Party" (Rashwan, 
1995). The MB achieved political victories in 1984 and 1987. This led them to try and 
gain legitimacy, asking the government to make them a legal organization once again 
(Campagna, 1996) . Lawyers acting for the MB disputed the organization’s illegal status. 
In 1984, they won eight seats in the elections to the 360-member People’s Assembly 
(Aly, 2007). This was unexpected, and did serve to prompt some change in official 
attitudes towards the group. It demonstrated that the MB held considerable popularity, 
and "alerted the regime to the potential political force of the Brotherhood and prompted 
it to closely examine the organization's activities"  (Rashwan, 1995). 
The government was concerned that the MB would use its newly-elected members to 
step up its criticism of government policy. This worsened relations between the MB and 
the government, who now saw the group as a threat. The MB wanted Sharia law to be 
implemented in parliament, but this was rejected. In general, this was a time of stability, 
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with Islamic radicals having only limited influence, largely confined to universities 
(Rubin, 1990). In 1987, the MB formed an alliance with the Liberal and Socialist Labor 
parties. Their alliance won 36 seats in the Assembly, further demonstrating the 
organization’s appeal to ordinary Egyptians. At the same time, the MB was gaining 
presence in professional associations, civil institutions, university faculty clubs and 
students’ unions. They had worked to develop this influence since the early 1980s, and 
their electoral success helped cement it, giving them credibility. This strategy gave them 
a means to communicate their ideas directly with large numbers of Egyptians, which in 
turn helped them gain electoral success. 
The MB gained a number of important victories among professional associations, 
winning elections to their boards. It gained control of the medical association in 1986, 
and of the engineers’ and pharmacists’ associations by the end of the 1980s. By 1992, 
they’d gained control of every major professional association except the journalists’ 
association. Notably, this included the formerly secular bar association. 
These were significant victories, helping the MB gain visibility in civil society. At the 
time, professional associations were one of the only forms of organization that 
maintained independence from the Egyptian state. Gaining control of them gave the 
Brotherhood an important legitimate power base with which to further its political aims. 
For the government, this was a serious challenge. Egypt’s official, legal opposition 
parties were weak, and the MB filled the space that they left. As well as taking control of 
professional associations, the MB created a social services network. With these roots laid 
down, the Brotherhood gained support across Egyptian society and challenged the 
establishment, dominated by the National Democratic Party (NDP). 
Between 1984 and 1989, the Egyptian state rarely confronted the MB. The security 
services would occasionally arrest and investigate members, and there was some 
criticism of the organization in the country’s semi-official state media. This was not 
necessarily a deliberate policy, but a result of pragmatism. One the Egyptian academic 
Ahmed Abdallah said:  
"Deferring confrontation was an instinctual trade-off, not a 
carefully thought-out state policy. The government turned a blind 
eye to Islamist grassroots power. In return, the Islamists did not 
confront state corruption and inefficiency." (Abdallah, 1993) 
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By 1989, there was a change in the government’s approach. In April of that year, then 
Interior Minister Zaki Badr issued a public statement criticizing MB for alleged links to 
radical Islamic groups. This was despite the group being demonstrably non-violent. 
Suggestions that the MB was linked to radical groups would continue and intensify over 
the years to follow. In August 1989, twenty Brothers were arrested along with eight 
children (US. Dept. of State et al., 1989, p. 1368). All of them had been at a four-day 
recreational camp in the city of Alexandria. According to the Egyptian daily newspaper 
Al-Wafd, the camp was held in defiance of the Interior Ministry. Further arrests followed 
under the orders of the Interior Minister, who was at the time embarked on a campaign 
of repression against groups across the political spectrum. He was sacked in January 
1990 by Mubarak (Vatikiotis, 1991). This increase in state activity against the 
Brotherhood demonstrates the polarization that was developing between hardliners such 
as Zaki Badr, and others in the Mubarak government who were less confrontational. This 
polarization would widen as the years went on. After the 1989 arrests, efforts to confront 
the MB intensified as the MB’s opposition to the regime increased (Hashim, 2011). 
  
90s tensions 
 
The assassination of Sadat in 1981 led to fears that Egypt would struggle to regain 
stability. Sadat’s successor, Mubarak, was head of the Air Force at the time of the 
assassination. He promised stability and, despite his lack of charisma and limited 
political experience, he achieved it, staying in power until 2011 (Hashim, 2011). 
Mubarak saw Egypt as a regional leader and guarantor of regional stability. Islamic 
groups were seen by his regime as one of the key enemies of both regional and national 
stability. It was for this reason that Mubarak sought to prevent the MB from participating 
in politics (Iskander, 2012). Mubarak’s emphasis on the need for security and stability, 
and his belief that only secularization could achieve this was a Cold War era hangover. 
Mubarak took a top-down military approach to government that relied entirely on the 
army to maintain security, without there being any real scrutiny of the army’s work 
(Monier and Ranko, 2013). The military remained loyal to Mubarak because they were 
given considerable autonomy, with officers creating and running lucrative military-
industrial businesses (Hashim, 2011). 
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The MB was cast as the enemy by Mubarak. He used the presence and perceived threat 
presented by the MB and other Islamic groups as a form of pressure against domestic 
opposition and a way of maintaining alliances with the West. Mubarak’s state media 
portrayed the possibility of a religious state as wholly undesirable, intolerant and 
extremist. In contrast, his own civil, secular state was portrayed as one that would 
safeguard citizens’ rights.  
 
The MB became a symbol of the Islamic threat and they were often referred to as Al-
Mah’thura, or the prohibited group. The threat was also said to include Hamas (an 
offshoot of the MB in Palestine), Hezbollah, and the Iranian government. All were 
portrayed extreme radicals, seeking to change the character of the whole Middle East 
and threatening the stability of the region. When security services uncovered a Hezbollah 
cell in the Sinai on April 8, 2009, the Egyptian government and both state and 
independent media portrayed Hezbollah and Iran as major threats to the Arab world. This 
narrative claimed a central place for Egypt in the politics of the Arab world, although 
Arab nationalism and Arabism had declined (Bilgin, 2004).  
 
Mubarak’s authoritarian presidency did not prevent him from claiming a role for Egypt 
as a leader among Arab nations. Egypt has claimed this role for itself consistently since 
World War II, as a way of consolidating domestic power for its governments and 
enhancing its regional and international status (Doran, 2002). Egypt resisted British rule 
partly by attempting to establish itself as a champion of Arab interests, particularly under 
Nasser (Monier and Ranko, 2013). Michael Barnett states that “Arab politics as a series 
of dialogues between Arab states regarding the desired regional order” (Barnett, 1998). 
 
From the 1990s, the same tactics were used by Islamic groups, who claimed that they 
were the natural champions of Arab interests. The Egyptian government resisted their 
assertions and launched a strong campaign to remove their influence. In November 1995, 
Egypt’s Supreme Military Court sentenced 54 leading members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to prison terms of between three and five years, with hard labor 
(Campagna, 1996). The trial of these 54 MB members marked the culmination of four 
years of repression of the organization by the Egyptian state. The MB had remained an 
illegal organization, and so the state was able to try them for membership of an illegal 
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organization, and order the closure of their Cairo headquarters. It was the first 
prosecution of members of the MB by a military court since 1965, when Nasser had tried 
and imprisoned its leadership.  
 
The move against the MB by Mubarak was a notable departure from the more tolerant 
approach of the 1980s. The MB had been allowed to function for some time as a 
legitimate organization, despite still being illegal, participating in elections and growing 
its power base in civil society (Campagna, 1996). The trial of the 54 led to considerable 
debate in Egypt. Opposition commentators noted that there was to be a parliamentary 
election the same month, and suggested it was a way of preventing the MB gaining the 
substantial victories they were forecast. This suggestion was supported by the fact that 
there were further trials of another 81 MB members, all former parliamentarians, leading 
civic activists, or parliamentary candidates. They represented the young, dynamic 
leadership of the Brotherhood, in professional associations, university faculty clubs and 
NGOs.  
 
In the People's Assembly (majlis al-sha'ab) election, 150 Muslim Brotherhood 
candidates stood, either as independents or for the Labor (Al-'Amal) Party. None of them 
w name won a seat. Human rights groups heavily criticized the Mubarak regime for 
interference in that election, including repression of MB candidates and campaigners 
(Campagna, 1996).  
 
2009 accommodation  
 
As tensions increased between Mubarak and the MB, both sides openly criticized each 
other, and each accused the other of illegitimacy, socially, politically and legally. This 
criticism softened in 2009 as Mubarak moved to accommodate the MB to an extent. Al-
Awadi (2009) argues that this happened because the MB were able to mount a serious 
challenge to the regime’s legitimacy, with its network of contacts and provision of social 
services giving it legitimacy in the eyes of many Egyptian people (Al-Awadi, 2009).  
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4.2.6 The Arab Spring and the Post-Revolutionary Period  
Following the revolution in 2011, the MB was legalized (Hope, 2011). Members in exile, 
such as scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, were able to return to Egypt and participate in the 
events that followed the end of the Mubarak regime. In the period immediately following 
the revolution, more than eighty political parties were created (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2015). 
In April 2011, the MB launched a political party of its own: The Freedom and Justice 
Party. Elections to the People’s Assembly were held between November 2011 and 
January 2012 that, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
resulted in victory for Islamic groups, with the Freedom and Justice party gaining 47% 
of seats, and the Salafi Nour Party gaining 24%. All liberal and secular parties put 
together gained less than 30% of seats. In addition, Islamic parties won almost 90% of 
seats in the upper house, the Shura Council, resulting in an Islamic majority in both 
houses. As a result of the Islamic groups’ success, in June 2012, Supreme Constitutional 
Court dissolved the People’s Assembly just two days prior to presidential elections. The 
court’s judges were primarily Mubarak supporters, appointed by his regime (Carnegie, 
2015).  
Later that month, democratic presidential elections were held. Mohamed Morsi won with 
52% of the votes, becoming Egypt’s first democratically elected president (Kirkpatrick, 
2012). He faced immediate and virulent opposition, particularly from those who had 
been in power during the Mubarak era (Saleh, 2013). He also faced international 
criticism, even from those who had not previously been vocal critics. New York Times 
correspondent Patrick Kingsley, who covered the events in Egypt for the Guardian, 
wrote: “Morsi was seen as increasingly divisive, open only to Islamist ideas, and loyal 
only to the Brotherhood” (Kingsley, 2015).  
Morsi attempted to grant himself considerable power, creating a constitution that would 
give the president total control over the state. He did not put this constitution to the 
judiciary, but instead put it to a vote without any debate. This led to unrest on the streets, 
with lethal fights between MB members and leftists/liberals (Kingsley, 2015). Egyptian 
media played a considerable role in the vocal opposition to Morsi, as did former 
members of the military. A year after Morsi’s election, there were huge demonstrations 
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against him in Egypt, leading to a coup led by Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi (Kingsley and 
Chulov, 2013). Morsi was arrested and the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist 
organization by countries that supported Al-Sisi: Russia, Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia 
(Reuters, 2014). All these countries were opposed to the MB and its role in revolutions 
that happened as part of the Arab Spring.  
As Morsi was ousted, so MB supporters took to the streets of Cairo to oppose the coup 
against him (BBC News, 2013a). They wanted to see Morsi’s return as democratically 
elected president. The demonstrations were peaceful and allowed to continue for a month 
and a half before the police, supported by the army, cracked down violently against the 
protestors. According to Human Rights Watch, 817 demonstrators were killed in Rabi’a 
Square alone, the location of one of the largest demonstrations (Human Rights Watch, 
2014). At this time, Syrian revolution was entering its third year of war following 
rebellion against the Assad regime. Most anti-Sissi, pro-Morsi Egyptians became afraid 
to express their political opinions openly, fearing that Egypt too would descend into 
conflict.  
 
4.3 The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria  
 
4.3.1 Origin, Founding, and Connection with the Egyptian MB 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (the SMB) was founded in 1942 by Mustapha Al-
Sibai. He was born in Homs in Syria 1915 and studied in Egypt, at the Al-Azhar 
University in Cairo in 1933. It is not clear whether the SMB was founded by the MB in 
Egypt or whether it was established independently in Syria. It is likely that it was 
established independently, but with the same ideological basis as the MB in Egypt 
(Teitelbaum, 2011a). Al-Sibai had met Hassan Al-Banna while in Cairo and became an 
active member of the MB. He participated in anti-British activities while in Egypt, for 
which he was imprisoned in 1934. He returned to Syria along with fellow Syrian 
students, taking with him anti-nationalistic and pro-pan-Islamic ideas (Mitchell and Voll, 
1993). Al-Sibai founded an association in Syria called Muhammad's Youth (Shabab 
Muhammad). This later became the SMB, along with a number of other Islamic 
organizations.  
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One of Al-Sibai’s classmates in Cairo was Mohamed Al-Hamid, who was born in 1910 
and lived until 1996. During his long life, he was an important ideological influence in 
the SMB. Both Mohamed Al-Hamid and Mustafa Al-Sibai attended meetings with 
Hassan Al-Banna and listened to him preaching at Al-Azhar University (Weismann, 
2005). Even before the SMB was established formally, the ideology of the Muslim 
Brotherhood began to make itself felt in Syria’s civil associations, or Jamiyyat. The 
Jamiyyat were originally largely elite organizations, focused on providing social welfare 
to their members (Mitchell and Voll, 1993). Later, some became political, and widened 
their membership beyond the elite. In the 1920s and 30s, working and middle class 
Islamic Jamiyyat began to emerge, working to encourage religious belief and oppose 
Western cultural influence in Syria (Mitchell and Voll, 1993). 
Muhamad Mubarak helped set up some of this new breed of Jamiyyat in Damascus and 
Aleppo. They later became part of the SMB. The Jamiyyat provided the early SMB with 
a strong initial power base from which to grow, and suggests that the organization grew 
up separately from its Egyptian sister organization. Despite this, we know from the 
writings of SMB founder Mustafa Al-Sibai that the Egyptian MB provided him with 
much of the inspiration and ideological basis for the establishment of the SMB.  Al-Sibai 
encouraged students at the University of Damascus to set up study groups (or halaqas), 
focused on the teachings of Islam and spiritual reform. These were the same messages 
being preached by the Egyptian MB, and these study circles were part of the early 
establishment of the organization. 
The first study circle to form outside Damascus came into being in Aleppo in 1935. In 
1937, this circle was legalized and given the name Dar Al-Arqam, after the first meeting 
point of the Prophet Mohammad in Makkah, where Islam was preached for the first time. 
Dar Al-Arqam hosted the Young Men’s Muslim Association in Aleppo and became the 
city’s first Islamic center (Markaz). At this and other centers, the SMB established itself 
and began to spread its message. However, the various centers and Jamiyyat were not 
connected until the mid-1940s. Conferences were held in an attempt to unify the 
movement, including in Homs in 1937 and in Damascus in 1938. It was decided that Dar 
Al-Arqam in Aleppo should be the primary center in a loose network of Jamiyyat. The 
Jamiyyats continued their work until World War II, but after the end of the war, they lost 
influence (Al-Dakheel, 2012).  
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Unlike the MB, the SMB was an urban organization, with little support in rural areas or 
in the military. They worked primarily from Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. 
Between them, these cities comprise more than two-thirds of Syria’s urban population 
(Adams, 1984). In 1941, Al-Sibai left Egypt and returned to his home city of Homs. He 
became politically active on his return, working to oppose Syria’s French colonial 
leaders. He was soon imprisoned by the French regime, and released in 1943. Once 
released, the Jamiyyat held another joint conference in Homs, at which it established two 
paramilitary youth organizations: Futuwwa and Saraya. In 1944, a conference in Aleppo 
decided to move the group’s headquarters and its newly-formed Supreme Central 
Committee from Aleppo to Damascus, as the Syrian capital. That conference was 
attended by a representative of the Egyptian MB, although the SMB had still not been 
formally established (Teitelbaum, 2011a).  
Between late 1945 and mid-1946, the group of Jamiyaat began to unite as the SMB, with 
Al-Sibai as its Controller General (Al-Muraqib Al-Am). In Arabic, this title implies a 
lower level of leadership than the title General Guide (Murshid Al-Amm) given to Hassan 
Al-Banna in Egypt. This may have been a deliberate attempt to ensure that the SMB 
remained less significant than the Egyptian MB (Teitelbaum, 2011a). However, Ali Al-
Bayanouni, the SMB’s Controller General between 1996 and 2006, stated that the use of 
the title was simply a different choice, rather than a significant one. He said:  
“But it meant that Al-Muraqib Al-Am is the head of the different centers (Jamiyyat) of 
the SMB that were distributed in different cities of Syria. As it was called (Dar Al-
Arqam in Aleppo, Al-Jamiyaa Al-Garra in Damascus, and Jamiyaat Al-Hydaia in Homs, 
etc.)” (Al Bayanouni, personal communication, London, 2017). 
He also added that the SMB “was organizationally independent from the MB in Egypt, 
even though it adopted the ideology of Hassan Al-Banna, which is the ideology of 
moderate Islam which refers to the Quran and the teaching of prophet Mohamed” (Al 
Bayanouni, personal communication, London, 2017). The use of these titles remained 
the same after Al-Banna was assassinated (Teitelbaum, 2011a).  
No financial connection has been established between the Egyptian MB and the SMB, 
and there is nothing in the rules of either organization that indicates a formal link. The 
two appear to be connected only by ideology, and not by organization (Teitelbaum, 
2011a). Al-Sibai was Controller General of the SMB between 1945 and 1958 (Rubin, 
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2010a). In 1957, he had serious health problems, and left Syria for Europe to get 
treatment. He spent some years writing articles and books, and providing advice to 
young Muslims, until his death in 1967. He continued to be revered in the SMB after his 
death.  
The SMB continued to grow. In 2011, the organization took advantage of the 
opportunity to spread its message further, as discussed in Chapter 5. By then, the SMB 
was well-established, with decades of experience (Lefèvre, 2013).The organization drew 
most of its membership from prosperous urban Syrians, had established its own 
education system, and was in a good position to recruit members.     
 
4.3.2 The SMB, the Education System and the Colleges of Religious Studies in Syria 
During the colonial period, Syrian public education followed the French system. This 
meant that local religious schools had little influence and no public funding. These local 
schools offered religious education, taught by clerics (Adnan Saad Aldin, 2010). The 
SMB worked to include religious education in public schools in Syria (Adnan Sadd 
Aldin, 2010). Many of those who had been through the religious school system were 
unable to gain work in public schools, able only to work as Imams and preachers. This 
was low-paid work, and most of them were keen to move to public education.  
The SMB helped by beginning to teach the government’s curriculum for public schools 
in religious schools. This meant that graduates of these schools could gain recognized 
qualifications that would allow them to work in universities or find better-paying 
administrative work. Mustafa Al-Sibai worked to establish Islamic Studies departments 
in Syrian universities, allowing students to gain a formal Islamic Studies qualification. 
Those holding this qualification could work in schools, at Al-Awqaf (the Authority of 
Islamic affairs) and in the judiciary. In 1955, Al-Sibai opened the first Islamic Studies 
faculty was opened at Damascus University, and became Dean of that faculty (Adnan 
Sadd Aldin, 2010).  
He focused the faculty’s work high-quality research and on producing graduates who 
would be well-versed in modern research methodologies and able to give expert views 
on the application of Islamic law across a wide range of spheres. He also created an 
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Islamic law encyclopedia, which would become a valuable reference for scholars (Adnan 
Sadd Aldin, 2010). 
 
4.3.3 The SMB and Politics at the Time of Mustafa Al-Sibai  
 
After World War II, politics in Syria underwent a number of changes. The Cold War put 
Syria at the geographical center of its two major powers: the US and the Soviet Union. 
Political Islam grew in popularity, as did opposition to it. Debate was had about the 
nature of Islam’s relationship with politics and law. At the center of this debate was the 
SMB (Teitelbaum, 2004).  
 
The SMB was a strong believer in the importance of political participation, unlike some 
other branches of Islamic thought, such as Sufism. The organization participated in the 
country’s first parliamentary elections following its independence from France, in July 
1947. While they did not appear on the ballot papers as a party, SMB members stood as 
candidates and won seats in Hama, Damascus and Aleppo (Rubin, 2010a). This success 
spurred the SMB on and they established a political party, the Islamic Socialist Front 
(ISF) in November 1949. The ISF stood for election at the 1949 parliamentary elections 
in Damascus and won three seats. Another seat was won by a known ISF supporter, but 
in the name of the People’s Party, in Aleppo. At the same time, the Baath party began to 
gain its own foothold in Syrian politics, winning three seats (Adnan Sadd Aldin, 2010).   
As SMB leader, Al-Sibai acted as ISF leader. He opposed a People’s Party proposal to 
merge Syria with Iraq (Torrey, 1964). In December 1949, Colonel Adib Al-Shishakli, 
supported by opponents of the proposed union successfully mounted a non-violent coup. 
Khalid Al-Azim, an independent, was asked to form a government until elections could 
be held. He included Al-Dawalibi and Mubarak in his cabinet. The ISF took part in 
writing Syria’s new constitution. They wanted Islam to become the country’s state 
religion, but met with stiff opposition, including from the Baath party. After lengthy 
parliamentary debate, the Syrian Assembly decided to include in the constitution a 
requirement for the country’s head of state to be a Muslim and provided for Islamic law 
(fiqh) to be the main source of Syrian legislation (Teitelbaum, 2004).  
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The inclusion of religion in Syrian politics remained controversial. In 1952, Adib Al-
Shishakli, Akram Hawrani, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), and other 
secularist parties moved against the SMB/ISF in order to remove religion from politics. 
The resulting political tension led the government to attempt to weaken the SMB, but 
limiting its political and social activities. In January 1952, SMB branches were closed, 
its newspaper banned, its youth organization dissolved and some leaders arrested. The 
SMB decided to end its participation in politics and concentrate on social activities 
(Teitelbaum, 2011a).  
 
In the mid-1950s, the left was rising in Syria. Both communist and socialist parties 
gained support among the working-class. The communist parties in Syria as well as 
Egypt and Iraq received support from the Soviet Union. Russian books and journals 
about communism were translated into Arabic in Moscow (Adnan Sadd Aldin, 2010). 
The Arab-Israeli conflict contributed to the growing support for communism in the 
region. The Soviet Union and China supported Arab countries against Israel, while 
Britain, France, and the US provided consistent support to Israel (Adnan Sadd Aldin, 
2010). The SMB sought to fight communism by providing an alternative in moderate 
Islam and participated themselves in resistance against Israel. In 1947 the SMB had 
declared its support for the creation of an Arab state in Palestine (Campbell and Despard, 
1983) and in 1948, Al-Sibai led the SMB into the war against Israel.  
 
In 1954, Syria held another parliamentary election, while the country was dividing into 
broadly communist or socialist, and religious camps (Adnan Sadd Aldin, 2010). The 
SSNP, Shishakli’s Arab Liberation Movement, and independent candidates all stood in 
the election. The SMB did not, upsetting many of its members and supporters. Al-Sibai 
himself was unsure of the decision but the decision had been made by the leadership 
committee. The SMB’s weakness helped the communists gain traction. The decision not 
to participate in the elections was criticized by long-term SMB leader Adnan Saad Aldin, 
both at the time and later, in his book. He argued that by failing to participate, the SMB 
had failed to fulfil its obligations to its supporters and the wider society (Adnan Sadd 
Aldin, 2010).   
In the mid-1950s, Egypt’s President Nasser began a campaign of repression against the 
Egyptian MB, including the arrest, torture and execution of some of its members and its 
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leader Hassan Al-Hudaybi. In 1954, Al-Sibai offered the MB the SMB’s support and the 
SMB actively demonstrated against Nasser in support of the MB. This caused tension 
between Egypt and Syria, and difficulties for the country’s ruling Baath party. At the 
time, Britain was moving to protect Iraq, its last remaining Middle Eastern colony from 
the Soviet Union, which was looking to expand its power base in the region. The 
Baghdad Pact was signed in 1955, accepted by Iraq and opposed by Egypt (Butt, 2003) . 
In Syria, the Communist and Baath parties opposed the pact and supported Egypt. The 
SMB also opposed the pact, but did not support Egypt, because of their argument with 
Nasser (Seale, 1965). Nasser became a popular figure in the Syrian Baath party, seen as 
standing up against western imperialism. As happened in 2011, the SMB’s position was 
shaped by a regional power struggle.  
The SMB and the Baath party clashed in cities across Syria. At the same time, the 
SMB’s boycott of the 1954 election meant that the Baathists increased their political 
representation, winning 22 seats. Secularist, nationalist, socialist parties were growing in 
appeal in Syria, and Nasser was becoming something of a hero. By boycotting the 
election, the SMB had made it easy for the Baath party to capitalize on that mood and 
increase its power (Adnan Sadd Aldin, 2010).  
 
In 1958, Syria and Egypt created a short-lived union, the United Arab Republic 
(Jankowski, 2002). The union fell apart in 1961, after Nasser attempted to control all of 
Syrian politics, dissolving its political parties (Palmer, 1966). Syrian officers in 
Damascus mounted a coup against Nasser. The SMB had remained politically inactive 
during these years, but in 1961, Al-Sibai fell ill and Issam Al-Attar became SMB leader. 
His leadership marked a return to active politics for the SMB, which participated as the 
IFS in the elections held in 1961 and won 10 seats. The Baath party was in disarray, 
divided over the union with Egypt and the coup. But in 1962 Michael Aflaq re-organized 
and re-established the party (Jankowski, 2002; Lefèvre, 2013). In March 1963, there was 
another coup that brought the Baath party to power. The SMB had mounted much of the 
resistance to the Baath party, and so it was subsequently banned. 
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4.3.4 The SMB During the Baathist Era, 1963-1980 
From 1971, the Baath party and the senior levels of the Syrian military were dominated 
by the Alawite sect (Pierret, 2014), in particular, the Assad clan. The Alawites are a 
branch of Shia Islam, adding a sectarian element to the party’s conflict with the mainly 
Sunni SMB. By the late 1970s, this conflict had become an armed struggle that reached 
its peak in 1982, when thousands of civilians were killed by the military.  
The coup in 1963 was followed quickly by restrictions on political freedom. Power was 
concentrated in military hands, and the majority of senior positions were given to 
Alawites. While the majority of Syrians were Sunni, there was no Sunni representation 
in government. The SMB was the strongest and most vocal opposition party. Since 2011, 
the SMB has sought to emphasize its role in opposition after the 1963 coup. At the same 
time, they have stressed that they are now committed to peace. During 1964 and 1965, 
the SMB was engaged in active conflict with the state, including strikes and mass 
demonstrations. These were quelled by the military.  
 
In 1971, General Hafez Al-Assad seized power. He took full control of the legislature, 
judiciary and executive (Ziadeh, 2011). He justified this by holding and winning a 
referendum to ratify his actions. He proposed a new constitution designed to cement his 
power. He banned all political parties other than his own. Elections were still held in 
Syria, but Assad was the only candidate. His regime became more repressive, with the 
media controlled by the state and the secret state intelligence (Mokhabarat) becoming 
increasingly feared.  
In 1973, Syrians demonstrated against the new constitution, which did not require the 
president to be Muslim despite 95% of the country’s population being so. There was 
further unrest when Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war in 1976. Some leading 
members of the government were assassinated, and the SMB claimed responsibility. This 
led to an Islamic uprising, beginning in 1976.  
The uprising failed. This was partly because the SMB was ill-prepared, lacking internal 
unity and strategically naïve. They were also unable to create the kind of mass 
mobilization they would have needed to succeed. At the same time, the uprising failed to 
win enough support either from Arab states or the West. Assad’s response was strong. 
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The failed uprising caused division in the Islamic movement, with conflict between the 
SMB and their jihadi opponents (Lia, 2016). The failed 1976 uprising continues to affect 
the SMB’s thinking post-2011 (see Chapter 7). 
Violence against the SMB and its high-profile supporters continued. One such supporter, 
Aleppine professor Yusef Al-Yusef, was assassinated. On 16 June 1979, a violent group 
within SMB carried out a retaliatory attack on the Aleppo Artillery School without the 
consent of their leadership , killing eighty-three cadets (SHRC, 2003a). The Syrian 
government responded by sentencing fifteen prisoners to death for belonging to the 
Islamic resistance. Violence continued, especially in Aleppo and other northern cities, 
with the government generally ascribing blame for attacks to the SMB. However, as the 
resistance movement grew and spread, more armed groups appeared and it is difficult to 
establish how much of the violence was at the hands of the SMB. 
A SMB leaflet in November 1979:  
“We, the SMB, reject all forms of despotism, out of respect for 
the very principles of Islam, and we don't demand the fall of 
Pharaoh so that another one can take his place. Religion is not 
imposed by force.” (Adnan Saad Aldin, 2010).  
 
In March 1980, protests, strikes, and street conflicts escalated in Aleppo. Demonstrators, 
supported by a diverse group of secular and religious organizations including the SMB, 
demanded that the Assad regime: 
1- Lift the state of emergency and cancel the exceptional material courts.   
2- Return all powers to the general judiciary. 
3- Re-instate the independence of the judiciary. 
4- Respect the international law of human rights and cancel laws in Syria that are 
not in accordance.  
5- Hold elections where people can choose their representatives freely.  
The government responded with brutal force, with tens of thousands of troops on the 
streets, supported by tanks and helicopters. Hundreds were killed and 8,000 arrested. The 
uprising was ended by April. President Assad’s brother, Rifaat Al-Assad, published a 
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statement that said the government would "sacrifice a million martyrs" to crush "the 
nation's enemies". At the time, Syria’s population was around ten million. In July 1980, 
the Assad government made membership of the SMB punishable by death. It also 
continued to use fear to dominate its people, executing eighty people living in one 
Aleppo apartment block, in response to an attack on troops in the city. In April 1981, 400 
people in Hama, some as young as fourteen, were executed, accused of being members 
of the SMB.  
The government then held a 50-day moratorium on the death-penalty for SMB 
membership. Over a thousand members turned themselves in, in the hope that their lives 
would be spared. Many of them were professionals, including teachers, engineers and 
professors, who were part of professional associations. Others were students, generally 
under the age of twenty-five. The majority were from Syria’s major cities, including the 
capital Damascus. The regime continued to blame the SMB for terrorist attacks, 
including car-bombs against military and government targets in Damascus that killed 
hundreds in 1981. In February 1982, SMB led a revolt against government in Hama. 
This revolt spread quickly across the city, and was met with force in the form of 
indiscriminate bombing of the city. This became known and the Hama Massacre, and 
killed 30,000 of the city’s 250,000 population (Kenner, 2011).  
The SMB marked the official defeat of the SMB and other Islamic opponents by the 
Assad regime. Despite this, the SMB retained a clandestine network, continuing some of 
its activities under a variety of names.  
4.3.5 The SMB in the Post-Hama Era 
After Hama, most surviving SMB members escaped into exile. Some were still in prison 
in Syria, although some of these were released in the mid-1990s. After the death of Hafiz 
Al-Assad in 2000, his son Bashar Al-Assad came to power after the constitution was 
changed to accommodate his young age, while promising greater political openness and 
social freedom. In May 2001, the SMB, then led by Ali Al-Bayanouni, published a 
statement calling for democratic elections in Syria and an end to violence. He then 
successfully led negotiations with the Assad government to release political prisoners in 
Syria, most of whom had been in custody for over 20 years without trial. While some 
political freedoms were won, they were revoked months later.   
 66 
The SMB continued to receive support from many in Syria while in exile. Its supporters 
and sympathizers included many secular Syrians, such as Riyadh Al-Turk, who said he 
saw the SMB as “the most credible" Syrian opposition. While in exile, the SMB worked 
with other opposition groups to produce the National Honor Pact in 2001 (Ziadeh, 2012, 
p. 69). This pact committed the SMB and other groups to democracy in Syria. In 2005, 
the SMB endorsed the Damascus Declaration for National Democratic Change, along 
with other opposition groups including Islamic, Nationalist, Kurdish and leftist groups 
(Zoepf, 2005). In January 2006, Al-Bayanouni emphasised the SMB’s commitment to 
peaceful change in Syria, and their desire for an investigation into the Hama Massacre of 
1982 (Abedin, 2005). He concentrated on the need for Syria to become a civil 
democracy, rather than an Islamic state. This shows an indication that the SMB has 
matured politically.  
Abdul Halim Khaddam, a Syrian defector, and the SMB jointly launched the National 
Salvation Front in Brussels ( Lefèvre, 2013, p. 177). The launch was attended by a 
number of prominent opposition figures, calling for peaceful change. However, the 
alliance with Khaddam was damaging to the SMB, as he had been part of the Assad 
regime, and they received criticism for it. The SMB withdrew from the Front in April 
2009. 
Turkey’s ruling party, the Justice and Development Party, was on good terms with both 
the Assad regime and the SMB. The party sought to mediate between the two, but their 
efforts failed when the regime refused to make the SMB legal again. Unable to return to 
Syria, the SMB has continued to work in exile, creating branches in the mostly European 
countries in which they now live.  
4.4 The SMB in Europe  
 
The International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood (IOMB) came into being 
soon after the creation of the Egyptian MB in 1928. The MB’s ideas spread quickly 
across the Arab world and beyond, with branches established in many European 
countries, including Spain, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. When the 
SMB leadership was exiled from Syria following the Aleppo Midfayaa (Artillery  
Academy) in 1979 and Hama Massacre in 1982, many SMB leaders found their way to 
Europe. There, they sought support from politicians, academics and the media in their 
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host countries, especially in Germany, Italy and Spain. However, they failed to gain the 
interest or sympathy they wanted. This was in large part due to the violent nature of the 
Assad regime, which was feared by journalists in particular 
 
The SMB eventually persuaded a German journalist, Bein Veit of Die Welt, to report on 
the violence suffered by the SMB. In return, the SMB helped him cover the Iran-Iraq 
war. Veit arranged a one-hour interview with the SMB leader, Adnan Saad Al-Din, on 
German TV channel ZDF10. Al-Din spoke about the violence in Hama and Aleppo, and 
the interview generated considerable interest among other western media, including the 
German network ARD, Agence France-Presse and Reuters. While SMB members in 
exile were still concerned that they and their families would face reprisals for speaking 
out, they believed the time was right to do so, as they have continued to do (see Chapters 
5, 6, and 7).  
The SMB has worked closely with security services in Europe to keep its members in 
exile safe from reprisals from the Syrian regime. In the 1980s, the regime carried out a 
number of assassinations of SMB members and opponents (SHRC, 2003b). Salah Al-
Bitar, Baath party founder-turned-enemy was killed in Paris (Koven, 1980). A week 
later, former military judge Abdul-Wahab Al-Bakry was killed in Jordan. He had 
interrogated some of the protagonists of the coup in 1962, among them Hafiz Al-Assad. 
In 1981, Banan Al-Tantawi, the wife of former SMB leader Issam Al-Attar, was shot and 
killed in her flat in Aachen, Germany. Also in 1981, journalist Riyadh Taha and 
Muhamoud Wadda, a student in Yugoslavia and opponent of the regime, were killed. In 
1982, SMB member Nizar Ahmad Al-Sabagh was killed in Madrid. 
While the Syrian regime successfully assassinated many of its opponents in exile, co-
operation between the SMB and European security services helped prevent many other 
assassination attempts. Despite this, SMB members in exile faced an ever-present threat. 
The SMB’s European center was in Frankfurt, Germany, and was well known to the 
German security service and frequently visited by the media. It acted as a focal point for 
SMB activity in Europe, and allowed the SMB to spread their brand of moderate 
                                                
10	Given	the	time	lapse,	the	interview	itself	could	not	be	obtained.	The	information	mentioned	here	was	
given	by	an	anynomous	interviewee	in	Turkey	in	2015	
 68 
political Islam across Europe. They encouraged Arab Muslims living in Europe to seek 
integration with their new communities.  
4.5 The SMB post-2011 and the Demise of the Egyptian MB: Lessons Learnt from 
the Egyptian Situation 
 
The future of the SMB has been uncertain since the 2011 uprising. It is not surprising if 
he organization is frequently linked in the media to the Egyptian MB, with the 
assumption that the Egyptian MB represents the ideas and aims of all Muslim 
Brotherhoods worldwide. The SMB itself has risen to greater prominence since 2011, but 
many question whether the organization will be able to play a significant role in Syria’s 
future. Academics, people in the media, Syrian intellectuals, Syrian fighters and those in 
Syrian civil society are often unsure whether the SMB can or should do so.  
 
The SMB has learned much from the Egyptian revolution, and the disaster that followed 
it for the Egyptian MB. However, while there are some similarities between the two 
groups and their situations, there are many differences. This study initially set out to 
compare the two, but it quickly became apparent that the differences are too great for a 
meaningful comparison. Both the SMB and the Egyptian MB hold similar beliefs, but 
there are many differences in their circumstances. After the 2011 revolution in Egypt, 
seeing the damage done to the MB there, the SMB asked other opposition parties in 
Syria to join it in opposing Assad (see Chapters 6 and 7). At the same time, they have 
sought to spread their ideas further among the Syrian people.  
 
This study analyzes why the Syrian MB and the Egyptian MB are different, and why it is 
not possible to compare the two post-2011. While there are some similarities, these are 
not enough to effectively answer the question ‘did the SMB learn its lesson from the 
Egyptian MB’s experiences?’ Governments in the Middle East, including those in Egypt, 
UAE, and Saudi Arabia, continue to attempt to pain Muslim Brotherhoods as terrorist 
organizations (Wittes and McCants, 2017). This does give us reason to ask whether the 
SMB has learned lessons from Egypt. The analysis in this study will look at the two 
revolutions in Syria and Egypt, look to identify their focal points and identify what the 
ideological positions of the MB and SMB were at those points.  
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In 1952, the Egyptian MB’s Mohamad Nagib supported the overthrow of King Farouq 
and the coming to power of Nasser. However, months of repression at the hands of the 
Nasser government followed, with members of the MB imprisoned and tortured, and the 
organization being made illegal. After the uprising in 2011, Mubarak was removed from 
power and replaced by Morsi following elections. Morsi was a senior MB figure. Morsi 
himself was then removed in a military coup a year later, led by his own former 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi. Thousands of 
MB members were then imprisoned, including its elderly leaders. Death sentences were 
handed out at will by military tribunals, including to former President Morsi. Many MB 
members and sympathizers disappeared, and can be assumed to have been captured and 
tortured.  
 
In Syria, the SMB has not been active for over three decades. The Assad regime is still in 
power, and it is unknown what will happen next or whether the regime will fall. If it does 
fall, we do not know how the rebel fighters, including foreign fighters, currently in Syria 
will react to or treat the SMB. Members of the SMB are very much aware of the 
potential dangers they may face in a post-Assad Syria, given what happened to their 
counterparts in Egypt. Zuhair Salem, SMB spokesman, reflects that “it is always wise to 
learn lessons from other countries” and acknowledges that Egypt “could be considered as 
a close country to Syria in numerous ways” (Salem, London, 10.10.2014). 
 
Other Syrians of varied backgrounds, when interviewed also state that they can see some 
similarities between the Egyptian and Syrian situations. They include Ismael (an 
economist), Hanoun (a school supervisor), Sabbagh (CEO of a humanitarian 
organization), and Abu Ammar (a leading member of the revolutionary council in rebel-
held Aleppo) (personal communication with; Abu Ammar, 2015; Hannoun, Gaziantep, 
2014; Sabbagh,Gaziantep, 2014). These interviewees understand and support the idea 
that the SMB should look more closely at the challenges the Egyptian MB faced and 
seek to avoid the failure and destruction they experienced. Their concerns reflect those of 
many other Syrians, including both men and women, and people of all religions, such as 
Christian intellectual, Khassis. He suggests that the SMB should look to identify 
solutions to potential problems before they face potential elections, so that they can go 
into the electoral process without fear (Khassis, personal communication, Gaziantep, 
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2014). SMB leaders will need to know how to perform a political comeback if they are 
to play a role in shaping Syria’s future.  
 
SMB leaders are still seen as being knowledgeable and capable, able to play a role in 
Syrian politics. They have, their members believe, earned the right to take part in Syria’s 
future by having played such a vital role in its past (Salem, London, 10.10.2014). As 
well as their role in the struggle against the Baath party, they gained significant 
experience in day-to-day Syrian politics in the pre-Baath era. However, Syria’s situation 
is ever-changing, and there is no guarantee that the SMB will have a political future in 
the country. Syrian intellectual Dr. Adel Rihawi, not a member of the SMB but an 
interested observer, especially since the 2011 uprising, is skeptical of the SMB’s future 
potential, saying “however, the SMB is intending to take part at the ballot boxes the 
leaders should be aware that coming to power and be part of the future governance does 
mean to know in advance the parties which could lobbying against a movement in order 
to fail”(Rihawi, Killis, 2015) . Arwa Sa’a Aldaher holds a similar opinion, stating that 
“the SMB should learn their lessons anyhow, if provided they will do they best not to 
make political faults, and even if they are democratically elected, they still will have a lot 
of opponents” (Aldaher, Killis, 2016) 
 
The Egyptian MB failed because its leaders were untested and inexperienced. The 
country was at a point in time where it needed strong, experienced leaders who would be 
able to unite its various factions. The MB was simply not equipped to do that in Egypt. 
Political activist Obeida Fares suggests that older SMB leaders should begin to give way 
to younger members, who are unfettered by the country’s past. He believes that the SMB 
should look to reshape itself “adapting of new and contemporary decision-making tools, 
such as based on academic political research and knowledge in international relations, 
instead on the present focus on brotherhood and supportive aid activism”(Fares, personal 
communication, Istanbul, 2014). This perspective is shared by the Islamic scholar Yusuf 
Al-Qaradawi. He recommends that changes “should be undertaken with a view to 
making use of the capabilities afforded by our contemporary age and possessed and used 
by others” (Al-Qaradawi, 1992, p. 133)These suggestions could only be enacted if the 
SMB is willing to change its current decision-making process (as discussed in 5.2.3). 
The SMB will need to be able to choose people able to align the SMB with the Syrian 
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people during challenging times and then help forge a path for the organization in Syria’s 
future civil society.  
 
One UK-educated female member of the SMB’s advisory board puts forward a possible 
compromise. She suggests that “the Egyptian situation provides a great lesson for the 
SMB”. The SMB, she believes, will need to be able to share the political stage with 
others if it is to make a contribution to a developing new Syrian state. She points out that 
“democracy is still in its initial stages in the Arab world”. She emphasizes that there are 
“still existing threats to attempting to prevent democracy” (Al-Soufi, personal 
communication, london, 2014)  
 
The military coup in 2013 in Egypt proved that even after the introduction of democracy, 
old corruption in the state was not weeded out, military repression was not ended and 
exploitation of the people continued as before. Democratic elections were not enough to 
cement democracy in Egypt.  
 
The SMB itself, while expressing deep regret at the fate of the Egyptian president Morsi, 
believes that the situation in Syria is significantly different to that in Egypt (personal 
communication with; Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; Salem, London, 2014; Waleed, 
London, 2014). The SMB leaders have been outside of Syria for some time, and they 
believe that it is therefore unlikely that they would face the kind of backlash that Morsi 
did in Egypt (Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014).  
 
When interviewed, they tended to focus primarily on the differences between Syrian and 
Egyptian socio-political structures and history. They also compare the Egyptian MB’s 
actions before and after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 with those of the SMB. They 
refer to the SMB’s political vision, which has included democracy and participation 
since 2004 (see Chapter 4 and appendix). It seems clear to the SMB that they are on a 
different path to the Egyptian MB, and that it is impossible to make realistic predictions 
about the SMB’s future by looking at the experiences of the Egyptian MB. They may 
have once shared an ideology, but that does not mean they share a future.  
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The Egyptian MB has faced, since 2011, a “wave of repression” that “is more severe 
than anything the Brotherhood has experienced at least since the era of the president 
Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s”(Brown and Dunne, 2015). SMB leaders 
frequently point this out. They also argue that there are significant differences in the 
geopolitical context, the social fabric of the two countries and the status of the 
Brotherhood in each country prior to 2011. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the SMB leaders believe that it is important for them to 
consider modifying their outlook and behavior in the light of the Egyptian experience 
(personal communication with : Al-Shaikh, Istanbul, 2014 and Waleed, London, 2014). 
This is in line with the thoughts of Egyptian-born Islamic political thinker, Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi, who states in his book Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming 
Phase, that there is “no harm in re-examining political strategies in the light of local, 
regional and international changes and developments” (Al-Qaradawi, 1992, p. 132). 
 
Al-Qaradawi’s statement assumes a relatively stable environment. But in a conflict or 
revolution, change can happen fast and develop unexpectedly. The SMB will likely be 
tested in some way, and it may be similar to the challenges faced by the MB in Egypt 
after 2011. There are some critical voices that doubt that the SMB in its current form will 
be able to meet those challenges effectively. The SMB may, they believe, face a similar 
fate to the Egyptian MB. Some of those voices are from younger members; others are 
from long-term older members and supporters (personal communication with; Al-Shami, 
Gaziantep, 2014 and Toma, Gaziantep, 2014).  
 
The older generation of SMB members will need to work to unify the SMB, making the 
necessary changes to the organization that will help close the gap between its older and 
younger members. There are some clear age-based differences in perspective, which has 
the potential to cause disagreement in the movement, as analyzed in 5.2.2. There are 
currently doubts about the capability of the SMB, with critics believing that current SMB 
leaders share the problematic attitudes of the MB leaders in Egypt, and that they will 
therefore suffer the same fate. This may happen “for example, by excluding women and 
youth” from the decision-making process (Al-Shami, personal communication, 
Gaziantep, 2014).  
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Yaseer Wafai expressed doubts about the SMB leaders’ ability to learn from the 
Egyptian situation and change their attitudes accordingly. He says: “SMB as an 
organization will not learn much from the Egyptian situation” (Wafai, Gaziantep, 2014). 
He recognizes that many believe that the SMB and Egyptian MB’s differences are great 
enough for this not to be a problem. But, he continues: 
 
 “The SMB was banned from any kind of activities in Syria for 
decades. This fact, makes some SMB members believe that any 
way, the lack of presence in the past will let the organization not 
gain majority of votes in future, because it is predictable that the 
SMB will suffer of a fundamentally insufficient base in their 
home country, other than it has been in the Egyptian case” 
(Wafai, personal communication,  Gaziantep, 2014) 
 
These critics make important points, although it is apparent that they are assuming that 
the SMB leaders will fail before they have had the opportunity to demonstrate their 
competence in a post Assad era. However, the future of any social movement is 
dependent on its leadership and their ability to respond to change and criticism. It may be 
the case that the SMB leaders have already begun to consider the points made by their 
critics. Mahmoud Othman says: “[o]f course they (the SMB leaders) learned, and one of 
those lessons is in his opinion is that you see the SMB adopting is that they do not sit in 
the frontlines of the opposition alliance, while, as he noticed, remaining very 
active”(Othman, Istanbul, 2014). 
 
Syrian people hold a diverse range of views about the country’s current situation and the 
ability of the SMB and other groups to create future change. But that future is currently 
entirely unpredictable and will be difficult to manage, even if the SMB leaders are 
currently working hard to take into account criticism and working on supporting people 
still in Syria. Syria’s cities are in ruins and 250,000 people have died (see UN and 
Human rights organizations report in Chapter 6). Millions have fled or are fleeing, 
infrastructure (including schools, hospitals and marketplaces) is destroyed, and the 
fighting continues to worsen as those involved in the conflict seek out ever more 
damaging, high-technology weapons (see Chapter 6). Daesh is gaining power and wealth 
by selling seized Syrian oil. Young people have been attracted to the conflict and, after 
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witnessing violence, perpetuate it themselves. Various untrained rebel brigades still exist 
without any cohesive leadership or direction. 
 
The SMB is recognized as an advocate of humanitarian relief, but it is also an active ally 
of the exiled opposition alliance. It is possible that the SMB has played some part in the 
conflict on the ground. It is unclear whether the SMB has its own brigades, and if they 
do, whether they have been able to put significant resources into funding them. If the 
SMB becomes further involved in the conflict now, it may risk its reputation among 
Syrians. For this reason, it may choose to operate only in the political sphere.   
 
The next section will explore the SMB’s role in the conflict in Syria by evaluating the 
responses gathered at interviews conducted during multiple extensive stays in Turkey 
and reflections given during meetings close to the Syrian border in Killis and Gaziantep 
(Turkey 2013-2016). 
 
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
Since the establishment of the MB in Egypt and the SMB in Syria, both organizations 
have played an important role in their respective domestic politics. Both have 
experienced power and loss of power. Both initially gained popularity among 
intellectuals, but then developed along different lines. The SMB has tended to be a more 
elite organization than the Egyptian MB, which gained greater traction across all social 
classes. It is notable that both the MB and the SMB have survived for over 80 years. 
They have in that time faced considerable stress, including being classified as terrorists 
and their members served with death sentences. Despite their similarities, there are 
considerable differences in the way the MB and SMB have evolved, shaped by historical 
events and their geo-political environments.  
 
The SMB’s political activity was at its peak in the late 1940s to mid 1950s. At that time, 
and later, the organization has faced a number of difficulties and uncertainties. In 1947, 
they boycotted the Syrian parliamentary elections, which allowed leftist and communist 
parties to grow their support bases. This contributed to the Baathists and Al-Assad 
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coming to power. In retrospect, this was a high price to pay for their lack of 
participation. This meant that, already weakened, they struggled to fight the Baath Party 
in the 1960s. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, the SMB focus has tended to be on 
its social and educational work. Even so, they suffered greatly during the violence that 
occurred in Syria between 1979 and 1982, with thousands of members being killed, 
tortured and detained in Hama and Aleppo. As the leadership of the SMB went into exile 
in other Arab countries and in Europe, they maintained contact with each other and those 
left in Syria.  
 
In 2011, the youth of Syria revolted as part of the Arab Spring, and the SMB regained 
some of its presence in the country. They gained a foothold in the majority of the rebel-
held regions. However, 30 years and three generations passed before this happened. 
During this time, the SMB lost much of its political strength and social recognition. How 
well will the SMB handle the challenges they are likely to face in a post-Assad Syria? 
The next chapter provides an analysis of empirical data and information about the SMB 
and its members’ links to their Syrian family, friends and intellectual groups. It will 
show how the SMB has evolved in exile to become a socio-political actor.  
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Chapter 5: The SMB’s Organizational Internal Discussions 
and Responses to the Syrian Crisis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 outlined the organization of the SMB, which was constructed upon the 
ideology that they shared with their Egyptian counterparts, the MB. The influence of 
Syria’s political environment on the SMB led to it having different experiences to its 
‘mother organization’ in Egypt. This overview elucidates how withstanding the peaks 
and troughs of socio-political life helped the SMB to unite, and how the clashes between 
it and the Assad regime led to the repression of the SMB for half a century. Additionally, 
it explains the exile of SMB members to Europe (this will be discussed later in Chapters 
5 and 6), and how this shaped the organization’s political views. Lastly, the previous 
chapter showed that the SMB do not compare their situation with the pitiful situation of 
the MB in Egypt following the coup d’état, as they continuously aim to form alliances 
with opposing political parties in Syria, both before and after the 2011 uprising. 
 
This chapter aims to discuss the domestic response of the SMB to the Syrian crisis 
following the 2011 uprising, as well as the SMB’s rise from an idle, exiled, and 
unrecognised political party to a reinvigorated political force in Syria. The ambitions of 
the SMB’s leader will be discussed, including his desire to enter the political arena in 
Syria – whilst remaining in exile – as a direct participant of an opposition political party 
during the Syrian revolution. 
 
It will be argued that the life-experiences and individual challenges faced by the SMB 
members during their time in exile helped equip them and their future generations with 
political astuteness, reinforcing their knowledge base whilst preserving the SMB’s 
institutional ideologies. It will also be argued that this knowledge allowed the SMB to 
recognize the challenges of the Syrian crisis and provide ad-hoc relief to the Syrian 
people in need. 
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This chapter will explain how the SMB members provided this humanitarian relief to the 
Syrian people. It will also explain how affiliates of the SMB contributed to Syrian 
politics through local councils, providing essential administrative and social services to 
Syrians in the rebel-held northern and southern regions of Syria. This chapter will then 
argue that despite these organized efforts, the SMB struggled to satisfy the rising 
expectancies of the Syrian people. An in-depth analysis will serve to show how the 
large-scale and far-reaching challenges faced by the SMB hindered their attempts to 
effect change and demonstrate their socio-political skills throughout this unique and rare 
opportunity for change. 
 
The chapter will elucidate the reasons why, on one hand, the SMB was disregarded due 
to the Syrian Ba’athist party’s political machinery, and on the other, why SMB members 
were rewarded for their pre-existing relationships within Syria. The Syrian people’s 
perceptions of the SMB will also be examined, as will the SMB’s hierarchical practises. 
These issues will all be discussed in light of the Syrian crisis and within the context of 
the region’s politically unstable state. It will also explain how these challenges 
influenced the SMB’s leadership’s decisions, leading them to remove themselves from 
the public political stage. Reform-orientated SMB members’ demand for hierarchical 
change has placed increasing pressure on the SMB; they want the organization’s 
hierarchy to accommodate the changing dynamics in Syria as a result of its evolving 
political climate. 
 
This chapter will explore the SMB’s recent reintegration with Syrian society despite the 
potentially undermining multifaceted challenges surrounding the organization. It will be 
explained that the SMB members’ decisions to build bridges revitalised their social and 
humanitarian commitments to the war-harmed Syrians. The leadership of the SMB 
acknowledged these personal initiatives, which were independent of the SMB’s 
organizational constraints. SMB members have been free to initiate or join NGOs that 
are compatible with the organization’s ideology. 
 
These humanitarian initiatives have been viewed positively by the SMB’s leadership as 
they are deemed to garner public support for the SMB’s socio-political efforts. However, 
interviews with former Syrian Ba’athists in Turkey bring to light another significant 
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challenge for the SMB. The interviews suggest that many intellectuals who studied in 
Syria before emigrating have been influenced by Ba’athist perceptions of the SMB. This 
chapter will explain how the SMB is countering this to gain the trust of critically-
thinking Syrians. These empirical findings will be analyzed in light of the conceptual 
framework introduced in Chapter 3. This will be used to explain how social movements, 
in general, and the Islamic movements, in particular, reacted to their surrounding 
political environments, recognizing opportunities and seeking to overcome these 
challenges. This chapter will begin by focussing on the organizational responses of the 
SMB to the Syrian crisis post-2011 (Section 5.2). It will expound upon the challenges 
faced by the SMB’s leadership from critics of the organization’s internal structure who 
are calling for reform. It will be explained that the SMB’s strict organizational structure, 
as founded by Al-Sabai, was not a priority of the SMB before 2011, primarily because 
the organization was facing an existential threat following the 1982 Hama massacres that 
resulted in the exile of SMB members. 
 
On-going interviews and discussions with members of the organization have made clear 
the SMB’s hierarchical structure following the 2011 Syrian uprising. This chapter will 
analyze the arguments and discussions between the SMB leaders, and those between the 
leaders and the second and third generation members in exile. The chapter will also refer 
to the “Meluccian challenge”, analyzing the movement without assuming its inception 
from a point of unity; rather it will be recognised that “a social movement is not a 
homogenous body” (Melucci, 1996). 
 
Section 5.3 will shed light on the internal structure of the SMB before 2011 in order to 
clarify any significant changes post-2011 (which will be discussed in section 5.4). 
Subsection 5.3.1 will examine the SMB’s humanitarian outreach and social service 
activities following the Syrian uprising. It will discuss whether the organization managed 
to reconnect with the Syrian people through its socio-political ideologies. The analysis in 
this subsection will be conducted using information that has been gathered through 
extensive interviews with active SMB members living in exile, and through interviews 
with both male and female intellectuals (unaffiliated with the SMB) who left Syria long 
after the beginning of the 2011 Syrian crisis. 
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Section 5.5 will illustrate the proposal of the ‘fast-track option’, which embraces more 
flexible facets of modern management concepts by comparing the internal statutes both 
before and after the uprising. This was suggested as an alternative to the existing 
hierarchical structure of the SMB. After analysing the structural prerequisites of the 
SMB as a hierarchical Islamic social movement, this study will examine whether the 
SMB’s socio-political position would be strengthened if the organization decided to join 
the growing number of NGOs in Turkey. Whether such a decision could make those 
viewing the SMB as a ‘clandestine Islamist movement’ view it as an internationally 
recognized organization will also be discussed. 
 
 
5.2 Organizational Discussions Surrounding the Syrian Uprising 
The Syrian uprising offered a unique opportunity for the SMB to return to the political 
scene. This came following the repression of the group and the exile of its members by 
Hafez Al-Assad in Syria. Chapter 4 discussed how the SMB entered the Syrian political 
scene during the 1950s and 1960s. Even following their exile in the 80s, the SMB 
remained politically active, opposing the Assad regime and considering itself as being 
part of the multi-ethnic multi-faith Syrian society. This provided the SMB with socio-
political legitimacy. It also allowed them to initiate and become part of the numerous 
opposition alliances that appeared post-2011. Despite this, however, the SMB’s 
influence on the ground in Syria remained limited. 
SMB members can see that the lack of young flexible leadership is preventing the SMB 
from significantly influencing Syrian politics following the uprising. The analysis 
showed that generally young people who joined the SMB as part of their commitment to 
the revolution are concerned that the SMB leadership is still primarily dominated by a 
team of elderly figures. This is seen as being a result of the organization’s internal 
structure and membership system, particularly the practise of not allowing common 
SMB members to attain leadership positions until they have been ‘tested’ for many years 
and passed through many stages of the hierarchical system. 
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This study discusses the benefits and drawbacks of the current structure of the SMB. It 
analyzes whether or not the SMB’s internal structure allows it to mobilize and recruit 
members of the Syrian society with similar ideological beliefs. These beliefs may be pre-
existing or a result of the Syrian crisis. On the one hand, the SMB leaders’ willingness to 
reconcile with the Syrian people following the result of their initial efforts is in question. 
On the other hand, the expectations of some Syrian people have been raised too high, as 
they consider the SMB to be a political alternative to the existing Assad regime. 
Analyzing the SMB’s internal structure both before and after 2011 serves to elucidate the 
SMB leadership’s efforts to bridge gaps between the organization, the Syrian people, and 
other political actors in Syria. It leads to the question of whether the SMB should 
eventually modernize its decision-making processes, taking into consideration the 
alternatives. The SMB will initially consider the ‘fast-track’ option, which comprises of 
a contemporary, lean management structure, because this structure is preferred by the 
reform-orientated SMB members. The option of shifting from being an Islamic 
movement to a recognised, Islamic socio-political NGO could be viewed as a far-
reaching step, but one that can increase the organization’s ‘action radius’ long-term. This 
coincides with the SMB’s desire to revive the organization as an Islamic grassroots 
movement and a key socio-political actor in Syria. 
 
5.3 The SMB’s Internal Statutes pre-2011 
 
Though the MB has traditionally been viewed as an international movement, it is clear 
upon examining its history that each MB movement became country-specific, with 
national programmes and aims (Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014). This has allowed the 
initiators to recruit members due to national contexts and goals. Regarding Syria, the 
SMB has been, as mentioned by(Teitelbaum, 2011a) , a small elitist organization. 
However, the current socio-political programmes of the organization have been strongly 
influenced by Ulama (religious scholars), such as the Egyptian born Sheikh Yousef Al-
Qaradawi (in Qatar) and the Syrian Mahmoud Al-Mira (in Saudi Arabia). 
 
In fact, many of the former and current SMB leaders were Ulama themselves, such as 
Mustafa Al-Sibai, Abdul-Fatah Abu Ghouddah, and Muonir Al-Ghaddban (see Chapter 4 
and Appendix 6). This influenced the SMB’s statutes, as the members consulted Islamic 
 81 
legal guidelines before adopting specific programmes. All of the organization’s internal 
practises are compliant with Islamic law(Teitelbaum, 2011a). Resultantly, a significant 
feature of the SMB’s organisation is that all members of its leadership need to have in-
depth religious knowledge. This has been the case since the foundation of the SMB in 
1948 by the charismatic Al-Sibai (Pierret, 2013, p. 179). 
 
Al-Sibai acknowledged that after World War II, the French colonialists had left Syria in 
not only a state of economic chaos, but in significant political turmoil, especially for the 
Sunni civil society of Syria. The alarm and confusion were caused by a new group of 
secular militias who were primarily supported by the up-and-coming Alawite minority. 
This resulted from the arrangement of Syrian borders by the French mandate in 1920, 
following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. To Al-Sibai, it became clear that the French 
occupation had amalgamated an ethnically and religiously diverse population, with the 
resulting turbulence continuing into modern day Syria. 
 
Since the SMB was founded it, possessed a strict hierarchical ladder similar to the one 
belonging to the EMB. They believed that this would provide them with a solid base 
from which they could educate the people with a demanding, yet moderate (wasatiah), 
Islamic programme (see 1.3.4 and 4.2). This ladder effectively means that members of 
the organization need to prove the strength of their character before they can reach the 
higher leadership positions. These proofs include: a willingness to gain religious 
knowledge, financial contributions to worthy causes, and efforts to increase one’s social 
engagement. Despite minor local adaptations, the SMB’s structure, recruitment systems, 
and training methods remain largely identical to those of the EMB, which set high 
character targets to attain before leadership positions were given (Krämer, 2009; 
Mitchell, 1993; Pargeter, 2013) . 
 
Al-Banna began the Usra (family) system. The Usra is the smallest unit within the larger 
MB structure. Anybody wanting to join the MB needed to first join an Usra through 
which they underwent spiritual education designed to cover communal matters and self-
reflections with Tarbiah (education). The Usra was limited to active MB members only. 
Hassan Al-Banna emphasised that the MB’s Dawa (preaching) needed to be through 
education, Tarbiah, and Jihad Al-Nefs (self-assessment and communal duties). These 
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three aspects are meant to represent the basic pillars of comprehensive and all-
encompassing Dawa. 
 
The SMB adopted similar methods whilst aiming to promote a ‘Syrian concept’. Their 
Dawa was carried out primarily through weekly study circles, Usar Al-Takween, and 
Usar Al-A’mal. The study circles ensured that members received essential Islamic 
knowledge, something which is considered to be a cornerstone of the SMB’s ideology. 
Usar Al-Takween (the smallest unit in the preparatory stage) was established to provide 
the necessary Tarbiah. Usar Al-A’mal (the working groups) was established to promote 
justice, Dawa, and Jihad Al-Nefs. 
 
This proved an effective strategy for the SMB, who did not make any significant changes 
to this structure for a number of years. However, this leadership recruitment and training 
system was no longer sustainable in the early 1980s. Hafiz Al-Assad outlawed the SMB 
and its leadership was forced into exile. The Usra circles could no longer be formed or 
held due to the political repression. Whilst in exile, members of the SMB carried out 
unofficial SMB-esque Dawa activities. They tried hard to integrate in their new host 
countries and avoid breaking any laws. Following the 2011 uprising, the SMB leadership 
considered these environmental settings to be the reason why a generation (or two) of 
Syrian youths identified ideologically with the SMB, but were not officially a part of it 
through Baya. 
 
Whatever the reason, following the 2011 uprising the SMB’s efforts to revitalize itself 
were hindered by its strict internal organizational structures. The circle of leaders 
consisted of passionate, ambitious, and moderate SMB members, as they had all passed 
through the rigorous years-long programs, and had proven their engagement. These 
individuals were able to make strategic and organizational changes to the SMB. Only 
privileged members who reached the level of Al-Raqeeb were allowed to vote and 
choose the consultation board members. The reality of the post-crisis Syrian situation 
affected the SMB’s ability to evolve and adapt to times and challenges. A broad and 
critical look at the SMB’s internal structure will serve to elucidate any significant 
changes to it resulting from the 2011 uprising. 
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5.4 The SMB’s Internal Statutes post-2011 
 
Regarding MB’s general organization, (Masoud, 2013)mentions that the “storied 
organizational effectiveness of the SMB stems in large part from a member recruitment 
process designed to select only the most highly skilled, committed cadres”. However, 
following the 2011 Syrian uprising, questions arose regarding the efficiency of the 
SMB’s internal structure. As will be shown later, younger interviewee respondents 
(SMB affiliates or members), who came together after residing in Arab and Western 
countries, suggested that a new organizational structure would pave the way for a revival 
and propagation of the SMB’s mission. This view is echoed by other activists as well 
who have been supporting Syrians in Turkey, something they view as unprecedented and 
representative of the dire situation of the Syrians. 
 
The fate of the SMB as a Syrian socio-political organization is not solely dependent upon 
the escalating developments on the ground in Syria. As Chapter 6 will show, the political 
performance of the SMB’s leadership on the international stage, along with their ability 
to win support from regional and international stakeholders, will also affect the outcome 
of the organization. The Syrian crisis required quick responses and coordinated action, 
and this was acknowledged by the SMB, whose structure was based on individual 
responsibilities, diplomatic knowledge, political experience, and charismatic leadership. 
Therefore, the SMB was, at the time of the crisis, represented by capable individuals (Al-
Bayanouni, London, 2014). However, because the SMB structure had not undergone any 
major changes since its inception by Al-Sibai, only those members with longstanding 
memberships were able to vote or run for leadership positions. Therefore, only these 
individuals were involved in decision making. 
 
Resultantly, younger members who had joined post-2011, as well as other SMB 
affiliates, felt frustrated as they were unable to benefit the organization significantly with 
their fresh understanding of the local dynamics in Syria. Despite their novel approaches 
to the Syrian crisis, these new members were barred from running for leadership 
positions as they had not undergone the years-long programs and had not had time to 
show sufficient engagement with the organization. This made it almost impossible to 
integrate these new members quickly into the organization’s decision-making centres. 
 
 84 
Young members of the SMB frequently mentioned these criticisms (Sermini, Gaziantep, 
2014; Toma, Gaziantep, 2014). To some extent, these opinions were also shared by more 
senior members of the organization, such as Al-Bayanouni. According to Al-Bayanouni: 
“it seems that there is a necessity of modernizing and easing the SMB organization’s 
decision-making process” (Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014).  Nevertheless, he equally 
mentioned that the SMB is an Islamic movement that is open to all active Muslims who 
share their goals and visions with the organization. 
 
This primary criterion for an affiliate or member of the SMB is a broad one. Internal 
statutes describe this ‘primary stage’, in which the prospective ‘brother’ or ‘sister’ 
becomes trained and aware of the Islamic practises and ideologies of the group through 
study circles. The individual is required to study selected verses of the Quran, which 
mostly deal with respectful behaviour. This criterion, though seemingly simple and easy 
to accomplish, can lead to a slowing of the recruitment process. In the post-uprising 
Syrian environment, not every individual felt that attending weekly study circles was a 
priority at the time. People struggling to fulfil their basic daily needs found it difficult to 
attend these circles every week, despite their desire to join a socio-political Islamic 
movement. 
 
Interviews in Turkey showed that the Syrian people were more concerned with managing 
their daily tasks than attending study circles. This observation reflects the statements of 
(Singerman, 2004), who said “social movements emerge out of local contexts,” and that 
the “political environment is key to an understanding of an Islamist movement’s agenda 
and trajectory” (Singerman, 2004:144). This explains the manner of Al-Sibai’s inception 
of the SMB in the 1940s. Post-2011, however, the political situation had changed, as 
SMB members operating from outside of Syria no longer had any significant influence 
within the country. Nevertheless, SMB members, even after 30 years of exile, considered 
themselves as being a part of the Syrian community with strong emotional attachments 
to the country. These members shared the grievances of the Syrians in Syria and in 
refugee camps across the world. 
 
The SMB considered all Syrians to be potential members, but in return, many Syrians 
argued that there was no need to regulate membership through religious activities (e.g. 
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memorising parts of the Quran); they felt that their connection with god as their creator 
was sufficient evidence of their commitment. SMB membership progression also 
demanded an extensive level of evidence regarding community support commitments. 
To reach the stage of ‘The Supporter’ (Al-Nassir), a candidate needed to be “an active 
supporter of the SMB and believe in its ideology. The supporter can take active roles in 
the SMB’s social activities” (Ikhwan web, 2007) .  
 
The Syrian crisis posed the question of how the SMB’s leadership would appoint active 
duties to their supporters. The SMB had proven that its networking was functionable, 
even whilst in exile, but the current Syrian situation was different; communication 
facilities were failing, and the environment was a much more dangerous one. Even if 
they ventured into the so-called free zones, Russian war-planes and Assad’s helicopter’s 
barrel bombs had proven anything but reassuring (McKeran, 2017). This made the 
organization’s activities difficult for all senior members of the SMB. The junior 
members were often imprisoned within the warzone or within refugee camps under the 
control of their host countries. 
 
A thorough look at the next stage in the SMB’s recruitment process highlights why the 
reform-orientated SMB members are calling for changes. To be a ‘Member’ (Al-Odu) 
(referring to the rank and not the broader sense of the word) of the SMB, “the Brother [or 
sister] must be actively engaged with SMB-related social duties for at least one year. 
These activities should not interfere with competing prosperities and responsibilities in 
other organizations, yet solely committing to Islamic values. He/she must be nominated 
by at least two members of the SMB and has to give the oath/’Baya’”. The question is 
again raised as to how a ‘Supporter’ could possibly fulfil such a criterion by working 
actively and regularly for the organization in a warzone. Measuring these activities in 
such an environment was also difficult, especially when considering that the dynamics 
on the Syrian ground were changing hourly. 
 
The concerns of a Syrian youth (who wished to remain anonymous out of fear of the 
Syrian muckabarat (secret services), who were active at Turkish border cities) may have 
reached the executive members of the SMB. In his opinion, the SMB could play a much 
more active public role if they were to be recognized by the Syrian people as the best 
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organized oppositional political party. He worried that: “time is running out for the 
Syrian people, yet our organization’s leadership is not showing keenness to cut or to 
adapt these kinds of time-consuming requirements, with their complicated nominating 
and ‘Baya’ procedures to appoint supervisors.” 
 
Having analyzed just the entry levels of the SMB’s organization, the strictness of the 
structure has already become apparent. This stringency hindered the SMB in answering 
the three questions that Beekum sees as essential for any organization: “Where are we 
going? Where could we be going? How do we get there?” (Beekum, 2006: 5). It should 
be mentioned that the SMB did try to show their vision of a pluralistic Syria clearly (see 
Appendix 5). The reality, however, is that effective management requires proactivity and 
adaptation to one’s environment to effect change, not just theoretical roadmaps. 
 
Now that the entry levels of the SMB’s membership ladder have been explained, a 
summary of the more senior levels will be given. This will serve to highlight the 
inconsistencies within the organization’s internal structure, something exacerbated by the 
political demands of post-2011 Syria. The next steps on the SMB’s membership ladder 
are: 
 
a) ‘The Affiliated’ (Al-Muntasib). This individual must have received two years 
of training in an SMB Usra. Members have to learn to, and show themselves 
to, sacrifice their money and time to support the wider society; they 
additionally have to pay an annual membership fee. ‘Al-Muntasib’ provides 
consultation to the SMB’s leading committee and he/she is recognized as 
being an active member of the SMB ‘family’. Until 1982, this consultation 
stage may have proven effective, because the Usra’s functioned regionally. 
 
Post-2011, the SMB leadership understood that “the costs of political 
participation in the region are high, and, thus, people turn to informal 
networks to organize and advance their interests” (Singerman, 2004, p. 
144)Post-2011, the SMB no longer functioned like a unified organization 
because of the uncertainties resulting from the proxy war inside Syria; there 
was a high level of fear of the regime. Additionally, since 2013, the extremist 
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group ISIS, who were terrorizing the local population, considered the SMB to 
be outlaws due to the more moderate nature of their organization; this was 
reiterated by eye-witnesses and long-term SMB members in Turkey 
(Interviewees, Istanbul and Gaziantep 2014, 2015). 
 
b) ‘The Operating Brother’ (Al-A’meel). The SMB’s statutes state that to attain 
this rank: “the member must be promoted by one of the SMB leadership. 
He/she must have been working for three years at least with the SMB, and 
have contributed from his money, effort, and time towards charity work or 
other humanitarian related activities, which allow him/her to act as an official 
representative for the SMB.” These requirements reflect the observations 
made by Singerman and other academics that: “[T]he Islamist vision of the 
“good life” is “not simply” about ‘religion’ or ‘politics’, but is part of a 
cultural battle over the very definitions of this term” (Singerman, 2004; 
Wuthnow, 1991, p. 16). 
 
The SMB demonstrated its intention to show its presence both in Syria and 
among the exiled Syrian community. The SMB’s leader may have to consider 
that: “they have more commonly and successfully directed their message and 
organizational strategies toward changing practices and the meaning of 
everyday life”  (Singerman, 2004, p. 150). Otherwise, the SMB’s stringent 
recruitment and progression practises could discourage and block people who 
wished to join such an organization. 
 
c) ‘The Captain’ (Al-Nakib). To attain this rank, the SMB leadership must 
promote the individual and he/she must have good organizational skills. At 
this rank level, the individual has the right to elect the leadership committee. 
To qualify for the role of Al-Nakib, he/she must be well known by the SMB’s 
leadership. This is very difficult in practise in the Syrian warzone, even 
though the organization’s headquarters are based in neighbouring Istanbul, 
Turkey. The changing circumstances and the provocative environment 
surrounding the Syrians mean that meetings with the SMB’s leadership would 
entail very dangerous border crossings. 
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Refugees have little opportunity to relocate from one place to another without 
valid travel permits. In light of this, how is it possible for the SMB leadership 
to test the organizational skills of the refugees? Upon hearing criticisms such 
as these, the SMB’s leadership aim to show their openness and willingness to 
rectify internal issues. However they wish to proceed, they cannot be 
oblivious to the effects of the evolving, multi-facetted, war-torn environment 
within Syria. 
 
Every individual member of the SMB will need to make decisions that they are satisfied 
with. Opp (2009) mentions that “persons sacrifice,” that is, do what they think is best for 
them and not what objectively (i.e. from the viewpoint of a third omniscient person) 
yields the highest possible benefits.” (Opp, 2009, p. 3). For potential SMB members who 
agree with the organization’s ideologies, the lack of immediate reward or 
acknowledgement may steer them towards other organizations through which they can 
vent their frustrations. For example, the apolitical ‘Sufi’ organization (who were 
tolerated by the Assad regime) gained a massive number of proponents with their Islamic 
agendas inside Syria following the exile of the SMB (Khatib, 2011; Lesch and Haas, 
2016; Pierret, 2013). The group is still recruiting (mostly female) intellectuals outside 
Syria (Suzan, personal communication, Killis, 2016) 
 
An individual dissuaded from joining the SMB due to its demanding criteria would seek 
alternatives to achieve his/her religious ambitions. The decision to join the SMB with its 
rigorous, years-long membership ladder is essentially a personal decision that SMB 
affiliates must make. Furthermore, the barriers to reaching positions of genuine influence 
within the SMB’s hierarchy within a reasonable timeframe, and without large financial 
and physical sacrifices, will make potential SMB “individuals choose between the 
behavioural alternatives open to them by maximizing their utility”(Opp, 2009, p. 3). If 
the potential affiliates are willing to bear burdens to demonstrate their goodwill towards 
the organization, the organization must respond by showing its goodwill towards the 
individuals by providing management posts as rewards for these candidates. 
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The membership requirements apply equally to men and women; the SMB’s leadership 
boasts that their organization’s upper management positions are open to all candidates 
from the ‘Sisterhood section’ too. However, anonymous female interviewees in Turkey 
(2014, 2015) still perceive gender inequality. The SMB leadership claim that they are 
aiming for women to represent at least 20% of the general membership and at least 10% 
of the executive board (Majliss Al-Shoura). However, these intentions are difficult to 
translate into figures, because there are no reliable statistics available on the subject. 
SMB leader generally agree that they need to actively promote greater female 
participation in the SMB executive council board. This step could serve to revive the 
existing female section; the greater participation of women would not be something new 
for the organization, rather, it would be a return to their state pre-exile (personal 
communication with: Al-Bayanouni, London, 2015; Salem, London, 2014; Waleed, 
London, 2014) 
 
The SMB executive board members had actively approached female members who were 
active pre-1980s, and had been staying in exile since then (Al-Droubi,personal 
communication, Vinna, 2014). The SMB’s leadership stresses that it has always kept the 
doors open for its female members who are interested in being engaged in wide-ranging 
social activities, including human relief work, which the SMB had been actively 
promoting post-2011(Al-Bayanouni, personal communication, London, 2015) .They also 
stressed that it was not easy recruiting elderly female members who were willing to 
appear on public podiums and work independently for noble causes. 
 
A deeper analysis identified two primary reasons for this condition. The first reason is 
the traditional, culturally conservative upbringing of these elderly women. These 
upbringings have not promoted female engagement in public affairs as much (personal 
communication with, Salem, London, 2014 and female interviewees, Turkey, 2016). The 
second reason is the fact that many elderly Syrian women had never been provided with 
free speech or power under the Ba’ath party - this was held predominantly by the male 
members.   
 
Due to the rules and regulations of the repressive Syrian government, female activists 
were not allowed to partake in any religious gatherings or organizational activities other 
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than those that were solely religious in nature. These well-known circles and their 
‘annsat’ (female leaders) were recognized by the state’s secret service as being 
apolitical. History has proven that the hands of the muckabarat did not respect the 
female wing of the SMB. The SMB have mentioned that a group of their socially active 
female members was infiltrated by the muckabarat, leading to imprisonment and torture 
of the females in the regime’s cells, traumatizing Syrian women and preventing their 
participation in socio-political activities (Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; Y. Al-Najjar, 
Gaziantep, 2015; Salem, London, 2014). Many females who belonged to the SMB, or 
showed any kind of political engagement, were detained and questioned, put under house 
arrest, or prevented from leaving the country (Anonymous interviewee, Turkey, 2014). 
 
Due to these security concerns, the SMB has been somewhat reluctant to fully publicly 
promote their female members. They feel that these women are safer in exile, and that if 
their activities are made too public, they may be tracked and harassed by the Syrian 
Secret Service; Banan Al-Tantawi’s assassination in Aachen, Germany serves as a stark 
reminder of this very real danger (Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; Al-Najjar, Gaziantep, 
2015; Lefèvre, 2013; Salem, London, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, the SMB leaders acknowledge the potential benefits resulting from female 
integration into the organization, especially in its higher ranks. Dr. Mohamad Waleed, 
who has recently been elected as a guide for the SMB, emphasized the fact that SMB 
leaders have continuously encouraged female participation. He states that: “They (SMB 
leaders) have been open for members equal to both genders to progress with feasible 
ideas and concepts regarding their vision for a modern future in Syria. In particular, the 
present leadership is investing in women’s empowerment, through the above-mentioned 
factors” (Waleed, London, 2014). Female participation, especially in political decision-
making, is viewed as being essential by the SMB’s leaders. 
 
The SMB has pushed for women with leadership qualities to be involved in designing, 
improving, and implementing programs for the SMB (Waleed, London 2014). Zuhair 
Salem mentions that there are some social traditions that prevent Syrian women from 
advancing in political roles. As a member of the executive board, he has personally 
worked for many years to overcome such constraints. He states that he: “used to visit our 
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sisters and their gatherings and I tried encourage all to take steps towards different 
possible SMB activities.” However, he mentions that the discussions often took place 
within a self-limiting frame of thought that limited the action radius to “social and 
charity work” (Salem, personal communication, London, 2014). 
 
Salem emphasizes the SMB’s historic determination increase the possibilities for Syrian 
women. There was much work done on this front in the past. However, post-2011, the 
environment has changed drastically. This begs the question whether increasing female 
participation still a top priority for the SMB. The SMB’s leadership has again 
demonstrated its appreciation for novel ideas for aid programs that have been thought of 
by Syrian women. The SMB have acted upon these ideas to bring aid to the Syrian 
ground and to Syrian refugees. The SMB has acknowledged the need to open new 
pathways of aid, especially for the many women who have faced tremendous life-
changing hardship in the evolving and dramatic Syrian warzone environment (personal 
communication with: Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; Salem, London, 2014; Waleed, 
London, 2014). 
 
Syria’s urban women have traditionally worked in the educational, medical, or nursing 
sectors. Over recent years, this has changed as more females have entered fields such as 
engineering, humanities, and computer sciences. Additionally, the daughters of MB 
members had been encouraged to pursue higher education in Western universities or 
newly established universities in the Arab Gulf states. The SMB was therefore met with 
a new workforce of educated and confident women in 2011. The families of these 
women worked hard to endure the circumstances and educate their daughters whilst 
keeping them politically aware. 
 
Interviewees suggested that young women with university degrees and/or professional 
women who had been raised within SMB (or their affiliates) families were invited by 
high-ranking SMB members to bring in ideas to support the SMB’s vision for the future 
of Syria (see appendices). The fact that there still is the need for a ‘female section’ shows 
that the movement still has some way to go in furthering the influence of its female 
members. The leadership has chosen to avoid reforming the female section at this time 
due to the risks of internal disputes. Though the results of such reformations may prove 
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beneficial, the SMB’s leadership has made other ‘more pressing’ concerns its priorities. 
The SMB are traditionally thought of as being a pragmatic organization. The question 
then arises whether they could use the fact that they currently have no official political 
presence in Syria to their advantage, carrying out internal reform before they become 
more politically involved. 
 
Encouraging internal segments of the SMB’s membership to speak out and voice their 
concerns would not weaken the organization. Rather, it would strengthen it by relieving 
the frustrations of its members. In the long-term, the SMB can benefit from this as a 
social movement and it can become a relied-upon political actor that responds to the 
contemporary concerns of its membership. The SMB’s leadership and its Majlees Al-
Shura (advisory council to the executive internal decision-making board) have 
repeatedly shown their clear preference to adhere to the organization’s historic practises 
as a grassroots organization; perhaps a risky move given the current concerns. 
 
In the opinion of the SMB’s leaders, the organization has consistently been meeting its 
members’ expectations, both young and old. This includes meeting the expectations of 
the members calling for reform. It was made very clear through the interviews with the 
leading members of the SMB, who highlighted the fact they were able to not only keep 
the organization alive, but to keep it functioning, making apparent their political vision 
despite being exiled for decades. The leaders are used to handling issues whilst dealing 
with time and space constraints and poor conditions, making them well-equipped to 
handle the challenges of post-crisis Syria (Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014). However, this 
reliance on ‘experience’ can also be viewed as a rather easily discreditable attempt to 
delegitimize the sharing of power. 
 
The organization has survived with this ‘Old Guard’ as its officially elected leaders. 
However, this experience whilst living for decades in foreign lands does not necessarily 
justify the keeping of the Old Guard and the refusal to accept newer, younger members 
as leaders. The SMB’s leadership has been questioned on many occasions over the past 
60 years. Differences within grassroot movements have long been acknowledged by 
social movement theorists. Masoud remarks regarding the SMB’s position on the Old 
Guard post-2011, he states that: “However, it may equally be argued that the 
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movement’s emphasis on obedience to authority gives its top leadership greater room to 
manoeuvre – ideologically and operationally – than organizations whose leaders must 
hew closely to the opinions of the rank and file” (Masoud 2013, 493) .  
 
Nevertheless, the SMB leadership acknowledges the need for structural reorganization 
and for the reorientation of its far-reaching aims. In order to implement major internal 
changes, they need to consider external factors that the SMB cannot influence. These 
external factors are the result of the nature of the proxy war in Syria, and the 
multidimensional international consequences resulting from the crisis, including military 
interventions and refugee-related problems. 
 
It may prove worthwhile for SMB leaders to reflect on significant changes in their frame 
of thinking, as the organization is now aiming to attain national and international 
recognition. There are some signs of a change of mind from the elder members. Though 
the leaders are showing moments of goodwill at present, it is questionable whether such 
gestures would be adequate to attract a significant number of female members to join the 
SMB’s leadership ranks. 
 
Campbell states that women’s groups in the USA “…were more successful when they 
framed their demands in ways that convinced people that granting women the right to 
vote would reinforce rather than undermine women’s traditional identity and gender 
roles” (McCammon et al., 2001). Taking this into consideration, as well as the 
unprecedented challenges in modern day Syria, emphasizing gender equality in an 
Islamic movement could provide the SMB leaders with an advantage over their rivals, 
allowing them to gain credibility from the Syrian people. 
 
This is a key step for the SMB; educated and committed women are wondering when the 
doors for exiled and displaced women, and for women residing in rebel-held areas, will 
open. Such women are: “willing to contribute positively to different kinds and forms of 
social engagement programmes in general, or programmes provided in particular for 
children and women in need would be open without barriers of hierarchical structures” 
(Suzan, personal communication, Killis, 2016) The SMB may, at a later time (following 
the fall of the Assad regime), rely on the votes and support of Syria’s women. 
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These programs are in line with Syrian traditions and culture, identifying women as the 
primary carers of children and the primary maintainers of family life. For most Syrian 
women, participation in any program would place increased physical (e.g. sharing 
family, household, and activity-related duties), psychological (e.g. warzone-related 
issues), and financial (e.g. logistic, travel, and childcare expenses) burden on them. 
Indeed, it has always been a challenge for Syria’s female intellectuals to join the SMB 
and alter their living circumstances. 
 
Nevertheless, the SMB leaders seem to be considering to  make the enrolment paths for 
both men and women easier (Waleed, London, 2014). Either a shorter ‘fast-track’ option 
should be made available, or significant changes to the recruitment and progression 
process in-line with the demands of reform-orientated SMB members should be made. If 
the SMB is looking forward to drastically changing its outlook through the revolution 
whilst remaining an Islamic organization with socio-political intentions, it must seriously 
reflect on its current context and the changes it needs to make to adapt to it. These 
alternative strategies, which will be analyzed in section 5.5, have been proposed by 
concerned members of the organization who feel that the SMB is at breaking point; they 
see these changes as being essential for the long-term survival of the organization and its 
socio-political ideology. Although time is not in their favour, the SMB leaders still have 
the opportunity to make these changes and adapt to their new environment. 
 
5.5 The Modest ‘Fast Track’ Option versus a Reflective Change Option 
 
In light of the above, reform-orientated members of the SMB have long insisted that the 
leadership demonstrate greater levels of flexibility. Syria is undergoing difficult political, 
humanitarian, and social challenges, and so many believe that reforms must be carried 
out to overhaul the SMB’s organizational structure. The aforementioned changes, such 
as the simplification of the entry process, the opening of decision-making positions, and 
the adjustment (or even removal) of the ‘sensitive’ female section of the organization, 
could be bold initial steps towards reform. 
 
However, according to the young reform-orientated members, these changes would still 
be insufficient in equipping the SMB to deal with the current situation. They feel that 
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there is an urgent need for broader changes to make the SMB sustainable in this new 
environment. Reform-orientated second and third generation SMB members in exile 
have clearly voiced these concerns. It became clear that although the leadership 
acknowledged the need for change, they eventually struggled to introduce new ideas. 
 
In the face of Syria’s emerging challenges, the essential task ahead of the SMB leaders 
was to enhance their image as a distinguished Syrian Islamic socio-political movement 
that can function as an effective opposition to the current regime. A number of 
influential active members recognized the need for the organization to evaluate the 
diversity of its internal sectors. One of these young SMB activists, who has been active 
in support and relief work for Syrian refugees, stated that he hopes this critical approach 
would lead to a sensitive and transparent outcome, bringing the ‘extreme poles’ within 
the organization closer together. He recognized that although the disagreements within 
the organization were disagreements regarding its structure and not its ideology, they 
were still both time and resource consuming disagreements (male interviewee, Istanbul, 
2015). However, the SMB may have reached a boiling point, something which could 
also hinder ideological progress. Interviews with SMB members have shown that they 
aim to test reform agendas before welcoming and implementing them, so long as the 
agendas are based on real concerns and constructive criticisms. These testing times have 
served as a testing ground for the organization. 
 
Promoting diversity and accepting criticisms are healthy for organizations in general, and 
this phenomenon is known as the ‘Melucian Challenge’. Melucci mentions that an 
organization is not a homogenous body, but rather, it contains – for its betterment – 
strongly oppositing forces with considerable demands on its leadership (Melucci, 1996). 
In response to these challenges, the SMB leaders need to reflect on their situation. The 
Syrian crisis has posed an unprecedented political demand on the SMB and the Syrian 
population; the leaders are tasked with keeping the organization alive, undivided, and 
strong. 
 
The SMB’s executive board eventually evaluated itself in the face of increasing pressure, 
and it did well to broaden its scope of action. To meet the demands imposed upon an 
ideologically Islamic movement during the crisis, the leaders launched organizational 
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platforms. Members of the SMB who joined the organisation because they were 
searching for a noble cause to financially and intellectually invest in did not hesitate 
when investing in these humanitarian activities. This was widely understood as being a 
well-defined and convincing effort to demonstrate the organization’s unity to the 
Syrians. 
 
The organization’s reputation serves to benefit from these humanitarian activities, but 
they are still in need for transparent structural reform to provide more appropriate access 
to its members (such as when electing leaders). This change should also serve to improve 
the SMB’s image in the eyes of the media and academia who, historically, have viewed 
the SMB as being a clandestine organization (Sayigh and Lefèvre, 2013). Furthermore, 
an enhanced, openly democratic internal structure could help defend against the oft-
levelled criticisms against the organization regarding its public transparency. This could 
help unveil some of the inner workings of the SMB, showing it to be a truly 
ideologically moderate Islamic organization. 
 
SMB leaders have managed to keep the organization alive over the past few decades. 
Now, they must work to adopt policies to ensure their survival in post-crisis Syria. First 
and foremost, the leadership need to ‘open their minds’, inviting the criticism of reform-
oriented members who are calling for change within the SMB. These changes do not 
need to oppose the SMB’s fundamental ambitions to provide socio-political support to 
the Syrian population. It would ease the path for mobilization and recruitment inside 
Syria, something which the SMB is in urgent need of. 
 
Campbell (2006) mentions that: “[F]raming involves the strategic creation and 
manipulation of shared understandings and interpretations of the world, its problems, and 
viable courses of action.”(Campbell, 2005, pp. 41–68). He highlighted the importance of 
adopting new understandings to gain ideological grounds. Although (Campbell 2006) 
example is regarding a very dissimilar social movement, it still underlines an important 
challenge hampering the SMB post-2011: “[F]or instance, Verta Taylor and Nancy 
Whitter (1992) showed how the lesbian feminist movement struggled mightily to define 
and frame its identity, and how it ended up with several identities depending on how 
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different groups defined their boundaries and consciousness.” (Taylor and Whittier, 
1992). 
 
This suggests that adjustments to the SMB to turn it into a modern, efficient, and 
professional Islamic social movement have become a necessity for the organization. The 
executive board needs to improve a decades-old internal structure with the intention of 
opening up the organization to competent new members who will eventually take part in 
decision-making on the organization’s executive board. According to those calling for 
reform, more flexibility in the years-long stages of progression will encourage 
participation in socio-political activities. As mentioned by a younger member of the 
SMB, a lean management style would positively affect the work of both new recruits and 
of long-standing members who have been less active in recent years due to the 
hierarchical structure of the organization (Sermini, Gaziantep, 2014; Toma, Gaziantep, 
2014). 
 
These changes would attract new members, especially educated Syrian females. One 
such change – organized by the young female SMB members in exile – to promote 
female participation proved to be less effective in reality. The fact is that programs 
designed by SMB women for female empowerment were widely appreciated by the 
SMB’s leaders post-2014, but they were not very effective, as the women have proven 
unfamiliar with making important decisions for the organization. This is partly due to 
many factors related to the Syrian crisis, including security concerns due to families 
being displaced, and logistical problems surrounding living and travel expenses inside 
and outside of Syria. Additionally, the culturally traditional duties of many Syrian 
women made the demands of the roles unreasonable. 
 
One interview with a Syrian intellectual demonstrates how others have perceived the 
SMB as being ‘too traditional’ despite their attempts at adopting a contemporary 
outlook. She disagrees, and recalls that during a casual meeting after the 2011 Syrian 
uprising, she learnt about the SMB’s interests in organizing educational activities: “I felt 
comfortable to adopt the ideology, which seemed, to me, quite contemporary while 
moderate”. With this impression, she decided to progress to the next step towards an 
SMB membership. She mentions that the SMB could benefit from her “formal and well-
 98 
structured educational proposal” (female interviewee, personal communication, 
Gaziantep, 2015). The analysis showed that newfound, informal local councils in rebel-
held regions struggled with the sheer number of pupils they received who had not 
previously any education. This was due to the disastrous situation in war-torn Syria, 
which robbed these children of their childhood (see the UN reports and Human Rights 
Organization’s assessments found in Chapter 6). Eventually, this intellectual did not join 
the SMB due to its ‘static’ internal ladder.  
 
Having been brought up in a family with moderate, mainstream Islamic views, the young 
activist felt ideologically bonded to the SMB. She serves as a good example of a female 
activist who has concerns regarding the SMB’s activities and decision-making processes. 
However, other comments by her highlight how the SMB does not utilise its potential 
members fully during this critical time; she states that: 
 
“I was very keen on joining the SMB. However, now knowing 
that I would have to go through all these years of training until I 
can have an influence in decision-making has made me lose 
interest in joining the SMB as a formal member. Nevertheless, I 
remain in informal contact with the SMB’s leadership and will 
bring my ideas forward, if they would be interested in them. I 
still believe that if I would have been given the chance to obtain 
liabilities within the organization, I possibly could have had a 
large impact on the SMB’s organizational educational outlook” 
(female interviewee, personal communication, Gaziantep, 2015). 
 
At an initial glance, it seems that similar criticisms have been levelled against the 
organization by other young members and affiliates. However, these interviews have 
shown that members of the old guard and leadership have also been open to adopting 
these fast-track options. These criticisms, which are based on individual perceptions and 
evaluations of the organization, have affected the group’s unity. Reform-orientated SMB 
members are demanding changes to allow new entrants easy access to positions of 
responsibility within the executive board of the SMB, effectively bypassing the 
organization’s hierarchical ladder. In their opinion, such changes would validate the 
SMB’s organizational structure, making it more palatable to the Syrian public. They 
claim that these changes need not mean that the fundamental positions of authority and 
rules within the group be changed, rather, they would just open space for the progression 
for new recruits. 
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The SMB may benefit from analyzing the EMB’s actions following the assassination of 
its leader, Hassan Al-Banna. This event, along with the existing challenges facing the 
EMB, required a rapid amendment of the EMB’s leadership recruitment process. Barbara 
Zollner (2009) showed in her research on the EMB that the organization parted from its 
hierarchical structure significantly once Hassan Al-Hudaiby was nominated to be the 
leader. In hindsight, this was a well-reasoned decision as Al-Hudaiby was already a well-
respected judge in Egypt who had the required experience to lead the EMB in the 1950s 
(Zollner, 2009). 
 
The Egyptian advisory board acknowledged that the ideal candidate “had to be recruited 
externally”, and so the decision was made. “[A]s part of the strategy for public 
rehabilitation, the ideal nominee had to be publicly recognized and well connected to the 
political power” (Zollner, 2009, p. 19). The SMB may adopt such a strategy to appease 
the demands of the members calling for a reform of the organization’s decision-making 
process and to provide room for a new, well-known, and experienced leader. However, 
this strategy may just offer theoretical reassurance with no empirical rectification of the 
problems at hand, and no reassurance of the survival of the SMB. The analysis in the 
research shows that unpredictability of the Syrian crisis makes the SMB’s success or 
failure with each strategy difficult to predict. The daily anguish experienced by the 
Syrian people has taken a heavy toll on them; the SMB, despite these changes, may not 
be recognized and lauded. 
 
As the strain of the situation in Syria has grown, so too has the strain within the SMB 
itself. The tension has led to many debates occurring within the organization. All sides of 
the debates share the passion, anger, sadness, and grief of their countrymen. The 
international crimes of the Assad regime and its Iranian and Russian allies, as well as the 
terrorist actions of Daesh, have placed significant and unprecedented stress on the 
region. The SMB went through devastating events, such as the 1982 Hama massacre. Its 
leaders now need to be able to use that experience to deal with the larger events in 
present-day Syria; unusual times demand unusual approaches. Long-term SMB members 
refer to history, tradition, and culture to overcome these challenges. They argue that new 
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entrants need to prove their strength and character during tough times before holding 
senior positions of authority. 
 
This means that the new members need to have internalized the ideologies of the group, 
and they need to have attained religious knowledge and leadership experience. They also 
need to have undergone the prerequisite self-imposed training before being appointed to 
positions of authority by the board (Al-Bayanouni, personal communication, London, 
2015). However, proponents of these high expectations should take into consideration 
the repressive environment of present day Syria. SMB affiliates need to personally feel 
that it is worth joining the organization and undergoing all the tests to reach the positions 
of authority. Nevertheless, they should first recognize that it is their collective actions 
that matter to the organization and not individual ranks, as mentioned in Opp’s analysis 
of social movements (Opp, 2009). 
 
Demanding years of active duty in the organization before consideration for leadership 
roles is not a stance that is appreciative of the warzone environment in Syria. People are 
constantly having to flee from one region to another. Syrian families that are unwilling to 
leave the country are searching for shelter in other regions, often facing inhumane 
conditions. Other exhausted Syrians have taken paths, the financial and emotional costs 
of which they are unaware. Often, their lives are at risk even after reaching the 
supposedly ‘safer’ regions of Europe. Due to these dire circumstances, it can be assumed 
that the SMB would gain credibility through their affiliates by giving new members 
leadership opportunities and a chance to revitalize the organization. 
 
That being said, no MB organization has successfully managed to do this. Additionally, 
there is no published research available describing this phenomenon in Islamic 
organizations and describing what the end result would look like. The SMB, therefore, 
has the opportunity of showing its willingness to adopt contemporary outlooks and make 
the necessary changes, proving untrue the analysts who suggest that Islamic movements 
inherently resist change. 
 
If the SMB’s leaders seriously consider the requests of the reformists, it would show that 
they have taken the environment of the conflict into consideration and have adapted 
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accordingly. Opening the door for recruitment to affiliates and other competent and 
interested individuals would serve as a gesture of ‘goodwill’ from the SMB leadership. 
This would improve the SMB’s reputation as a grassroots social movement, helping 
support its integration into Syria’s political system. Currently, it seems as if the SMB is 
not able to utilize all of the available opportunities to increase its membership. 
Nevertheless, the interviews demonstrated that there is still a lot of unexplored potential 
to ‘gain land’ among Syrians in exile, making the organization more accessible to new 
and old members who wish to take part in decision-making. In the eyes of these 
members, the change will have a positive impact on mobilization and recruitment, 
benefitting the organization as a whole. 
 
The SMB’s internal structure has provided stability in the past. Periodic meetings of the 
executive board have been useful as the environment and conditions are discussed in 
them. It must be remembered that it was the SMB’s leadership that kept the organization 
alive over the past few decades, despite the harshness of their environment. They 
developed strong networks between people and across a number of countries. Diani and 
McAdam consider this to be part of the inherent “nature of a social movement” (Diani 
and McAdam, 2003, p. 1) . 
 
This may have been the case under the relatively ‘stable’ situation in Syria between 1982 
and 2011. However, post-2011 Syria demands a different organization and management 
strategy. This new strategy can still be based on the deep-rooted networks of the old 
strategy that kept the SMB afloat for so many years. The SMB just need to ensure that 
this network does not maintain its old hierarchical structures that are preventing many 
new members and affiliates from joining in with the decision-making. According to the 
leaders of the SMB, the organization’s intention has always been to improve the 
standards of community life in Syria. Pierret mentions, when defining social movements: 
“Social movements are sustained and intentional efforts to foster or retard social changes 
primarily outside the normal institutional channels encouraged by authorities: George 
Ritzer and J Michael Ryan (eds.), The Concise Encyclopedia of Sociology (Chisterester 
and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011)” (Pierret, 2013, p. 565). However, these 
efforts are viewed as being insufficient in the eyes of young SMB members who feel 
neglected and marginalized by the leaders when it comes to decision-making. 
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The exclusion of the wider members of the SMB network from decision-making was not 
a massive issue during the organization’s time in exile; major decisions were made only 
infrequently. The SMB’s activities during this time were predominantly limited to social 
and religious gatherings and circles. This was a result of the host states’ politically tense 
environments. The SMB’s leaders took somewhat apolitical stances in order to minimize 
their being viewed as potential threats to the host states. Contrastingly, the pressures 
placed on the SMB post-2011 require faster, and more, decisions to be made. In this 
situation, the lack of representation of the SMB’s social fabric has been shown to have 
some detrimental effects on the organization. 
 
In his highly acknowledged analysis of social movements, Charles Tilly observed that 
the leaders of these movements should react in accordance to existing, or upcoming, 
circumstances by recognizing: “that political opportunities have common properties over 
a wide variety of circumstances…”  and understanding that “the explanations themselves 
involve specification of how and why those elements – mobilizing structure, political 
opportunities, and so on – behave and interact as they do” (Tilly, 2004, p. x) . The 
interviews showed that, despite the youth’s perceptions of the executive board members, 
the executive members are increasingly recognizing the presence and potential of the 
next generation. They understand that political integration is only plausible for the SMB 
if they work as a united organization comprised of political activists from each 
generation (see above interviews with Al-Bayanouni, Waleed, Salem, and others). 
 
In 2014, the SMB aimed to move towards lean management by appointing Dr. Mohamad 
Waleed as its new Murakeb Al-Am. This choice was not agreed upon unanimously within 
the SMB. It was thought that this move would involve more youth activists. The British 
educated doctor had been an experienced member of the SMB’s executive board member 
for many years, and he was one of the foremost initiators of the Wa’ad party (see 
Chapter 6). Despite being a man in his sixties, Waleed has widely been thought of as 
tending towards relatively liberal views. Dr. Waleed is keen to open new paths and 
create new chances to form innovative ideas (Waleed, London, 2014) 
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It is unsurprising that these messages have been met with great hope, as ordinary 
members of the organization have mentioned in formal interviews during their time in 
social gatherings in Turkey. There is widespread belief that the old leadership is 
intending to gradually step aside and allow for internal reforms. Conversely, the 
interviews also highlighted criticisms of the changes. Members noted that major reforms 
had not been planned in the immediate future, and had been put aside to take place at a 
later point in time. They felt that the gestures of ‘goodwill’ were insufficient to satisfy 
the expectations of the reformers. These moves partly reconciled between the reformers 
and the leaders of the organization. However, it soon became obvious that change was 
needed to ensure long-lasting reconciliation between the two groups. Such a solution 
could involve bringing certain skilled members up to work at senior levels within the 
organization. In return, these individuals could be made to show evidence of being able 
to recognize challenges and design solutions. 
 
All members of the organization prefer to invest their potentials in tackling socio-
political issues, not in wasting time with fruitless arguments. The leadership may have 
been of the opinion that in this fast-moving environment, it may be better for the youth 
to implement any fast-paced ideas on an individual basis rather than through the SMB. 
This decision from the leadership was perhaps made to maintain the current members 
and recruit additional members both inside and outside of Syria. However, it will not 
necessarily lead to any alterations in the SMB. 
 
Opening external alternatives without reforming the SMB’s internal system may be an 
effective means for the leadership to calm tempers for the time being. Nevertheless, the 
calls for reform have not halted; the leadership is still under pressure to take action and 
act to fill the well-known gaps inside the organization. This pragmatic, yet temporary, 
solution is in line with the historical actions of the SMB. The SMB members have 
traditionally been able to mobilize and maintain the loyalty of the youth by including 
students and young professionals in social activities and political forums (Esposito, 
1998; Lefèvre, 2013; Rihawi, Killis, 2015). The leadership is able to stay connected to 
the youth despite the still-present need for modifications due to the parental upbringing 
of the SMB members with a [generally] moderate Islamic ideology(Al-Bayanouni, 
London, 2014; Salem, London, 2014; Waleed, London, 2014). 
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The dynamics of the on-going crisis in Syria have pushed younger SMB members to 
make use of social networking. Some members have individually designed webpages 
and blogs, highlighting their views by sharing their personal opinions, suggestions, and 
messages. These members feel that the webpages and blogs would function beneficially 
as online platforms. The online content conforms to the SMB’s ideologies, however, 
unlike the SMB’s official publications; these blogs are fed with up-to-date news articles 
and are open to more ‘hard-line’ discussions. 
 
SMB activists have proven their competencies on political platforms by initiating and 
participating in numerous conferences and events. These have been organized by them in 
order to assemble the Syrian opposition in exile(Al-Droubi,Vinna, 2014) . Second and 
third generation SMB activists in exile have invited – whilst unofficially representing the 
SMB – representatives of various Syrian oppositional political groups to take part in 
discussions in Brussels, Istanbul, Antakya, and Gaziantep (Rafael Lefèvre, 2013; Lund, 
2013). These SMB members have been working to unify the opposition groups in exile. 
Meetings between youth of similar ages who had been raised in Syria has led to a greater 
understanding of the need to meet the demands of these youth, allowing them to play 
greater roles in effecting change. 
 
It is worth mentioning that there are more reasons than one for these occurrences. Not all 
young SMB members are officially a part of the organization. This is due to the historic 
repression of the Assad regime that prevented them officially joining the organization 
through ba’ya11. The fate of the MB following the military coup in Egypt, and the 
detention of the freely elected president Mohammed Morsi, have led the SMB to develop 
deep concerns. General Al-Sisi has blacklisted the MB as being a terrorist organization. 
This decision was emulated by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who both 
added the MB to their long lists of terrorist organizations. 
 
This was considered and discussed by the younger SMB members. There were debates 
between those who wanted to be linked to the SMB and those who did not. The 
terrifying events abroad has led to some youth distancing themselves from officially 
                                                
11	This	is	process	similar	to	swearing	in	or	pledging	allegiance	to	an	entity,	in	this	case	the	SMB.			
 105 
being identified as SMB members. Instead, many second and third generation SMB 
younger members contribute independently by establishing NGOs in the humanitarian 
sector. These individuals have proven their resolve to take up the demanding and 
increasing workloads, building confidence and trust amongst the Syrians living inside 
and outside of the country. The leaders offer assurances that they understand that these 
groups are not an ideological departure from the organization, but they are other means 
of helping the cause. Through these NGOs, young members are able to carry out 
activities that they would not be able to carry out through the SMB, with its strict 
regulations and policies. 
 
Currently, it was recognized that SMB leaders are developing a type of openness and 
flexibility towards innovations involving new ideas and the introduction of soft 
recruiting policies aimed at educating youth inside and outside of Syria. These programs, 
which include a broad range of socio-political activities, aim to help vulnerable Syrian 
people who have been dislocated by the crisis and have not been officially integrated into 
the SMB. The SMB’s executive bureau stresses that the organization has consistently 
shown their willingness and capability to work with young and active individuals. 
 
Other actions realized through individual efforts also appear to be efficient. Although 
they have had to overcome the rising financial demands, and muster the willpower to 
persevere, the second and third SMB generations have been highly motivated to take part 
in supporting the Syrian people. This is highlighted by their determination to take part in 
integrating the oppositional groups within Syria. They are aiming to academically 
empower the population and bring about a modern, democratic Syria. The SMB 
sincerely believe that the Syrian people will be able to work together for a brighter future 
following the collapse of the Assad regime. This generation of SMB members hope to 
use their Western education and professional experiences to reconstruct their homeland, 
whenever the chance arises. However, they also admit that it is still too early to forecast 
or anticipate decisions regarding rebuilding Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. 
 
Given the current confusion in Syria, the youth’s sincere intentions, and their genuine 
concerns, it is time for the Old Guard to give the youth greater means to effect changes 
with. The way the SMB leaders respond to the youth will significantly impact the 
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organization and their image. If they are sincere in their attempts to revive the 
organization, they would integrate the youth more as a response. In post-2011 Syria, this 
means the SMB need to take on the suggestions of the youth who have been brought up 
in different parts of the world and learnt new skills. If the ideas of the capable youth are 
not taken on board, and they leave, it would weaken the SMB as an organization. A lack 
of opportunities for these youth would definitely be a waste of talent, both now, and in 
the future. The prerequisites to holding leadership positions are limited and do not 
include many of the activities carried out by these young people. Their organization of 
conferences, meetings, and recruiting programs do not just require intellect, but also 
physical and emotional strength and commitment. 
 
The youth section is not the only section of the organization that needs renewal. As 
previously mentioned, the female section also needs to be revamped. SMB members 
have proudly mentioned that their female section has been constantly growing 
throughout its history inside Syria. They recall that the SMB has historically been 
evolving and attracting women from the middle-classes. Years on, and the female section 
is still underrepresented in the decision-making processes and leadership levels. The 
extensive interviews did not elucidate a clear reason for this phenomenon. According to 
some respondents, the SMB’s leadership have emphasised that all activities and positions 
are officially open to all members and both genders. They mention repeatedly that the 
SMB leaders have invited, encouraged, and welcomed interested women by highlighting 
the necessity of women’s activity for the SMB’s evolution. Having understood the 
personal barriers faced by the female SMB activists, the leaders have realized that they 
need to be given more space within the higher positions of the organization (personal 
communication with: Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; Al-Droubi,Vinna, 2014; Salem, 
London, 2014; Waleed, London, 2014). 
 
According to the interviewees, the female section of the SMB has historically been 
thought of as an important part of the organization (Salem, London, 2014; Al-
Bayanouni, London, 2014; Al-Bayanouni, London, 2015). However, this analysis has 
shown that, again, due to the hierarchical ladder, it has been difficult for female members 
to reach the upper levels of the organization. Only a handful of female members have 
made it to the upper ranks, but they are still not in the uppermost positions; often, they 
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deal with women’s issues. This is due to the specific situation of the SMB activists who 
are living as asylum seekers in changing cultural environments. The burden on 
childrearing traditionally rests with women. Most female SMB members have to limit 
their activism to giving Quran lessons to girls within secure circles (Al-Soufi, london, 
2014). 
 
To solve this dilemma, members have suggested appointing female relatives of male 
activists to positions of authority within the SMB’s affiliated NGOs. In these NGOs, 
they could support human rights and spark change. Politically interested women have, 
therefore, been invited by SMB leaders to join the newly founded Wa’ad party to 
establish a gender inclusive program, increasing political awareness in a free and 
pluralistic Syria. 
 
This pragmatic decision had the backing of the SMB and was in line with their ambition 
to increase the education and empowerment of women in their organization’s factions, as 
well as in general public life. This is a testing ground for the SMB’s internal structure. 
So far, no female members from any of the generations seem to have developed much 
socio-political leadership experience. When this occurs, and women attain high positions 
of leadership, the SMB may be recognized as being a modern Islamic social movement 
in Syria. 
 
The SMB have stepped forward and used the crisis and its challenges as an opportunity 
to shed light on the diversity within their structure. Reformists, who are generally from 
the younger generations and SMB leaders have both focused on their primary role as an 
Islamic social movement. For the time being, these groups have acknowledged that their 
priorities lie in bringing relief to the war-damaged Syrian population. It may be the ideal 
time for the SMB’s leaders to consider taking major steps towards changing the 
organization’s outlook. (Campbell 2005) mentioned that ” forces for change must be 
mobilized through framing” (Campbell, 2005, p. 54) For the SMB, this means 
considering a new official outlook, from being an Islamic social movement, to being an 
Islamic non-profit NGO. This change does not need to compromise the SMB’s Islamic 
ideology. An SMB NGO will consist of already existing, newly founded, affiliated sub-
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NGOs, which were founded post-2011 and already offer a broad range of humanitarian 
support to the homeless Syrian people. 
 
This change could be rewarded, endorsed, and accredited by the Syrian population. 
Some SMB members state that the current organization reflects an improvement of the 
SMB’s state as a socio-political actor. In their opinion, the SMB may have come a step 
closer to raising political awareness and activism in Syria, something which post-2011 
Syrians are keen on achieving, especially since the doors of political activism have been 
kept closed by the different post-colonialist Syrian regimes. However, this is based on 
individual perceptions that have been gauged by observing periodically held council 
polls within Syrian communities in rebel-held regions. These polls testify that public 
opinion of the SMB has changed. Both unofficial (i.e. known affiliates) and official SMB 
representatives have succeeded in gaining communal posts. 
 
From 2011 to 2016, over 1,100 Syrian-crisis-related NGOs have been founded. They are 
primarily in Turkey, but also in Jordan and the Western states such as Germany and the 
United Kingdom (see also statistics from Visions for Syrians NGO mapping 2016). By 
joining together the NGOs of socio-politically engaged Syrians, the SMB will achieve 
what Campbell (2005) described as being an important factor for a movement: 
“…involve the strategic creation and manipulation of shared understandings and 
interpretations of the world, its problems, and viable courses of action.” (Campbell, 
2005, p. 49) F As a movement with decades-long socio-political experience, the SMB 
are able to adopt modified NGO outlooks, which could be based on its original Islamic 
outlook. 
 
SMB leaders would have to tackle certain misconceptions about their organization that 
are present in the minds of many of their opponents. The leaders of the organization are 
nearing retirement, and although the SMB may not be in a position of strength at this 
moment, its leadership has managed to keep it alive and active throughout all the 
challenges it has faced. However, the future of the organization will be determined by 
the actions of the second and third generation SMB members, both male and female. The 
future decision-makers will either maintain the organization the way it is now, or they 
will rebrand and modernize the movement, changing people’s perceptions of it. 
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Eventually, the executive board of the SMB will decide which path the organization will 
take to integrate itself within the Syrian society. They could either remain within their 
comfort zone as a Dawa organization, or develop as an NGO, pushing their members to 
participate in socio-political activities, perhaps even becoming a serious political party. 
These choices will be analyzed in the next sub-chapter, which takes into consideration 
(Campbell, 2005) analysis: “what happens when a practice arrives at an organization or 
movement’s doorstep, ready and waiting for adoption?”(Campbell, 2005, p. 54). 
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter discussed the SMB’s internal structure and the debates surrounding it 
following the Syrian crisis. The analysis was carried out using in-depth interviews, 
which were conducted with SMB members and potential members, including SMB 
executives. The interviews have shown that the Syrian crisis, with its disastrous 
consequences for the Syrian people, has placed enormous stress on the SMB’s 
leadership. They have had to recognize change quickly, and respond accordingly. They 
have responded through publications, statements, internal changes, and other means. 
 
However, the outcomes are inadequate according to many younger SMB members who 
voice concerns that the leadership is not able to handle the numerous imminent 
challenges of post-crisis Syria. These criticisms have pitted the younger SMB members 
against the older members who fill much of the organization’s executive board. These 
differences are not just due to differing views regarding the organization’s hierarchical 
structure (though this is the primary concern); they are also due to differences between 
the youth and the elderly in recognizing challenges, handling opportunities, and solving 
problems. The second and third generation SMB members feel that the hierarchical 
ladder needs reforming and modernization. They feel that this would ease the pressure on 
the SMB and serve as a decisive response to the Syrian crisis. 
 
The SMB re-emerged at a crucial time. It had long been operating from outside of its 
homeland in unstable, foreign conditions. The disagreements within the organization are 
based on how it should anticipate problems, enhance strategic management, and define 
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its objectives. Currently, these are exclusively decided upon by the decision-making 
board. In the opinion of the reformers, the older SMB members, whilst still in exile, are 
incapable of representing the organization as a socio-political force in Syria. Therefore, 
the reformers are asking for new structures and leadership strategies to tackle the current 
challenges and provide a roadmap for the SMB’s future. 
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Chapter 6: Discursive and Behavioural Responses to the 
Syrian Uprising: Domestic Level 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter focused on internal discussions within the SMB. It presented and 
analyzed core discussions over the SMB’s existing hierarchy as well as the post-2011 
requirements to reach the upper echelons of the movement. The senior leadership of the 
SMB is currently composed of elderly members. This is due to the decades-long rigid 
hierarchical structure that exists within the movement. The previous chapter also 
discussed the senior leadership’s postponement of solving several internal issues 
accentuated by the Syrian crisis. 
 
This chapter will further explore and analyze this postponement by the SMB’s senior 
leadership and its appropriateness in the status quo. Section 6.2 will explore the setting 
aside of disagreements between SMB members to unite in providing humanitarian 
support to the Syrian people facing a refugee crisis. This section will also shed light on 
the responses by SMB members to a nationwide emergency that commenced on March 
15th 2011. These responses have all revolved around similar ideological concerns 
removed of any organizational differences. This section will reveal how SMB members’ 
strong beliefs in their foremost duties (detailed in Chapter 5) have been the most 
important uniting factor. This section will also demonstrate the public service provided 
by several Brothers investing in and developing various health, education, and nutrition 
projects. These Brothers have continued to establish or join charities, relief groups and 
NGOs within resistance-held areas of Syria.  
 
Section 6.3 focuses on the assertion that the SMB is united with the common Syrian 
people in their vision of a democratically ruled Syria. This assertion is based on the fact 
that SMB members are deeply rooted within the Syrian intelligentsia (see Chapter 4). 
Many senior teaching and administrative positions within faculties of Sharia (Islamic 
law) at Syrian universities are held by Brothers. Section 6.3 will also analyze the SMB’s 
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democracy and rights discourse, with reference to its members’ wide-ranging 
sociopolitical activities.  
 
The SMB’s outlook and vision of a future Syria guides Section 6.4. This section analyzes 
the founding of the Wa’ad Party (Justice and Constitution National Party - Al-Hizb Al-
Watani Li Al-‘Adala Wa Al-Dustoor’). It shows how politically engaged members of the 
SMB founded the party while in exile. Empirical data gathered through numerous 
interviews will be presented alongside an analysis of the party’s conventions. This 
analysis will incorporate the Wa’ad Party’s reputed association to the SMB, the outlook 
of the founding members of the party, and their vision of a post-Assad Syria.  
 
Section 6.5 will elucidate the SMB’s dissuasion of enforcing fighting on Syrian ground. 
With the backdrop of the 1982 Hama massacre, leaders from the movement are 
concerned about the involvement of their youth members in, or sponsoring of, fighting 
brigades. The SMB leaders draw a strict line between the organization’s sociopolitical 
activities and any militant activity some of their members might have become engage in.  
 
Section 6.6 concludes that, despite the challenges of war dynamics and deep-rooted anti-
SMB prejudice, the SMB is privileged in being considered the most capable oppositional 
group in Syria. Many of the distressed Syrian population would even argue that the SMB 
qualifies to politically confront the regime. This section will show that these 
controversial opinions are built upon the SMB’s evolution as a social and humanitarian 
actor since the start of the revolution. The humanitarian attention that Brothers have 
shown towards their fellow Syrians has been recognized as a revival of the SMB after 
three decades of silence.  
 
The conclusion of this chapter highlights the SMB’s efforts of distinguishing themselves 
as a politically competent party; it is Islam-centred, yet open to all Syrians. These efforts 
will be related back to the SMB’s emphasis of separating the ideological commitments 
of its members from the organization’s domestic political engagement of all Syrians. 
Finally, the conclusion will consider concerns within the SMB about its tackling of the 
challenging dynamics of the on-going revolution. The roadmaps being considered for the 
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organization include either sticking to traditional and well-probed configurations, or 
exploring novel and unfamiliar procedures.  
 
Instead of spending time solving problems within the organization, SMB members 
focused on supporting their fellow Syrians through social engagement. Both the senior 
leadership and individual members of the SMB were involved in these activities. The 
SMB has always identified itself as a grassroots Syrian movement. Similarly, its 
members have always considered themselves (an integral) part of Syrian civil society. 
The ideological commitments of the Brothers drove projects such as schools and 
orphanages for children as well as health centres in resistance-held regions. This well-
received engagement revived the SMB’s influence in Syrian society after a silence of 
thirty years under the rule of Hafez and Bashar Al-Assad.  
 
Like other Syrian activists, the Brothers founded a number of NGOs in response to on-
going crises in the country. These NGOs serve to provide necessary materials such as 
food and clothing in the extreme weather conditions of the region. Shelters are also built 
for refugees fleeing with their families from areas destroyed by the proxy war. In 
addition, reports have confirmed that the SMB has established education programs to 
supplement the educational sector. Education has always been an important focus of the 
organization since its founding by Al-Sibai (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
The approaches that the Brotherhood has taken in confronting issues raised by the Syrian 
revolution has aroused interest in their acceptance by Syrians. However, this still remains 
difficult to measure. The generation of Syrians educated by the Ba’athist system may 
still believe that the SMB is to blame for the 1982 Hama massacre. In essence, the Assad 
regime was successful in eliminating the SMB from daily Syrian life. It is therefore no 
surprise that the Brotherhood has sought to strengthen and rebuild its connection to a 
broad part of the Syrian population, especially in opposition strongholds of the country. 
The SMB hopes to convert the positive reception it has garnered into a process towards a 
democratically governed state. Its leaders have stated that the organization is finding its 
position again and evolving as a widely accepted Islamic grassroots movement (personal 
communication with: Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; Salem, London, 2014; Waleed, 
London, 2014).  
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Senior SMB members initiated the reintroduction of the SMB to the Syrian people at a 
key time in Syria’s history. Ali Sadr El-Din Al-Bayanouni, who led the SMB for two 
terms, returned to resistance-held areas of Syria in 2011. Several other members of the 
SMB from all levels of the hierarchy followed suit, with some taking along their 
families. The aim of these visits was for members to reconnect with the societies they 
were emotionally attached to while calling on ‘their people’ to reconnect with the SMB 
(male and female interviewees, Gaziantep, Istanbul, Killis, 2014, 2015, 2016).  
 
The organization’s leaders saw re-establishment of the SMB’s status through the eyes of 
the Syrian people as a priority. The executive bureau recognized that the public 
appearance of well-known senior leadership would support the SMB’s efforts of 
integration and acceptance into Syrian society. At the very least, they hoped to reconcile 
with a significant proportion of the Syrian people in a post-Assad era. The Assad 
regime’s negative stereotyping of the Brotherhood in school textbooks and the media led 
to a resentment and scepticism of the organization. Two different school administrators 
previously involved in the Ba’athist educational system recall the details before fleeing 
to Turkey (see Annex IV). The SMB’s leadership is aware of the education that the 
younger generation of Syrians has received from the Assad regime; an education that 
blames the SMB for any suffering in the aftermath of the 1982 Hama massacre together 
with the punishment, torture, and murder of the older generation. Over the decades, the 
relational gap has widened between the Brothers who fled the regime and the rest of the 
population who stayed behind. 
 
A further challenge that the organization recognized post-2011 was the need to gain the 
trust of refugees and the rural population. The SMB has previously attracted highly 
educated intellectuals (Teitelbaum, 2011a) and has had to speak in the language of the 
middle- and lower-class. However, refugees and rural inhabitants questioned the SMB’s 
real intentions behind striving for a united Syrian nation. Would Alawites, Christians, 
Kurds, and Turkmens be treated equally? It is well-known that the rural Syrian 
population has faced an incredibly difficult time under both Assad governments. 
Inequality has resulted in low income, insufficient health and education services, and a 
poor power supply in rural areas (Blank, 2015).  
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This challenge was tackled by offering humanitarian support for the daily needs of the 
rural population, supplemented by political platforms within newly founded regional 
administrations (expounded upon in subsections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2). Bonding is a 
mechanism widely used by social movements because “communitarian ties operate at a 
minimum to strengthen the identity and solidarity among movement activists and 
sympathizers” (Diani and McAdam, 2003, p. 9). Understanding this communitarian 
bonding will require a deeper investigation into how the SMB has overcome concerns by 
the Syrian people. It is also important to understand how the Brothers have been able to 
build a relationship based on trust with their people. The next section will explore and 
analyze the SMB’s numerous social service activities that aimed to reconnect the 
movement with the people post-2011. 
 
Finally, this chapter will draw comparisons between the SMB as a Middle Eastern 
Islamic social movement and the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) in the USA. This 
comparison will be guided by Diane Singerman’s analysis. It will explain how religion 
plays a vital role in recruitment, mobilization, and framing of the grassroots of a 
movement. As with the CRM, the SMB has struggled to integrate within its environment 
of suspicion. By highlighting ideological similarities between the two movements, the 
analysis will seek to understand the SMB leadership’s strong emphasis on moderate 
Islam and democracy within a pluralistic Syrian state. It will analyze the challenges 
faced by the SMB in an unstable post-colonial environment idealised by pan-Arabism.  
 
 
6.2 The SMB’s Humanitarian Outreach and Social Service Activities 
  
SMB members in exile have integrated into different sociopolitical environments (see 
Chapter 4). Due to the circumstances of the countries they reside in, these members have 
prioritized their personal lifestyles in accordance with their duties towards the SMB. 
Personally addressing the needs of the underprivileged in society is termed Jihad al-Nafs 
and is deeply embedded in the Brotherhood’s ideology (Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; 
Othman, Istanbul, 2014; Salem, London, 2014). Exile has not severed the ties the Syrian 
Brothers have with their relatives and associates living under the Assad regime. This 
study has repeatedly demonstrated that these ties have existed for decades (Al-
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Bayanouni, London, 2014; Y. Al-Najjar, Gaziantep, 2015; Al-Omar, Gaziantep, 2014). 
The leaders of the SMB have always seen themselves and their family members as 
Syrians who will be a part of the Syrian community again once the Ba’ath Party’s 
regime has ended.  
 
Since the start of the uprising in 2011, the Syrian people have faced immense life-
threatening challenges on a daily basis. Individuals either remained in their communities 
living under extremely difficult conditions, or left to seek refuge elsewhere. In either 
case, active members of the SMB worked towards a better future by allaying the anxiety 
of persecution and hostility experienced by members and their families. They recognized 
the importance of social projects and charity work to a population struggling to survive. 
The demand for shelter and healthcare rapidly increased during the ensuing proxy war. 
SMB members, affiliated relief groups, and other individuals supported these projects 
with the aim of comforting the tremendous amount of worried and impoverished 
families. These families have taken the difficult decision to remain in Syria despite the 
incessant threats from barrel bombs dropped from warplanes by Assad and his allies. 
Invading Shi’a brigades and Islamist terrorist groups have compounded these threats. 
 
The SMB’s decision to officially advertise their activities publicly was needed in order 
for them to garner support. Initially, the Brothers decided not to go public with their 
planned programs. The rapid rise in demand for services shifted this view in favour of a 
grassroots movement approach. Programs were initiated by solitary members but would 
not be carried out under the organization’s name.    
 
It is worth noting that junior SMB members have worked outside of the SMB’s formal 
organizational structures. These members view the senior leadership as slow and 
inefficient in deciding the organization’s humanitarian vision. Acting in smaller and 
more aligned groups, these young SMB members have responded more rapidly to the 
humanitarian demands of refugees in resistance-held regions. The power of networking 
through social media brought together like-minded SMB members to establish NGOs. 
Most of these NGOs are registered and headquartered in Turkey, although a few can also 
be found in Jordan. Within their NGOs, junior SMB members independently dictated 
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logistical decisions in response to demand. The analysis here reveals that these decisions 
were very often in line with the SMB’s approach, yet not dictated by it.  
 
Molded by their SMB-influenced upbringing, these younger members interpreted the 
SMB’s ideals and effectively stood out from other activists from different social 
backgrounds. Ali Sadr El-Din Al-Bayanouni, a life-long executive member and two-time 
leader of the SMB, acknowledged this: “Ultimately, although those numerous human 
relief and educational aid NGOs are often affiliated with the SMB, they are not linked to 
the SMB” (Al-Bayanouni, personal communication, London, 2015). Thus, the 
organization does not present itself as the initiator of these newly founded platforms. 
However, analyses gathered at informal private gatherings, educational meetings, and 
professional seminars in Turkey indicate a connection to SMB activists. At the very 
least, these individuals subscribe to the Brotherhood’s ideology of moderate Islam. 
Crucially, these NGOs and their members do not wish to be associated with the SMB. 
Understandably so, as there has been an increase in prejudice against Muslim 
Brotherhood organizations worldwide after the Egyptian coup d’état of 2013.  
 
Members of these NGOs present their projects as simply an expression of humanitarian 
solidarity; a commitment to the idea of a common humanity. In this way, they do not 
seek to expose themselves to any risky scenarios. Nevertheless, the opinion of activists 
within the SMB is that these pilot projects have been initiated by SMB members and 
their wider circle of affiliates (personal communication with: Al-Droubi,Vinna, 2014; 
Rihawi, Killis, 2015; Waleed, London, 2014). Eventually, this incognito group of 
activists reconciled their commitments to both the Brotherhood’s ideology and the 
support of Syrian civil society. 
 
Much attention has been directed to aid programmes working to relieve the refugee 
crisis. According to several international human rights organizations (See Chapter 7) 
people in besieged towns as well as ‘liberated’ rural areas face tremendous hardships 
(PAX, The Syria institute, 2017). The Syrian people have unified in order to provide 
medical, educational, and moral support to refugees. Ad hoc relief efforts by the SMB 
have evolved throughout the revolution. Since 2011, these efforts have developed into 
more structured relief organizations. However, their scope of activity is limited due to 
 118 
several challenges. Primarily, a dependency on private donors has resulted in a lack of 
funds. Private donors include members of the SMB and their close friends (Al-
Bayanouni,personal communication, London, 2015). However, the rising demand for 
humanitarian relief has stretched the financial capability of many donors. The outcome 
of relief organizations’ efforts remains insufficient. Contributions have barely covered 
the basic needs of refugee families (anonymous interviewees, 2015). 
 
Some observes have questioned the wealth and resources of SMB members. In the 30 
years of their asylum, some Brothers have acquired wealth in business ventures they 
have set up (Lefèvre, 2013).The leadership of the SMB does not believe it should 
publicly announce funding sources for its projects. The justification used follows the 
Islamic guidelines on Sadaqa (charity/aid). Anonymity is desired in any charity given. 
The Hadith often quoted by Brothers states: “The left hand should not know what the 
right hand gives in charity” (Ahadith, 2017). However, this approach leaves the 
Brotherhood open to accusations of a lack of transparency. Leaders of the SMB are 
aware that they are accountable for how donations are used. 
 
Nevertheless, the SMB stresses that Islamic-based charity is accepted by the Syrian 
people. This is because the leaders for these charity projects are a part of the Syrian 
community itself (male and female interviewees, Gaziantep 2015, Killis 2016). 
Activities that the SMB has undertaken since 2011 correspond with Stephan Rosiny’s 
writings on the Brotherhood’s proactive attitude. Since the establishment of the Muslim 
Brotherhood by Hassan Al-Banna, members have become more activist than theorist in 
their attitude (Rosiny, 2013). SMB members have been able to provide logistical, 
medical, and educational support through their connections with ministries of the Syrian 
Interim Government (See Chapter 7). 
 
Plans for functioning institutions in resistance-held regions are being drawn up by the 
interim government’s ministries(Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; Y. Al-Najjar, Gaziantep, 
2015; Othman, Istanbul, 2014). An example of the impactful projects that the SMB have 
pursued includes a small food production plant in a resistance-held zone of northern 
Syria. Basic foodstuffs such as bread, cheese, and vegetables are produced and 
distributed here. Unfortunately, the maintenance of this plant is not without its 
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challenges. Output remains limited. The little that is produced is destroyed by the Assad 
regime and its allies (see Chapter 7). Nevertheless, the community served by this 
production plant reports that it is crucial in providing the community with physical and 
mental support. The plant is a source of both nutrition and hope to people in this region.  
 
For decades under Ba’athist rule, education of the rural population has been demoted in 
favour of that of urban children (Al-Shami, Gaziantep, 2014; Yousef, Gaziantep, 2014). 
The 2011 revolution laid bare this inequality. SMB members quickly sought to rectify 
this by providing educational programs at refugee camps located at borders of 
neighbouring countries. Rural children rapidly populated these camps. NGOs founded by 
SMB members set up basic mixed-gender schools and educated boys and girls in a 
variety of courses. Trained supervisors and experienced teachers from the SMB led 
educational projects that taught basic subjects (Arabic, English, natural sciences, etc.). 
Arts and sports were also taught, with the latter sometimes carried out indoors in 
provisional tents or outdoors at field locations. Schools were located in opposition-held 
IDP camps both inside Syria and refugee camps in the neighbouring countries Jordan 
and Turkey. Numerous traumatized pupils and educational volunteers flocked to these 
schools. The highly motivated founders of these schools have succeeded in establishing 
curricula for elementary, secondary, and even university education. However, an 
unstable and irregular donor base has resulted in financial issues.  
 
In spite of this, donations have allowed for provisional day-to-day support of the children 
in need. Yet SMB activists struggle to balance their commitments towards their 
homeland alongside commitments towards their families and relatives. Furthermore, the 
SMB has had to withstand comparisons drawn between its work and that of well-funded 
international aid organizations under the UN/OCHA (United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Similarly, it has had to vie with other faith-based 
aid organizations such as the Christian Aid Mission (headquartered in the USA). Its 
regional director Stephen Van Valkenburg has proudly stated that his organization 
“currently supports 16 Christian organisations active within Syria” (Middle East Eye, 
2016). In contrast to the SMB, global organizations are well-funded and experienced in 
the logistics of delivering relief to war zones. The Christian Aid Mission is reported to be 
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working “with Christian aid groups in over 100 countries, as well as funding ‘indigenous 
missionaries’ in ‘mission field’ locations” (Middle East Eye, 16 September 2016).  
 
In addition to humanitarian relief, the SMB has broadened its political activities since the 
start of the 2011 revolution. Regaining the trust of Syrian society and gaining legitimacy 
as a credible political actor have been the main political aims of the organization. This 
revival in the SMB comes after decades of one-party regulations implemented by both 
Ba’athist Assad regimes (see Chapter 4). The SMB’s activities have been concentrated 
in resistance-held regions, mostly in northern and southern Syria. The next section will 
analyse the SMB’s efforts in gaining political territories in these regions and Syria in 
general using their democratic vision (see Appendix III).   
 
 
6.3 The SMB’s Democracy and Rights Discourse  
 
The previous section focused on the SMB’s humanitarian response to the Syrian 
revolution. Despite members’ differences with regards to logistics and execution, the 
Brothers were united in their goal of aiding the impoverished Syrian people. The SMB 
insists that these activities were carried out for purely humanitarian reasons. Notably, 
there has been a positive reception to the organization from refugees within Turkey and 
resistance-held regions. As part of an Islamic socio-political grassroots movement, 
Brothers have strengthened their integrity with their compatriots. The SMB’s 
humanitarian efforts have therefore opened the way for the organization to bond on a 
political level with the Syrian people.  
 
The strict Assad regime had outlawed the SMB for decades. This section draws attention 
to the SMB’s political evolution after its resurgence post-2011. The SMB had to 
strategize ways of presenting their demands for a democracy and rights discourse. This 
included reintroducing the SMB’s vision of a future Syria to the Syrian people. 
Consequently, there have been multiple academic and political debates on the 
applicability of Islamic Sharia-based concepts with ‘modern democratic values’ (see 
Chapter 7 and Appendix VI). On a domestic level, however, analysis points to the SMB 
executive board’s personal contacts with the Syrian population in aiding this resurgence. 
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Brothers were able to outline their organization’s concepts and policies to a population 
disillusioned by the Ba’athist’s secular policies and strict regime. 
 
This section outlines how the SMB put forth its vision for a pluralistic Syria. It also 
shows how Brothers reconciled their politically democratic goals with their identities as 
activists in a decades-old Islamic movement. The Brothers have individually strived to 
rebuild connections disrupted by both Assad regimes, father Hafez and son Bashar. 
Furthermore, this section highlights Syrians’ perceptions of the SMB’s political 
engagement. These perceptions have been shaped by information from the ruling 
governments and the SMB since its inception. The SMB’s primary goal is to emphasize 
its democracy and rights discourse within resistance-held regions. It is mobilizing its 
politically active members to operate in areas where political and administrational 
institutions have collapsed. However, the success of this approach is difficult to measure. 
No historical benchmark of an Islamic movement’s successes exists with which to 
compare the SMB’s accomplishments.  
 
The Wasatia (Islamic centrist) path followed by the SMB has gained popularity in 
Sunni-majority cities such as Aleppo and Idlib. This has been a refreshing change from 
the cruelty experienced by Syrians at the hands of ISIS terrorists calling for a Khilafa 
(Islamic State) (Tran and Weaver, 2014). The SMB has repeatedly stated that their 
ideology of Wasatia is compatible with democracy. Through this ideology, the SMB 
aims to occupy the political vacuum opened by the revolution. While the SMB is hopeful 
in advancing itself into a position of influence, it still faces the effects of the Ba’athist 
regimes’ accusations. Admittedly, the regimes have indeed succeeded in sowing 
suspicion of the SMB among Syrians. On the other hand, many Syrians are outraged at 
the current regime’s repressive policies. 
 
When researching Muslim politics, it is essential to consider each country and its Islamic 
movement separately (Esposito et al., 2015). Syria presents an opportunity to utilize 
Esposito’s distinctive research approach. The SMB has evolved throughout its history 
when faced with difficult circumstances. It now faces questions about its democracy and 
rights discourse. This section will approach these questions by scrutinizing the narrative 
surrounding the SMB’s recent history. This will include individual experiences of 
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members under the strict Assad regime, in exile, and during the rise of the SMB from 
‘the ashes of Hama’(Lefèvre, 2013). 
 
Approaching the issue this way may be criticized as focusing more on individual 
members rather than the organization’s outlook. However, this approach – guided by 
interviews conducted with members over three years – will provide valuable and 
insightful information from members across the organization’s hierarchy. A trustful 
relationship had to be built with interviewees, most of whom regularly received 
depressing news about the situation back in Syria. 
 
It is interesting to note that the ideology that Brothers hold may not be fully compatible 
with that of the countries they have sought asylum in. However, the academic Gudrun 
Kraemer states that it would be unjustified “to deny to contemporary Muslims any 
capability towards integration within a legal institutional governed state, as has been 
done in publications by Orientalists and recognized political journals” (Kramer, 2011, p. 
41). In fact, the SMB’s records verify that its leadership practiced great personal 
integrity in the countries where they were welcomed. Brothers who sought refuge across 
the Arab and Western world have done their best to integrate into their environments. 
Notably, Brothers who sought asylum in Western democracies were only allowed to do 
so after delineating the SMB to state intelligence services as a nonviolent moderate 
Islamic movement  (Peter and Ortega, 2014).   
 
Although seeking asylum has been arduous for SMB members, they have experienced 
hospitality in countries that have provided it. SMB leaders have had to face several 
challenges since fleeing Syria in the 1980s (Lefèvre, 2013; Pierret, 2013). One example 
of this is the constant harassment by the Mokhabarat of the Assad regime. Threats of 
assassination and intimidation followed the SMB’s leaders even outside Syria’s borders. 
Raphael Lefèvre writes how “the message sent to them (the Brothers) by the Syrian 
Mokhabarat was very clear: no protection, even from abroad, would ever shield them 
and their families from the wrath of the regime where it finds out that opposition 
activities were being carried out or planned” (Lefèvre, 2013). 
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Brothers in exile have always believed in the Brotherhood’s ideology, first constructed 
over 80 years ago (see Chapter 4). The senior leadership repeatedly highlight their 
decades-long struggle in managing the SMB from foreign countries (personal 
communication with: Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; Salem, London, 2014). The struggle 
was to keep a movement founded on Islamic values alive - a struggle to portray the SMB 
as a moderate Islamic movement to the critical eye of academics (Kramer, 2011; 
Lefèvre, 2013; Lund, 2013; Teitelbaum, 2011). Gudrun Kraemer, a recognized 
researcher on Hassan Al-Banna (see Chapter 4), argues that moderation is embedded in 
the organization’s Islamic ideology. Kraemer recognizes that moderation guides the 
“moral dimensions of the individual’s, the community’s, and society’s commitment to 
manifest social equality, which is anticipated by commitment and education” (Kramer, 
2011, p. 37) . 
 
The SMB draw inspiration for their moderation from the Qur’anic virtue of Wasatia –
practicing a middle, refined path. Wasatia guides both the relationship between mankind 
and God as well as relationships between individuals. The SMB thus labels itself in 
Arabic as al Haraka Islamia Wasatia – a moderate Islamic movement. Wasatia in the 
SMB is supplemented by the concept of Muruna (flexibility). The SMB’s flexibility to 
adapt to dynamic political climates is part of a wider “qualification of political Islam” 
(Kramer, 2011, p. 40). A well-known Islamic scholar with roots in the Muslim 
Brotherhood is the Egyptian scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. Al-Qaradawi recognizes the 
importance of Muruna by writing: “The Islamic Movement...will not live, prosper and 
grow without the minds of studios, creative renewers and thinkers, and will not wither, 
shrink and become ‘sterilized’” (Al-Qaradawi, 1999, p. 132). 
 
Opponents have viewed Muruna as a tool used by the SMB to profit from political 
opportunities. The SMB argues that this flexibility allows it to adapt to the ever-shifting 
political dynamics of Syria. An example of this can be seen in the early 1980s. SMB 
leaders attempted to negotiate a ceasefire with the Ba’ath regime by sending Ghazan 
Najjar for discussions. This attempt backfired when Najjar, a highly respected member 
of the Engineers Union of Syria, was violently removed from his home on 31 March 
1980. Najjar was then imprisoned for 12 years without trial (Al-Najjar, personal 
communication,  Gaziantep, 2015).  This harrowing experience proved enough for the 
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SMB. Any attempts at reconciliation with the regime would be met with a forceful reply. 
The SMB soon postponed any plans to stand as an oppositional political force to the 
regime. In the opinion of international political analysts, the Assad regime has not yet 
shown any intention of reforming the current political system nor is it signalling the end 
of its strict regime (Khatib, 2011; Lefèvre, 2013; Pierret, 2013).  
 
Things changed with the arrival of the ‘Arab Spring’ in March 2011. The people of Syria 
raised their collective voices demanding reforms. Crucially, the SMB seized this 
opportunity to present their vision of a democratic Syria to their people. However, there 
are still questions to be answered. How will the SMB participate in a pluralistic Syria 
while their leaders have been in exile for decades? Some may argue that exile will end 
when Syria becomes democratic. Is the SMB’s Islamic ideology compatible with 
democratic governance popularized by Western governments? The perception of some 
Western scholars, such as Samuel Huntington, is that Islamic Civilisation clashes with 
modern democracy (Huntington, 1997). If it is compatible, how does the SMB 
conceptualize dealing with controversial issues of ethnic minorities and women’s rights? 
How representative of the Syrian people is the SMB as a social movement rooted in 
Islam? 
 
Several different thoughts exist with regards to the SMB’s presence in the political arena 
of a future Syria. These thoughts are shaped by various experiences and observations. 
Syrian civil society, in addition to academic researchers in the West, continues to 
provide different definitions of Islamism. The variety of opinions is reflected in Barbara 
Zollner’s writings: “The first that comes to mind is the observation that Islamic 
movements are, by definition, seen as fundamentalist, radical, anti-democratic and anti-
Western”(Zollner, 2009, p. 9). This analysis remarkably differs from Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi, who states that he “would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could 
support anything other than political freedom and democracy” (Al-Qaradawi, 2000: 
187). He also points out that Islamic principles are compatible with social governance of 
modern society:  
 
“The tools and guarantees created by democracy are as close as 
can ever be to the realization of the political principles brought to 
this world by Islam...It is only in democracy and political 
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freedom that the power of parliament is evident and that people’s 
deputies can withdraw confidence from any government that 
breaches the constitution. It is only in such an environment that 
the strength of free press, free parliament, opposition and the 
masses is most felt” (Al-Qaradawi, 2000: 188). 
 
Al-Qaradawi is well-recognized by both Islamic movements like the SMB as well as 
Western academics for his thoughts regarding Sharia and its compatibility with modern 
democratic values. 
 
The Brothers recognize that they have to use more than just abstract political 
terminology to win the support of Syrians. As a long-standing Islamic social movement, 
the SMB has had to explicitly state its promises of political engagement in a future Syria. 
One of their main priorities is to invest in a productive economy that builds projects for 
the Syrian people. Promisingly, the wide-ranging humanitarian activities by the SMB 
have influenced a positive outlook on its members and leadership (see Section 5.3.1). 
Regardless, the Brothers have had to constantly justify their plans in resistance-held 
areas after the decades-long smear campaign by the Ba’ath Party (Al-Bayanouni, 
London, 2014; Al-Droubi,Vinna, 2014; Al-Rifai,Gaziantep, 2015; Othman, Istanbul, 
2014). The SMB has committed to being a potential political force in Syria. In 2012, it 
published its ‘National Covenant after a Syrian opposition summit held in Cairo. This 
publication reiterated and highlighted details of their ‘National Honour Charter’ and 
‘Political Project’ (Ikwanweb, 2005; Lefèvre, 2013) 
 
The SMB has been present in Syrian politics since the early history of modern Syria. 
Throughout the decades, its leaders have reiterated the organization’s political legitimacy 
to the Syrian people (see Chapter 4). Yet this has not been without its challenges. The 
SMB faced a difficult time in the Syrian parliament soon after its inception in the late 
1940s (Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; Al-Rawi, 2015; Rafael Lefèvre, 2013; Salem, 
London, 2014; Teitelbaum, 2011). Its members have appreciated the rules of politics 
nonetheless. Teitelbaum’s claims that its members’ integration in Syrian politics made 
the SMB “not an irredentist fanatic Muslim political force, but one that played the 
political game more or less according to the rules” (Teitelbaum, 2011). Teitelbaum 
recognizes that: 
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“SMB members are very much a part of the political mainstream 
– and certainly not a fanatical, violent Muslim political 
force…the Brotherhood held several seats in parliament, 
including ministerial posts. The leadership was concerned with 
the issues that affected all politically involved Syrians” 
(Teitelbaum, 2011: 136).  
 
Although many Western academics differ from Teitelbaum’s analysis, it can still be 
considered a notable observation on the SMB’s authenticity. 
 
Since the start of the revolution, the Syrian people have been eager for change. They 
looked for credible and intellectual political actors to represent them in a future Syria. 
The SMB stood up to be recognized. Understanding the relevance of this is crucial in the 
post-colonial environment that the SMB finds itself in. On the SMB’s potential in the 
future of Syrian politics, Joshua Teitelbaum writes:  
 
“The leadership of the Syrian Ikhwan [Brotherhood] was highly 
educated; most had university educations and several had 
advanced degrees, notably in the field of law. It is significant that 
among the leaders were those who, in addition to expertise in 
Shari'a law, were schooled in secular law as well. This allowed, 
perhaps, for a greater openness to other ideas and issues that were 
not ‘Islamic’ as such” (Teitelbaum, 2011: 137).  
 
The ‘openness’ mentioned here has not disappeared since the SMB’s exile. Its leaders 
are now more educated than ever. Their emphasis on the importance of supporting the 
education of the future generation of Syrians has not withered. Indeed, before leaving 
Syria, they were recognized by their communities for their commitment to education 
through their relief organizations (Najjar, Gaziantep, 2014; Al-Bayanouni, London 
,2014; Salem, London,2014). Post-2011, the new generation of SMB members have 
shown themselves to be well-versed in international relations and diplomacy. John 
Esposito reflects on the modern transformation of the organization’s members:  
 
“[T]heir intellects have been fast in the reading and interpreting 
of available information and they have been goal-oriented…they 
develop program materials to foster modern, Islamic oriented 
youth, run social centres, and where political conditions permit, 
engage in politics” (Esposito, 1998, p. 319). 
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Looking back in history and at modern times, the senior leadership of the SMB have 
been a fundamental pillar in the survival of the Muslim Brotherhood. Critics may argue 
that this is to be expected from leaders of any organization. However, the SMB’s leaders 
have faced immense challenges. The rapidly changing dynamics of Syrian politics post-
2011 meant that they have had to react rapidly as well. The need to demonstrate their 
goodwill to their own communities added an extra challenge. Through all this, the SMB 
understood its importance in providing the Syrian people with a political alternative.  
 
The SMB has stayed true to its ideology. Scholars allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, have legitimized strategic changes within the organization. 
This included forging alliances and adapting to dynamic political situations, which Al-
Qaradawi argues is important for the survival of the Ummah: “Being rigid in sticking to 
a rigid pattern in organization, a rigid pattern in the methods of Tharbiyah [Islamic 
education], a rigid pattern in the means of Da’wah [Islamic proselytism], a rigid pattern 
in the stages by which the objective will be attained and a rigid pattern in certain political 
ideas, to the extent that anyone who tries to change, add or amend these procedures, 
means and methods finds himself facing zealous refusals, even accusations and 
defamations” (Al-Qaradawi, 2000: 132-133). 
 
Many Syrians hoped Bashar Al-Assad would give them dignity, freedom of speech, and 
justice. This never materialized. In the months leading up to the 2011 uprising, a group 
of the SMB’s executive board members discussed their organization’s future. Members 
reflected on their ideologically-driven duties and commitments towards their Syrian 
compatriots demanding a change (Al-Droubi, Vienna, personal communication, 2014). 
The primary objective of the SMB has been to meet the Syrian people’s expectations of 
an Islamic social movement. Al-Bayanouni, a senior member within the SMB, questions 
the extent of his organization’s utilization of political ‘tools’ to deliver on its promises: 
“What kind of communication has the SMB adhered so far to the values of freedom, 
democracy, pluralism and social justice, as these values are the foundation upon which 
the modern state is established?” (Al-Bayanouni, London, personal communication, 
2014). The values he mentions are crucial in the building of a state, something not seen 
in the modern Arab world. Al-Qaradawi stresses what the political profile of an Islamic 
 128 
movement should look like: “The Movement should always stand by political freedom, 
as represented by a true, not false, democracy” (Al-Qaradawi, 2000: 186). 
 
Al-Bayanouni highlights that the SMB’s all-encompassing ideology is capable of 
winning the hearts and minds of the Syrian people, both Muslims and non-Muslims alike 
(Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014). The academic Line Khatib presents an example of the 
extent of the influence of the SMB’s moderate Islamic ideology: “For instance, in 
September 1979, around 500 primary and secondary school teachers and dozens of 
university professors who were suspected of teaching pro-Muslim Brotherhood ideas in 
their classes were dismissed from their jobs” (Khatib, 2011, p. 83). The strict regime has 
even assassinated some SMB members for propagating these ideas. Al-Bayanouni 
asserts that, unlike the Assad regime, the SMB is committed to institutional values 
present in Syria. Line Khatib lists the failures of the regime being “the wave of 
corruption that had invaded the country, the inefficiency of the bureaucratic apparatus, 
the economic crisis, the absence of individual freedoms, the lack of justice in the justice 
system and the lack of a democratic life” (Khatib, 2011, p. 83). 
 
Looking further into Syria’s future, the SMB faces questions about its Niyya (intention) 
in cooperating with others in a pluralistic state. The SMB has outlined its Niyya in its 
statements and pamphlets (Ikwanweb, 2005). Yet, post-2011, it has been difficult to fully 
detail the organization’s intentions. Like other oppositional groups, the SMB has not had 
the opportunity to ‘test drive’ Syria’s political battleground. However, its leaders know 
the time is right to assert that “the true intention of the SMB is to oblige to their 
commitment both at the internal level and in dealing with partner institutions in the 
opposition’s coalition, the National Council and the Interim Government” (Al-
Bayanouni, London, personal communication, 2014). By publicly presenting their 
impactful vision, the SMB knows it will have to face new challenges. The Syrian people 
have not experienced radical institutional changes since the Assad regime took power. 
On this point, it is crucial for the SMB to remember that “the state unleashed a number 
of significant repressive measures against the institutions of the dissenting Islamic 
establishment” (Khatib, 2011: 83).  
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With its Niyya and willingness to prove its commitment to pluralism, the SMB’s 
executive board called a meeting at the start of the 2011 revolution. This meeting was 
attended by groups across the spectrum of the Syrian opposition (Ikwanweb, 2005). 
Various intellectuals and members of ethnic groups, some of whom were living in exile, 
assembled in Turkey to see what the SMB could offer. Academics who blamed the SMB 
for starting the revolution were surprised to see this positive response in the SMB’s call 
for a united front (Hassan, 2011; Al-Droubi, Vienna, 2014). Whether these groups 
trusted the SMB or not, their attendance gave credence to its organizational capabilities 
(see Chapter 7). This meeting marked the first step towards establishing the SMB as an 
influential leader of the Syrian opposition. Consequently, the SMB was able to begin 
setting the agenda of the Syrian opposition. Individual opposition members also grew 
increasingly comfortable with the Islamic democratic vision outlined by the SMB in this 
first meeting.  
 
However, the meeting was not without its criticism. Certain secularist, liberal, and ethnic 
groups from the opposition raised objections. These groups considered the SMB’s 
Islamic-infused vision incompatible with their concept of a secularly governed Syria. 
Conversely, leaders of the SMB view the secular governance imposed by the Ba’ath 
Party for decades (see Chapter 4) as incongruous in a nation where more than 90% of the 
population is Muslim.  
 
In response to these critics, SMB leaders point to their National Honour Charter – first 
published in 2001 – which clearly states a commitment to a future Syria being “a civil 
modern state with a civil constitution” (Rubin, 2010a) . Similarly, they point to their 
2004 published manifesto (Ikwanweb, 2005), which details the SMB’s openness and 
equality towards secularists and ethnic minorities in the population. SMB leaders claim 
that “[T]his encompasses a democratic pluralistic deliberative country in which people 
choose who governs and represents them through the ballot box in an impartial, free, and 
transparent election” (personal communication with: Al-Bayanouni, London 2014; Al-
Bayanouni, London, 2015; Othman, 2015; Al-Droubi, Vienna, 2014).  
 
The memorandum titled ‘The Vision of a Future Syria’ has been described as “the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood’s most important statement regarding their evolution and their 
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vision of Syria’s evolution”. Leaders of the SMB repeatedly refer to this all-
encompassing manifesto (personal communication with: Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; 
Salem, London, 2014). They believe that it is still relevant post-2011. The manifesto 
respects not only Sunni Muslim communities but also the Christian, Druze, and even the 
Alawite populations of Syria. Leaders of the SMB have repeatedly defended their 
unchanged vision of a pluralistically democratic Syria. In response to criticisms of the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy, the SMB has continued to reaffirm its belief in 
that its ideology permits it to work towards and in a pluralistic democracy (personal 
communication with Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014; Waleed, London, 2014; Salem, 
London, 2014). The older generation of exiled SMB members, with their focus on their 
higher education, can play an influential role in a pluralistic Syria. Their education 
contributes significantly to what Goodwin and Jasper describe as “a movement’s ability 
to create, interpret, and use mobilizing structures and political opportunities” (Goodwin 
and Jasper, 2004, p. 26). 
 
Another criticism levelled at the SMB is Islamism’s focus on private life. Critics see this 
intrusion as a decidedly anti-liberal, if not totalitarian, practice. In response, the SMB’s 
senior leadership believes that this should not be seen in a negative light. The SMB’s 
ideology “embraces both public and private life” (Rosiny, 2013). It is because of this that 
the SMB was successful in building social services in Syria prior to 1982.   
 
Moreover, the SMB’s leadership stress that its position of moderate Islam protects 
against religious extremism of the Syrian people. Moderate Islam acts as a regulator of 
civic life to prevent a repetition of the acts carried out by terrorists abusing Islamic 
concepts to fulfil their murderous desires (Al-Bayanouni, London, personal 
communication, 2015). Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, an expert on the study of the Muslim 
Brotherhood across the Arab world, warns political analysts not to paint Islamic activism 
with a broad brush: “[T]he portrayal of the mainstream Islamist actors as single-
mindedly bent on seizing power to achieve a set of fixed goals is a gross 
oversimplification – indeed a caricature – that cannot survive close empirical scrutiny” 
(Wickham, 2013, p. 10).  
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The SMB point to another aspect of post-2011 demonstrations that exhibits an Islamic 
influence on Syrian society. During the early days of the revolution, religious vocabulary 
at anti-regime demonstrations was very rarely used. Soon enough, slogans used by 
Syrian youth became infused with Islamic themes. Mosques were used as launch pads 
for protests. Some even called for divine support in reforming the autocratic regime. The 
SMB views this as an opportunity to represent these youth in a future Syria. Zubair 
Salem, a former spokesman for the SMB, recalls the cooperation between different 
groups of Syrians during the uprising. Demands for reforms extended beyond mosques 
and Islamic beliefs. However, he points out that, after weeks of demonstrations: 
 
 “It has to be recognized that the revolution of the Syrian people 
was later carried by Islamic slogans, which reflects the Sunni 
Muslim majority of Syrian citizens. Non-Muslim communities 
(Christians and Alawites) joined the young and frustrated people 
of Syria, who initiated protests usually after gathering at the 
Islamic Friday prayers in the mosques. Their mottos were 
Islamic, chanting and asking for the help of Allah, their only 
supporter – ‘Mafy gheirak ya Allah’” (Salem, London, personal 
communication, 2014). 
 
This observation is corroborated by many Syrians who fled in the aftermath of the 
uprising. An anonymous Syrian intellectual narrates how her father was executed in the 
early 1980s by Syrian Mokhabarat. She and her siblings grew up orphaned. The reason 
given for the execution was ‘evidence’ of her father’s ‘closeness’ to the SMB’s ideology. 
Like thousands under the Assad regime, the Ba’athists denied her and her siblings any 
involvement in social engagement. She narrates how her entire neighbourhood in the city 
of Al-Bab had “been waiting for the unpredictable opportunity to peacefully demonstrate 
their belief in something mightier (i.e. God/Allah) other than what the Ba’athist traitors 
have tried to convince us in” (female interviewee, Gaziantep 2016). When the Syrian 
youth rose up on March 2011, “[i]t did not make any difference if people had been 
religious or secular, Christians or Muslims, male or female: we all just wanted to be the 
one strong body gathered against the brutality done in the name of secularism by the 
Syrian government” (female interviewee, Gaziantep 2016).  
 
Three major Syrian cities – Aleppo, Hama, and Homs – have experienced incessant 
attacks since the start of the revolution. Despite the extremely difficult circumstances of 
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their surroundings, the citizens of Aleppo joined the uprising relatively late. This was 
because they feared the presence of the Mokhabarat in the city. Moreover, the merchants 
and manufacturers of Aleppo feared significant ramifications on the economy of the city; 
Aleppo is Syria’s main trade and industrial city. Its inhabitants are well-educated and 
economically stable. This places Aleppo in an important location in the Syrian conflict. 
Several well-known political analysts claim that the fight for Aleppo will be the ultimate 
turning point for the freedom of the Syrian people (Landis and Lund, 2016). 
 
The SMB has maintained solid connections with the citizens of Aleppo, not least because 
many of its leaders’ hail from the city (see Chapter 4). This historic relationship will 
support the SMB in mobilizing its members to revive the organization’s perception in the 
city, even amongst merchants. Benjamin Smith’s observation during the Iranian 
revolution can be applied to Aleppo. Smith notes how Iranian ‘bazaaris’ – merchants in 
bazaars – shared the same humiliating experiences under the strict regime there. The 
shared fate of these ‘bazaaris’ “is the strongest communal bond between ‘bazaaris’ of 
varying religious and class backgrounds…the mobilization of the bazaar highlights the 
importance of informal networks as mobilization resources in authoritarian settings” 
(Smith, 2004: 186). Smith explains the importance of tight-knit connections between 
these bazaaris in making “a strong community identity possible even in the face of 
serious ideological and cultural divides within the community itself” (Smith, 2004: 186). 
Bazaaris in Aleppo eventually united against the regime, starting within their small and 
interconnected communities. 
 
The second of the major Syrian cities, Hama, has also fallen victim to the regime’s 
military campaigns (see Chapter 4). Line Khatib sheds light on the SMB’s success in 
Hama post-2011: “The destruction of Hama and the general ruthlessness of Al-Assad’s 
response had a chastening effect on Syria’s estimated 30,000 Muslim Brotherhood 
sympathizers. Nonetheless, the government’ killing of many innocent civilians during 
the course of the Hama confrontation served to crystallize Syrians’ discontent with the 
regime, while also helping to spark an increased willingness to integrate the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s vision of the social order” (Khatib, 2011: 81). 
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The third city, Homs, has suffered brutal attacks. Homs is the birthplace of many of the 
SMB’s leaders. Thus, the SMB has maintained the city as a stronghold and has managed 
to mobilize its networks there during the revolution. Regardless, the SMB’s leaders 
understand the strains these connections will come under once the regime is reformed. 
Because of this, they have reiterated their call of equality and dignity in a future Syria. 
They still refer back to the organization’s moderate Islamic identity. In investigating the 
SMB’s political activities in the past, Joshua Teitelbaum recognizes that “the 
Brotherhood elections campaign was characterized by an intensive and effective use of 
the mosque apparatus” (Teitelbaum, 2011: 137).  
 
The SMB has never forgotten its Islamic identity when establishing its presence in Syria 
(Rafael Lefèvre, 2013; Lund, 2013; Rubin, 2010) . The academic Diane Singerman 
highlights that the challenge Islamic movements face is the political context in which 
they operate. The SMB remains committed to religion in the unstable environment of 
Syria. To understand this, Singerman points out that “[a] comparative lens explains the 
similarities between movements across time and space, and also suggests their 
distinctiveness” (Singerman, 2004, p. 143). The SMB is not a historical exception, and a 
comparative lens can be added to this topic to explain its socio-political challenges. 
 
Set more than 50 years ago, the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) in the USA will be used 
to draw similarities to the SMB. It is important to note several differences between the 
two movements. The SMB was founded in a different era. Its activities have been carried 
out in a different political environment. Its leaders have been in exile for three decades. 
Most importantly, its members are from a different ethnic and religious background to 
those of the CRM. However, both movements have followed the same political evolution 
and have publicly displayed their religious outlook. The CRM’s evolution followed its 
leaders’ religious beliefs and visions (Jones, 2014). Martin Luther King, a leader of the 
CRM, held a doctoral degree in theology and was an active Christian Baptist minister. 
He prayed in public while reminding the repressed African-American population of God 
as their ultimate leader (King, 1964). Aldon Morris explains King’s deliberate use of 
Christian rhetoric: “[I]f King had chosen to adopt an aggressive militant tactic that 
includes the use of violence, the masses and their churches would not have supported it” 
(Morris, 2004: 241).  
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The SMB’s utilization of Islamic rhetoric is similar to King’s, who “as a Baptist minister 
with a doctorate in theology…actually believed that those ‘themes’ were true or valuable 
for their own sake” (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004, p. 25). King’s religious-based ideology 
united the African-American people who had faced grief and suffering throughout their 
history. King’s ‘dream’ emphasized his people’s dignity and self-determination. He 
insisted on reform through peaceful protest. Similarly, the leadership of the SMB “like 
that of other Islamic movements, saw their movement as all-encompassing, not just as a 
religious association. Islam, they believed, applied to all areas of life, and the appeal of 
the Brotherhood could therefore be an all-encompassing one” (Teitelbaum, 2011: 5). 
John Esposito adds, “Islam has remained a principle of social cohesion and identity. Its 
continued presence among the majority of Muslims explains the continued appeal to and 
acceptance by many Muslims of Islamic politics” (Esposito, 1998, p. 221). The SMB’s 
leaders have always affirmed their personal Islamic beliefs even through difficult 
political times (Al-Bayanouni, London, personal communication,.2014). This has kept 
the organization steady even after the 2011 revolution. 
 
Looking back to the USA, the CRM organized the March on Washington in 1963. This 
march called for the human rights of the African-American people. It would not have 
been possible in this ‘classical phase’ (Jones, 2014) of the movement without its 
members’ fundamental beliefs. No matter where a movement is located and the political 
climate surrounding it, its success relies on the experience of its leaders. The SMB is 
going through a critical phase in its evolution. It will need its younger, more charismatic 
members to relay the organization’s message to the Syrian people. The interplay between 
the old and the new generation was seen in the CRM: “King delivered the finale at the 
Lincoln Memorial, but the tone for the day was set in an opening address by A. Philip 
Randolph, the seventy-four-year-old trade unionist, who was official leader of the March 
on Washington” (Jones, 2014). 
 
The analysis of the SMB in this chapter thus far has focused mainly on its social 
engagement and politics by the SMB’s male executives. However, it is important not to 
forget the significant role Syrian women have had in the challenging environment since 
the revolution. The dynamics of the Syrian conflict have affected both male and female 
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members of the SMB. The SMB labels its female members’ section as the ‘Syrian 
Sisterhood’. This section was launched at a very early stage in the SMB’s history, with 
the organization proudly welcoming both male and female members. Since it was 
founded in 1948, the SMB has included their female members in their study circles and 
social engagement programs. This came to a halt after the Hama massacre of 1982 (see 
Chapter 4). Post-2011, this female section was revived, with Raphael Lefèvre remarking 
that “interestingly, though, women are becoming an important part of the Muslim 
Brotherhood” (Lefèvre, 2013). By 2013, six women were elected to the SMB’s 30-
member Majlis Al-Shura (consultative board). The SMB’s leaders have underlined their 
passion of integrating, supporting, and educating Syrian women. They are aware of the 
importance of female activists in solving problems created by the Syrian revolution (Al-
Shami, Gaziantep 2015; Al-Daher, Gaziantep 2015; Al-Bayanouni, London 10.10.2014; 
Waleed, London 2014).  
 
Several questions are still to be answered: is this inclusion a veiled show of lifting the 
SMB’s profile with the Syrian people? Will an increased female presence successfully 
rebut the criticisms levelled by Western academics about Islamism’s stigma towards 
women? How will Syrian women’s perceptions of the SMB as a socio-political 
movement change? Will the SMB gain support from these women in a future, more 
democratic Syria? In this study, interviews were conducted with several Syrian women 
to determine their perception of the SMB in a pluralistic future Syria. Section 6.2 of this 
study detailed the SMB’s connection to their communities and the wider Syrian 
population. In general, the analysis showed a positive perception by Syrian intellectuals 
of the potential of the SMB in mobilizing the Syrian people. Here, a case will be 
presented of a Syrian woman’s perception of the movement and its ideology towards 
women. 
 
Mariam (name changed for anonymity) is a Syrian intellectual in her fifties. She has 
been active in the SMB’s various sociopolitical programs. While exiled in Turkey, 
Mariam took the initiative to start her own female circles and aid groups. By 2016, she 
had gathered more than 300 members from her various initiatives. In line with the 
SMB’s moderate Islamic ideology, these members were not demanded to pledge an 
allegiance (bay’a). In Mariam’s opinion, her interest in the SMB was shaped by her 
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environment and the appreciation of the SMB within her family. Her Sunni family had 
been a part of the modern Syrian environment; no hijab (Islamic veiling), attending 
mixed gender schools, etc. Although her late father had not been a member of the SMB, 
he was interested in their publications and statements before the 1980s. Mariam recalls 
how, living in the Alawite-majority city of Lattakia, her SMB-affiliated neighbour would 
explain the SMB’s ideology and vision to her father. The unique ideology interested her 
father and subsequently the whole family. However, living under the autocratic regime 
of the Ba’ath Party made her father apprehensive about joining the controversial 
movement. 
 
Now exiled in Turkey, Mariam confesses that she feels safe far away from Assad’s 
Mokhabarat. She and her family are still concerned about the Brothers back in her 
neighbourhood. Her family has stayed in contact with SMB members who have 
integrated into the country’s educational system. This comes after the SMB’s elimination 
from the public sphere in the 1980s (Mariam, Killis 2015). Mariam’s story contributes to 
the claim that the Brothers have integrated within the Syrian bourgeoisie and the 
educated upper middle class (see Chapter 4). The political scientist Thomas Pierret adds: 
“Indeed, despite the departure of the historical leaders of the Muslim Brothers in the 
1960s, active members of the movement continued to teach in the faculty until the late 
1970s, and several of the deans who headed the institution until the 1980s had known 
sympathies with the Brothers” (Pierret, 2013: 39). 
 
In conclusion, this section has illustrated the SMB’s potential of being seen as an 
alternative and credible political force. It has emphasized that the SMB’s success in a 
future Syria depends on its tight-knit family connections by individual SMB members. 
The SMB as a social movement has utilized social bonding and engagement to further its 
cause. Even after the Ba’ath regime’s attempted removal of the SMB from the political 
and public sphere, its ideology continues to resound with the Syrian people. Having 
experienced disappointing and difficult times under the secular Ba’athists, many Syrians 
see the SMB as a legitimate political alternative. They hope to see a future in which a 
pluralistically governed Syria provides them a chance to exercise their democratic rights. 
Unfortunately, there seems to be no sign of the conflict in Syria ending. 
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The next section of this chapter will examine the significance of some SMB members’ 
founding of the Wa’ad Party. The party was formed my members in exile to include a 
coalition of intellectuals and political activists. While members of this party come from 
different ideological and religious backgrounds, they have used moderate Islam as a 
reference to guide the party’s actions. The next section will probe into why the SMB’s 
leadership did not object to their members forming this political party independent of the 
SMB (Al-Bayanouni, London 10.10.2014). Furthermore, it will scrutinize whether this 
new party will ever see a pluralistic Syria in which Syrians can elect them as their 
representatives. 
 
 
6.4 The SMB and the Foundation of ‘Wa’ad’ Party: ‘The National Party for Justice 
and the Constitution’ (Hesb al Adala wa al Dustour) 
 
In July 2012, Israeli news agency Ynetnews ran a story about the establishment of a new 
political party by the SMB, stating: “Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood, a key opponent of 
President Bashar Assad’s regime, announced plans Friday to launch an Islamist political 
party, saying it was ready for the post-Assad era”. In 2013, the Carnegie Endowment ran 
a similar story (Lefèvre, 2013), as did several Arabic news websites, including the Noon 
Post (Noon Post, 2014). The content of these stories has been disputed by leading 
members of the SMB, including Ali Sadr eldin Al Bayanuoni, and executive members of 
the newly established political party, such as Dr. Mohammad Waleed. Both stated that 
the media had misrepresented them. The new party, they said, was not run by the SMB, 
although it had been established by SMB members. They emphasized the inclusive 
nature of the party, open to Syrians of any religious or ethnic background (Waleed, 
London, personal communication, 2014). 
 
In Syria, public political action had traditionally often led to serious conflict with the 
authorities. But by 2011, the SMB no longer feared reprisals from the Syrian state 
intelligence, or Mokhabarat (Lefèvre, 2013). They were prepared to take on the risk 
inherent in establishing a new party while in exile, which put them firmly back into the 
center of Syrian politics. They risked negative reactions from the Syrian public and put 
themselves in some danger. They were willing to do so to support their belief in a 
democratic and pluralistic Syria.   
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The party was named the Wa’ad Party. Wa’ad can be literally translated as ‘promise’, 
but it is also an acronym for ‘The National Party for Justice and the Constitution’. 30% 
of the party’s founding members were also members of the SMB. These members 
emphasized their commitment to Syria as a nation, rather than their religious or 
ideological beliefs (Wafaai, Gaziantep, 24.8.2014). The Wa’ad Party’s founding 
statement committed it to transitional justice, pluralism and separation of powers. As a 
result, it attracted many liberal Syrians. It was not an overtly Islamic party. Its elected 
head, Nabil Kassis, was Christian. “Based on its official documents, it would be hard to 
tell that the Wa’ad Party was Islamist at all” (Kerr and Larkin, 2015, p. 166)  
 
Despite this apparent pluralism, the party was subject to considerable criticism from 
Syrian activists, both those in exile and those still in the country. It also received 
criticism from some within the SMB, including from speaker Suhair Salem, who stated 
that the party was “stillborn”. He believed that the Wa’ad Party was likely to be 
ineffective, because: “Any party that will be established outside of Syria, will be only a 
number of people without a base” (Salem, London, personal communication, 2014). 
Syrian academics have repeatedly expressed public skepticism about the timing of the 
party’s establishment, its location outside Syria and its relationship with the SMB 
(Sayigh and Lefèvre, 2013).  
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the reasons for the party’s formation, its location in 
exile, and its stated aims. It will look at the social and political backgrounds of the 
party’s members and their motivations for joining it, especially in the light of the 
opinions of prominent Syrian observers. In 2012, some members of the SMB, working as 
individuals rather than on behalf of that organization, founded a Syrian political party in 
Istanbul. The city had been the location of the SMB’s headquarters ever since the 2011 
uprising. They hoped that the party would be able to contribute to the establishment of 
democracy in a future, post-conflict, Syria (Wafaai, personal communication, 2015). 
 
It was then 2013, and the Syrian crisis was in its second year. At the time, some felt it 
had already reached its peak. The Wa’ad Party’s founding committee had begun to work 
towards its vision of a democratic Syria, inviting members of all of Syria’s communities 
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to be part of this work. These communities had lived alongside each other for decades 
with little serious conflict (Hashemi and Postel, 2017; Khatib, 2011; Lesch and Haas, 
2016; Pierret, 2013) . They included Alawites, Kurds and Christians (personal 
communication with: Wafaai, Gaziantep ,2014; Waleed, London, 2014; Al-Bayanouni, 
London, 2014). 
 
The Wa’ad Party’s founders intended the party to be a mainstream national political 
party, not a political wing of the SMB. (Hanoun, Gaziantep 2014; al Bayanouni, London 
2014; Al-Soufi London 2014. Waleed London, 2014; et al). The party had some 
commitment to Islamism, but this was not a barrier to it gaining support from Syrians of 
other religions. Nabil Kassis, founding member and later deputy leader, was Christian. 
He stated that his support for the party was based on its commitment to a civil state. He 
has repeatedly denied that the Wa’ad Party is the political arm of the SMB, as many 
continue to claim (SOHR, 2014) and emphasizes that the party’s stated aims and values 
correspond with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Kassis, Gaziantep, personal 
communication, 2014).  
 
The party’s founding members brought with them considerable experience of democratic 
and pluralist political systems outside Syria and of political movements elsewhere. Nabil 
Kassis studied and lived in Algeria, where he ran a publishing company and became part 
of the growing democracy movement there. He returned to Syria, but soon left for 
Canada, seeking freedom of expression. In Canada, he established another publishing 
company and made short documentaries for Shabakkat Sham Alakbaria (Damascene 
News Network), a news agency for Syrians living outside the country. Syrian 
intellectuals such as Kassis have long tended to engage in Syrian politics from outside 
Syria. Kassis became part of several anti-Bashar Assad groups while in Canada, and was 
active in them until he left to help found the Wa’ad Party. He explained: 
 
 “The establishment of this party came as a practical result of a 
deep change in the political approach of the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood. This alteration started in 2006 by the release of the 
new political program of the Muslim Brotherhood, manifestly 
adopting the concept of peaceful transition of power and the 
concept of citizenship” (see Appendix 6) (Kassis, Ghaziantep, 
2014). 
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Kasssis’ statement and those of other powerful figures in the Wa’ad Party has gone some 
way to changing the critical opinion many Syrians hold of the SMB. Since 2011, Syrians 
have increasingly come to see the SMB as a well-organized opposition group that could 
become a vital part of a future Syrian democracy.  
 
Despite this, there are some who still perceive the SMB to be a more conservative 
organization, including some within it. This is not uncommon in Islamic movements. 
Masoud states: “Splits within the movement between liberals and conservatives, between 
those focused on political work and those who believe in the primacy of Da’wa 
(preaching), between young and old, can be expected to remain salient, and to be joined 
by new ones generated by the push and pull of democratic politics” (Masoud, 2013: 
496). Syrian activist Obaida Fares carried out an analysis of the SMB and the likely 
future of the Wa’ad Party. His view was that the party was at high risk of failing because 
of its lack of experience and poor public perception of it. He suggested that SMB 
members should resign before entering the party, in order to avoid public confusion over 
their loyalties. He also proposed that the SMB should limit itself to social engagement 
rather than political activity, drawing a clear line between it and the Wa’ad Party to 
avoid competition between the two (Fares,Istanbul, personal communication, 2014).  
 
By contrast, SMB leader of 14 years and lawyer Al-Bayanouni believes that individual 
SMB members should make their own decision on whether to resign membership if they 
join the Wa’ad Party, or to remain active in both organizations. The Wa’ad Party’s 
leadership stated that there was no conflict of interest, with the party operating entirely 
separately from the SMB. The party, they said, welcomed Syrians of all ethnic and 
religious backgrounds (Al-Bayanouni, London, .2014 and other respondents). It is 
inaccurate to view the Wa’ad Party as an offshoot of the SMB, as many Syrians do. SMB 
members have long been active in Syrian professional syndicates (see Chapter 4). 
Officially, 30% of Wa’ad Party members are also SMB members, but the real figure may 
be much higher, indicating a strong degree of shared aims and values. At the same time, 
the two organizations have different purposes, and it is not reasonable to ask SMB 
members not to also engage in politics via the Wa’ad Party if they choose. Some argue 
that the establishment of the Wa’ad Party has been vital to the development of political 
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activity in the SMB, which in turn has helped encourage young people to participate in 
the movement (Al-Baker, Gaziantep, 2014). 
 
Essam Abou Mousa, Director of the Al Ezza Institute for Political Research and 
Analysis, considers the establishment of the Wa’ad Party a positive step, but argues that 
the party must communicate its goals and structure more effectively to the Syrian public 
in order to gain their trust (Abou Mousa, Istanbul 4.1.2015). Transparency is important, 
especially as the SMB has often been accused of working secretively. To an extent, this 
is understandable, given the conflict in Syria and the need for SMB members both within 
the country and in exile to hide their membership of the organization (see Chapter 4). 
However, the Wa’ad Party must gain the trust of the Syrian people in order to legitimize 
the party. This is unlikely to happen unless the party can operate with transparency and 
show that its link to the SMB is not problematic.  
 
The Wa’ad Party is most likely to succeed politically if it can offer a clear set of aims 
and values that will attract new active members and donors. Mohammed Iman, Syrian 
author, political analyst and activist, endorsed the establishment of a political party by 
the SMB. He is a life-long SMB member, and describes the setting up of the Wa’ad 
Party as “this important initiative”. During the 2011 uprising, Imam, then in exile, 
decided to return to Syria. He has since become heavily involved in Syrian politics, and 
has encouraged unity among Syria’s democratic opposition groups. He favors 
consultation with regional councils in rebel-held areas, and argues that the SMB should 
have acted on this some time ago. The SMB, he states, is not only a religious movement 
but a political organization that must demonstrate openness, acceptance and the 
promotion of well-being (Imam, Killis, personal communication, 2015). 
 
Syrian opposition activist and SMB sympathizer Maha Mohammed argues that it is vital 
that the Wa’ad Party demonstrates its independence from the SMB. She supports the 
party’s foundation, and believes that “decisions made by the SMB should under no 
circumstances influence the decisions of Wa’ad, neither concerning the politics, nor the 
organizational structure or any other matter” (Mohamed, Killis, personal communication,  
2015). 
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Not everyone in the SMB welcomed the foundation of the Wa’ad Party, including some 
of the SMB’s leaders. Some of them have been vocal critics of the Wa’ad Party. Zuhair 
Salem, SMB spokesman and founder of the Arab Orient Centre for Strategic and 
Civilization Studies in London, voiced concerns about the timing of the Wa’ad Party’s 
foundation. He believes that Syria’s instability will hinder the party’s success, and that 
its founding members should have recognized this. He acknowledges that some kind of 
political organization is needed, but that its foundation should have been delayed until 
Syria became more stable.  
 
Greater stability would have meant that the party could have communicated more 
effectively with the Syrian people, broadening its membership and engaging activists 
more readily. He believes that the party should only have been established once Syrians 
in exile (including members of the SMB) were able to re-enter their homeland freely. He 
states, “Any party that has been established in exile will be just a group of key 
personalities, yet with no fundamental base” (Salem, London, personal communication, 
2014). Salem is an influential figure, and his contribution to the debate within the SMB 
has been significant. This appears to confirm Peter and Ortega’s statement that “the 
debates inside these groups demonstrate their awareness of what is objectively at stake 
when they enter the field of party politics, namely a commitment to participate in a 
process which exerts considerable constraints on their program, activities and 
legitimacy” (Peter and Ortega, 2014, p. 4).  
 
Debate about the establishment of the Wa’ad Party was not confined to the SMB. Many 
Syrians interviewed, as we will see below, felt that a political party established in exile 
could not function properly. This is not unreasonable, given that political parties 
generally function within state structures. However, the current environment in Syria 
makes the establishment of an inclusive party there impossible. There is a considerable 
lack of practical political knowledge in the country, as a result of decades in which 
Syrians have been excluded from active politics. This is a huge challenge for the Wa’ad 
Party, and one that it must address in order to succeed.   
 
Mohamad Sarmini, consultant to the Interim Syrian Government’s Prime Minister, spoke 
when interviewed about the “unfortunate founding strategy” of the Wa’ad Party. He 
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believed that the foundation “could not be regarded as substantial, as there was no public 
invitation to attend the party’s launching process”. He criticized the party’s founders for 
moving to declare its foundation too quickly, without proper research, and leading to 
“unnecessary” debates about its legal status in Turkey. He argued that the party should 
have sought expert advice before its foundation. The SMB adopted the model used by 
new parties in other Arab countries, including Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. However, 
Sarmini argued that this model failed in Syria because the country lacked the political 
stability found elsewhere. There would be, he said “a substantial lack of support by an 
entire civil society as long as the party will remain in exile” (Sarmini, Gaziantep, 
personal communication,2014).   
 
Mohammed Ameen Haffar also argued that the timing of the Wa’ad Party’s foundation 
was wrong, given the political situation in Syria. He explained:  
 
“Perhaps the current situation does not encourage the creation of 
a political party, this is because the Syrian people are going 
through extraordinary situations in every aspect; there is no 
security or stability and the number of refugees and internally 
displaced are beyond imagination. People are concerned with 
how to escape this disaster, where should they live, how to 
survive, and where to educate their children. There are priorities 
before creating a political party, therefore I see that the 
development of the party will be slow given the current 
situation”. 
 
Haffar did acknowledge that the party had national appeal, stating that: 
 
“An element that will increase the acceptance of this party is that 
it is not exclusively for the SMB; only one third are members of 
the SMB; on the other hand, non-Muslims are accepted to 
become members too. All that factors make the party being 
accepted largely on both internal and external levels”(Haffar, 
Gaziantep, 2014).  
 
Kerr and Larkin’s analysis of the Wa’ad Party noted that that “the party’s political 
program is a model of liberal-even secular-values that effectively relegates Islam to the 
status of a cultural asset and a bond with other Arab and Islamic states” (Kerr and 
Larkin, 2015, p. 166). This analysis could provide the basis of further study of the Wa’ad 
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Party. It is not clear how much influence, or not, the SMB has had over the Wa’ad 
Party’s inaugural program.  
 
Critics of the party have tended to focus not on its program or policies, but on the timing 
of its creation. Many prominent Syrians in exile have voiced such criticism, including 
Yassin Najjar, who was Minister of Communications, Transport, and Industry in the 
Interim Syrian Government in 2014. He specified that:  
 
“It has not been to the preferences of the Syrians in a war-torn 
zone, to appreciate a newly founded party. Divergent, such a 
distinct project may add more to the confused state of the Syrian 
population. Because, the younger generation, which were brought 
up inside Syria will not be able to recall links to the names of the 
advisory board members at the Wa’ad Party, who are unknown to 
them.” (Najjar, Gaziantep, personal communication, 2015) 
 
He wonders whether the party will be able to establish itself effectively in Syria while it 
lacks charismatic local leadership. Najjar, now in his late 40s, was brought up in Syria in 
a family that was generally critical of Syrian government propaganda. He became 
politically aware in his early twenties, becoming part of charity organizations and social-
political networks. In 2007, he supported the Damascus Declaration (Alam Damask 
Movement). While in Damascus he met the liberally minded Professor Bourhan 
Ghaliouny, who went into exile in France when the environment in Syria became hostile 
to intellectuals.  
 
Well-known social activist and former head of the Syria and Aleppo Engineers’ 
syndicate, Mohammad Najjar remained in Syria under the Baathist regime. He was 
frequently questioned by the secret service regarding possible connections to the SMB, 
and eventually detained for twelve years without trial. His view of the Wa’ad Party is 
built on his experiences with the Syrian regime and his work with the Syrian people. He 
expressed concern that “the party will be facing a problematic attempt in mobilizing new 
members and associates for a future Syria, if the people are still experiencing a brutal 
conflict throughout the revolution” (Najjar,Gaziantep, personal communication, 2015) 
 
This echoes Masoud’s thoughts regarding Egypt “that the future Muslim Brotherhood 
electoral performance will remain highly sensitive to contextual factors, and the 
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movements’ continued dominion is by no means assured” (Masoud, 2013: 496). The 
same is likely to be true of Syria. It is impossible to predict how people will react to the 
circumstances Syria will find itself in once Assad’s regime has been dismantled. Syrians 
may well seek new political representation, but they may also want the SMB to provide 
social activism. This puts pressure on the SMB. The organization is viewed as the most 
credible opposition political force in Syria by analysts and its leaders are aware that as a 
result they are the subject of considerable media attention. Their potentially significant 
role in the peace-building process has been discussed since 2011, and the Wa’ad Party is 
often touted as being the political wing of the SMB, ready to step into the Syrian 
political scene as needed.  
 
As it stands, the SMB is not equipped to enter mainstream Syrian politics (as discussed 
in subsection 5.2.2). Any political party seen as part of the SMB will attract considerable 
criticism, as happened in Egypt (see 5.3.4). As it is based outside Syria, the SMB’s 
ability to deal with criticism is limited. As a result, many have questioned whether the 
SMB should have chosen the timing and location of the launch of the Wa’ad Party more 
carefully. Given the current situation in Syria, they argue, it would have been more 
sensible to delay the founding of the party until the country has become more stable and 
the conflict has been resolved.  
 
It is clear that there is much that the Wa’ad Party can be criticized for. Regardless, it is 
an independent Syrian political party with a commitment to democracy, freedom and 
justice. Saad Wafai, one of the party’s co-founders, states that “the overall approach for 
founding the party has been positive”. The party was founded on the collective effort of 
the SMB, Islamic oriented members and Nationalists, working together. Wafai stresses 
that the party must represent all Syrians and act as a political platform for young Syrians 
who are likely to want to play an active role in the country’s political life, post-Assad 
(Wafai, personal communication, 2014).  
 
Wafai is politically motivated by the desire for change in Syria, particularly in the 
context of the country’s colonial history. The British/French Skyes-Picot Agreement of 
1916 and the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon of 1922 provide a colonial 
legacy that has continued to influence politics in the region and support the existence of 
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repressive governments. Wafai is experienced with politics on the ground in Syria, 
working to help provide healthcare in Syria’s regions and as head of the Security Council 
in Aleppo during the 2011 uprising. He has travelled and worked extensively in the 
country and that experience has given him confidence that the Wa’ad Party is able to 
connect with ordinary Syrians (Wafai, personal communication, 2014).  
 
Other members of the SMB have, like Wafai, come out in support of the Wa’ad Party 
and are positive that it can increase political diversity and help create change. Abdul 
Razak Diarbakkerli, long-term, senior SMB member said of the party:  
 
“The political party is a good idea, as it provides an evolvement 
in the relationship between the SMB, the community and the 
wider political movement. It is therefore presenting a new vision 
for contemporary democracy. It is important to note that the party 
denounces its link with the SMB, and the founders express that 
they neither are a part nor a political wing of the SMB. Although, 
the fact that many of the members of the party belong to the 
SMB, make it in the eyes of the media seem like being a political 
wing of the SMB. Taking into account the range of factors and 
challenges that have been raised due to the rapidly changing 
dynamics on the ground, the Brother’s choice could be 
recognized as a political evolution of the organization as a social 
movement” (Diarbakkerli, Gaziantep, personal communication, 
2014) 
 
Another senior figure, former acting leader of the SMB Al-Bayanouni, summarized the 
differences and similarities between the SMB and the Wa’ad Party: “the invention of 
founding a political party has been done in complete independence from the SMB”. (Al-
Bayanouni, London, personal communication, 2014) 
 
The SMB’s constitution refers to twenty points of Hassan Al-Banna’s manifesto (see 
Chapter 4), which provide the ideological base of the SMB. However, the Wa’ad Party 
constitution is different. One commonality between the two organizations’ constitutions 
however is their reference to moderate Islam. The Brotherhood’s organization is a 
Jameah Islamaih or Islamic social movement, focused on Da’wa (preaching), education 
and social welfare; the Wa’ad Party focuses on civil rights. 
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Al-Bayanouni went on to say that the SMB had a long-held intention to move into 
mainstream politics. The SMB in 2006 already had plans to start political party, which 
would have been based on the SMB’s 2004 presented memorandum of “The Vision of a 
Future Syria” (see Chapter 4) However, the main ambition of Wa’ad Party has been “to 
support the rebuilding the Syrian community and its unity which the repressive regime 
managed to destroy over the decades” (Al Bayanouni, London, personal communication, 
2014).  
 
This clearly-stated intention of the SMB to play a part in the creation of a democratic 
Syrian state bears our Esposito’s statement that “modernists advocated an adaption of 
Islam of changing conditions of modern society. This process would result not simply in 
the reaffirmation of the past but in new laws and attitudes religious, legal, educational, 
and social reforms” (Esposito, 1998, p. 55).  
 
Women have played an active role in the establishment of the Wa’ad Party, further 
demonstrating the party’s commitment to pluralism and the modernization of Syrian 
society. Syrian women in general are not as politically engaged as Syrian men, partly 
dictated by tradition and upbringing, and partly because the regime discouraged them 
from being so. However, the Wa’ad Party has encouraged and recognized the 
contributions of women in political debate and activism. Research by the Badael 
Foundation has found that there are female Syrian intellectuals who are keen to be 
involved in politics, but prevented from doing so under Assad (Badael Foundation, 
2016). Because the Wa’ad Party was established outside the country, it has been able to 
attract educated Syrian women who, free of the restrictions of the regime, are able to 
play an active part in politics and peace-building. By 2015, the Wa’ad Party had more 
than 40 female members, out of a total of 500. This is considered a significant proportion 
in the Syrian context (Kassib, Gaziantep, personal communication, 2015) 
 
One such female member is Khitam Al-Soufi. An educated woman with a Master’s 
degree from a Russell Group university in the UK, Al-Soufi and her husband have spent 
several decades in political activism, despite being in exile because of their membership 
of the SMB. On the foundation of the Wa’ad Party, she says: 
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"The situation in Syria requires the likes of this national party, 
which represents moderate Islam and aims to include all 
segments of the Syrian population regardless of its ethnic or 
religious backgrounds. The party also calls for a pluralistic state 
and political engagement. The creation of this party also helps 
eliminate the one-party situation that rule Syria for the past 50 
years which created tyranny and destroyed political engagement, 
noting that democracy and freedom were about to start their first 
steps after the end of the French colonization era” (Al-Soufi, 
London, personal communication, 2014). 
 
Al Soufi, like party Secretary General Saad Wafai, sees Syria’s colonial history and 
particularly the French Mandate as bearing responsibility for the country’s difficulties 
since. While the French left Syria decades ago, their legacy was rule by the Alawite 
minority, something that continues to affect Syrian politics today.  
 
Middle East expert David W. Lesch says of the Alawite community’s role: 
 
“At the time of Syrian independence from the French, in 1946, 
the Alawites found themselves well positioned in the military. By 
gaining more power over the years, the February 1966 intra-
Baath coup brought Hafiz Al-Assad to a senior position in the 
new regime” (Lesch, 2013, p. 3).  
 
On whether a party with an Islamic reference can cater for non-Muslim, Al-
Khattib comments that: 
 
“Some people think that Islam is only for Muslims, and that 
Islam is not able to regulate and manage a State that hosts a 
number of ethnicities, races and religions, and that it is unable to 
provide justice to all the latter. Those people forget the Quranic 
Verse ‘And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a 
mercy to the worlds’ (worlds, not just for Muslims)” (Al-Khattib, 
Gaziantep, personal communication , 2016) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the SMB is recognized and known as an Islamic organization 
with an ideology based on the vision of Al-Banna, though adapted to the Syrian context. 
The SMB’s membership is made up of politically moderate but committed, practicing 
Sunni Muslims. As an example, Waffai states that: “You would rarely find a smoker 
within the SMB, as smoking has always been considered to be inadequate for a Muslim’s 
life” (Waffai Gaziantep 2016). By contrast, the Wa’ad Party accepts Syrians of all 
religious and ethnic backgrounds, including the non-religious. It does not exclude 
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members on the basis of their personal life or behavior, provided they do not break 
common international law. In theory, anyone can hold a leadership role in the Wa’ad 
Party, although some Western critics voice doubts that women are able to do so in 
practice.  
 
It seems clear that the membership of the Wa’ad Party is broad and distinct from that of 
the SMB. As Waffai explains: “You might meet certain Muslim party members that 
don't pray any of the five obligated prayers or fast the holy month of Ramadan, and you 
might find non-Muslims too, because there is no difference in the membership between 
any of them based on religion” (Wafai, Gaziantep, personal communication, 2016) 
 
The breadth of membership found in the Wa’ad Party would not be appropriate in the 
SMB, but this does not mean that the links between the two organizations are likely to 
weaken. The Wa’ad Party provides the SMB with a means of reaching and engaging 
with Syrians who would not be eligible for SMB membership. Al Khattib explains:  
 
“We are not letting go of the SMB. The SMB wants to work and 
collaborate with all the segments of the nation, but it cannot 
include them to its ranks because the SMB requires practicing 
Islam as requirement. The SMB does work within the SNC 
(Syrian National Council and Itilaf (Syrian National Coalition) 
with other segments of society, but it wants to do so through a 
political party to have a political impact.” (Al-Khattib, 
Gaziantep, personal communication , 2016)  
 
The Wa’ad Party gives the SMB a means of being fully involved with future state-
building, spreading goodwill while maintaining its own particular membership 
requirements. The SMB has always had a remit that goes beyond the purely religious, as 
explained by Al-Bayaouni: “The Brotherhood organization has been clearly established 
more than 80 years ago as a preaching organization, yet comprising humanitarian relief, 
preaching education, and socio-political activities” (Al-Bayaouni, London, 2014).  
 
Despite the clear differences between the Wa’ad Party and the SMB, many in the media 
and academia see the two organizations as one. Some believe that the Wa’ad Party is 
effectively the SMB in all but name. This is understandable, given the Wa’ad Party was 
established by members of the SMB. However, it is a view that does not take account of 
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the differences in membership and aims between the two organizations. This study has 
sought to examine and define those differences. The Wa’ad Party’s founders have used 
and adapted the approaches taken by established parties in democratic countries to create 
a party that has broad appeal. The Wa’ad Party appeals to Syrians of all ethnicities and 
religious backgrounds, brought together by a desire to create a sustainable, peaceful 
future for their country. It is committed to pluralism, and therefore its members are not 
involved in any kind of religious preaching.  
 
By contrast, the SMB’s membership is comprised of committed Muslims and it includes 
religious preaching among its aims. The Wa’ad Party focuses on increasing political 
awareness and the creation of a democratic state. However, some critics have pointed out 
that it has also committed to the use of Sharia law as state jurisprudence, and that this 
may be inconsistent with its other aims. Syrian intellectuals tend to believe that: 
“creating parties that are working in the Syrian political framework is positive, as it 
enriches the political process in currently and in the future”. However, they express 
doubt about “the Islamic reference integrated within of the party state” 
(Younis,Gaziantep, 2015).   
 
There is a clear feeling among some commentators that it is impossible for Sharia and 
democracy to function alongside each other and that any attempt to ensure that it can is 
overly ambitious and likely to fail. However, this view is formed with a lack of 
understanding of how the SMB interpret Sharia and without reference to other situations 
in which religion and democracy have functioned alongside each other.  
 
Western politics offers examples of how concessions can be made towards religion 
alongside a commitment to democratic values. On July 27th 2016, Hillary Clinton 
accepted her nomination as the US Democratic party presidential candidate, at the 
party’s National Convention in Philadelphia. The final speaker at the convention was 
Rev. Dr. William Shillady, Executive Director of the United Methodist City Society in 
New York. He asked those at the convention to “pray for “Sister Hillary” and “Brother 
Tim” (the Vice President nominee Tim Kaine) (Luo, 2017). Another example comes 
from Bavaria, Germany. There, there is a governing coalition between the regional 
Bavarian Christlich Soziale Union and the nationwide Christlich Demokratische Union 
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(CDU/CSU), both parties with a clearly stated religious base. The CDU’s constitution 
sets out its commitment to the maintenance of Christianity in Germany. The party 
defines the country as a “Christian nation” with “Christian roots”. It states that Germany 
has “Christian public signs” that should conform to ‘Christian values’.  
 
These statements have a clear parallel in the religious base of the Wa’ad Party, and they 
demonstrate that it is possible to have a party that functions effectively in secular civil 
society while maintaining some religious values. The Syrian population is over 80% 
Muslim and Syria is recognized as a Muslim country, so it does not seem unreasonable 
for a political party there to have a stated commitment to Islam.  
 
While many outside the organization have focused on the religious element of the Wa’ad 
Party, some in the SMB have criticized the party for distancing itself too far from the 
religious ideology of the SMB. Mohamad Al-Khattib states that: 
 
“They say that ideologies are on the rise, contrary to common 
belief, especially the Islamic ideologies given the recent election 
results in a number of countries.  These people also say that some 
Islamic oriented members have joined forces with seculars to get 
western support. These members have lost public support from 
their followers, while also they will not be getting the support of 
the west. They lost both.  A question has also been probed; will 
the SMB ask its members to vote for a party that is semi secular? 
This contradiction, these members claim, will lead the SMB to 
lose its credibility amongst its members” (Al-Khattib, Gaziantep, 
personal communication, 2016). 
 
SMB members and co-founders of the Wa’ad Party are compelled to spend time offering 
clarity on their aims to external and internal critics, while also having to meet a number 
of other challenges. The party faces a fundamental barrier to progress in its lack of 
reliable funding. Members do not pay a subscription fee, which opens up membership to 
all Syrians. However, it means that the party is reliant on donations from members and 
supporters and its budget is limited and sometimes unpredictable. Without a solid 
financial base, it is difficult for the party to make future plans. It is difficult for it to rent 
office space and other facilities, to pay speakers’ fees and meet general running costs. 
The commitment of the party’s members and leaders to their vision for Syria’s future has 
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gone some way to ensuring that they continue to work towards their goal, despite facing 
significant financial and other challenges.  
 
The Wa’ad Party has made some changes to its structures in order to allow it to operate 
effectively from Turkey. The party’s headquarters is in Gaziantep, and some members 
have moved themselves and their families to live close by. Many have worked to 
establish themselves professionally in Turkey, learning Turkish and gaining Turkish 
qualifications as needed. The commitment of these members is clear, but this does not 
mean that the party will necessarily be a success. The party’s founders have faced 
criticism for their concentration on the future needs of Syrian democracy, rather than on 
the immediate basic needs of the Syrian people.  
 
“The founders should have taken into their consideration those 
actual disturbances of the Syrian people, which should have had 
been in their only focus. At a time were people are suffering from 
hunger, having no shelter and children are not able to receive 
proper education, future politics have to be postponed” (Haffar, 
,2015).  
 
Syria’s current situation provides the SMB with an opportunity to create a new political 
base for themselves, in line with their religious beliefs. Gudrun Kraemer comments: 
“Like other social political actors, Islamists learn from experience, they interact with 
others to articulate their ideas, drawing on earlier as well as contemporary intellectual 
trends, and their design their strategies accordingly” (Kraemer, 2010: 92). 
 
This is in line with the views of Dr. Mohamad Waleed, one of the Wa’ad Party’s 105 
founding members. This group of people came together via networking and private 
invitation to form the party. Waleed stresses that the party’s membership is governed via 
a quota system, which specifies that one third of its members will be from the SMB, one 
third others with an Islamic outlook, and one third from a liberal, nationalist background. 
It is not clear how the latter two groups are defined.  
 
On the founding of the party in 2012, Waleed says: 
 
“The Syrian revolution has put an end to the political monopoly 
of Baath’s ruling party. Syria as a plural ethnic and religious 
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society, political pluralism should prevail in future Syria. This is 
why the Wa’ad Party was launched. Our goal is to participate in 
building a modern democratic state in Syria, where citizenship 
with equal rights and responsibilities prevail” (Waleed, London, 
personal communication, 2014).  
 
Dr. Waleed, a UK educated doctor, was living and working in Saudi Arabia when he was 
elected first head of the party. In December 2014, he became the SMB’s Murakeb Al Am 
(Controller General). His deputy Al-Khoury, a Christian intellectual and member of the 
party’s executive office, replaced him. 
  
This change in leadership appears to prove that the SMB were not committed to 
controlling or dominating the Wa’ad Party. It demonstrates their openness to integration 
and the party’s role in Syrian society post-Assad. It may be that the SMB’s leaders 
recognized and acknowledged mistakes made by their counterparts in other Islamic 
countries before, during and after the Arab Spring. 
 
The founders of the Wa’ad Party hope for a free, pluralistic Syria, in contrast to the clan-
based regime of Assad, which confiscated much of their property illegally. Dr. Adel 
Rihawi (Killis, 22.8.2014) refers to his personal experience. He points out that the 
founding of the party could be a vital step towards a pluralist, democratic state. He was 
born in Lattakia to a wealthy, educated family. He witnessed how that region had 
become a stronghold of the Alawite sect and Assad’s supporters. He had no connections 
to the SMB and had not engaged in Syrian politics for decades. However, he had 
experienced the repressive Baathist regime, and their land reforms, with some of his 
family’s property being confiscated. This naturally had a considerable impact on the 
family, its income and lifestyle. His father moved to Damascus but was not able to 
successfully re-establish himself, and suffered from depression until his death. Many 
former wealthy Syrians have had similar experiences under the Baathist regime (Rihawi, 
Killis, 2015).  
 
This is just one example of Syrian people’s experiences at the hands of the Baathists that 
damaged the social contract in Syria. Many educated Syrians found themselves victims 
of the regime, and also found themselves without a strong opposition to support after the 
SMB left the country in the 1980s. The founding of the Wa’ad Party provides some hope 
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for these people and has helped increase momentum towards the establishment of 
democracy in Syria (see Chapter 7). For Sunni Muslim Syrians living in coastal areas, 
the Assad regime was particularly damaging. The Lattakia region was an Alawite 
stronghold from the early 1970s onwards, when Assad took over. The regime and its 
Russian allies took over marine and airbases in Tartous and destroyed schools, homes, 
hospitals and marketplaces in rebel-held regions. Dr Rihawi’s family fled Syria, fearing 
attack by snipers, or Shabbiha (ghosts). They “added to the ugliness of the crackdown”, 
according to David W. Lesch, Professor of Middle Eastern History and consultant to US 
and European international organizations (Lesch, 2012, p. 177)  
 
Many Syrian Sunni Muslims sought refuge and a new life in Turkey, but are still keen to 
return to Syria when the time is right. This desire to return adds to the appeal of the SMB 
and the Wa’ad Party (see Chapter 5). The SMB’s work in domestic, regional and 
international politics (see Chapter 7) helps further increase the organization’s appeal to 
Syrians keen to rebuild their homeland. As Rihawi states: “when the Assad clan will 
have to made space for pluralistic governance with competing parties, like Wa’ad”. The 
Wa’ad Party has in, his view been, founded by likeminded people. This is a common 
view among Syrian intellectuals, who see the party as fulfilling its promise to integrate 
all factions of Syrian society.  
 
There have been those both within and outside the SMB who criticize the timing and 
location of the founding of the Wa’ad Party. They argue that there are too many 
challenges for the party to meet, and that it is unlikely that they will be able to overcome 
them. The party will not progress, they believe, without first resolving three major 
problems. First, the Wa’ad Party’s founders will have to provide proof that they are able 
to operate effectively in Syria’s unstable environment, despite being established in exile. 
Secondly, they will have to achieve solid, reliable funding. Third, they must achieve 
international recognition among governments and NGOs, which they have not yet done. 
Leaders of both the SMB and the Wa’ad Party hold these concerns.  
 
The SMB and Wa’ad Party share the common desire to establish a strong relationship 
with the Syrian people. For the Wa’ad Party, the current conflict in Syria provides 
evidence that they will be able to meet political challenges in a democratic future Syria. 
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However, it is not yet clear whether the Syrian people will respect and accept Wa’ad 
Party’s vision for parliamentary governance. The Wa’ad Party intends to introduce 
democratic, political Islam in Syria. Whether or not they succeed will either confirm or 
negate Alfred Stepan’s analysis, (citied by Hashemi), that he: “has drawn attention to 
various “maps of misreading” in the history of religion– state relations in Europe. He is 
critical an ahistorical approach to this topic, which erroneously suggests that the 
development of democracy requires a hostile and rigid separation between religious and 
state” (Hashemi, 2013: 71). Syria is a civil society with a majority Muslim population, 
strong Islamic traditions and a general belief in Sharia, as confirmed by academics such 
as (Khatib, 2011; Pierret, 2013). It is in this context that the Wa’ad Party will either 
succeed or fail.  
 
By 2016, the SMB appeared to be shifting its focus from social movement to political. 
This shift had been the vision of a number of prominent SMB members for several years. 
It has been seen as too bold a step by some, given the circumstances in Syria, but it has 
met with approval from Syrian intellectuals in exile. Many individuals joined the Wa’ad 
Party in the hope that it could provide the pluralistic vision they favored. The pragmatic 
approach of the SMB towards attracting support from a varied base is paired with their 
social and political vision and hopes that they will be able to play a significant role in 
Syria’s future.   
 
As Masoud states: “Future work on that party’s experience can teach us about how 
parties form, behave, and change in developing democracies” (Masoud, 2013: 497). That 
is, the intentions of a political party in a developing democracy may be to represent the 
people and teach political awareness, but they may misread the behavior of others and 
become vulnerable to anti-democratic forces. This could happen in Syria to either a 
secular or Islamic party. It may be that the Wa’ad Party fails and is viewed by history as 
being the result of overexcitement among a small group of exiled activists. However, the 
SMB may be able to handle international and Syrian critics adeptly, ensuring that even if 
the Wa’ad Party fails, their own reputation remains intact.  
 
Having analyzed a complex political issue in this subchapter, this research will now 
examine how the SMB has evolved through the Syrian revolution. The next subchapter 
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will ask whether the SMB as a social movement has any impact on day-to-day life in 
Syria against a background of severe conflict.   
 
6.5 The SMB and the Non-State Brigades in Syria 
 
Bashar Al-Assad’s brutal response to the peaceful Syrian uprising showed clearly his 
refusal to accept any of their demands. The regime seemed to not fear any political 
consequences when using internationally prohibited weapons against its own people. 
This was despite the US administration warning the regime not to cross the “red line” 
(Bardy, 2012). The Syrian regime also ignored international reports, such as the United 
Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the 
Syrian Arab Republic, which was published collaboratively by a number of Western 
democracies in December 2013 (Daerden, The Independent 30.9.2015). Assad’s 
sectarian Shia allies openly subsidized his regime, providing thousands of Iranian and 
Lebanese ‘Hezbollah’ fighters (Sullivan, 2014). Russia also reinforced Assad’s forces 
with their air force, who have reportedly broken a large number of international human 
rights laws, using Syria as their testing ground for impermissible weapons (Human 
Rights Watch, 2016). 
 
It should be noted that this crisis began following the call for freedom of speech and 
dignity in Syria’s small southern town of Deera, when schoolboys, aged 10-13 years, 
graffitied their school wall with messages of hope and resistance (Hanano, 2013). These 
boys were then detained, tortured, and murdered by Bashar’s Mokhabarat. Pictures of 
their mutilated bodies, with their hands and feet cut off, along with those of thousands of 
other tortured and poisoned alleged ‘terrorists’ were published and made public by a 
number of human rights activists. Eventually, they were shared on social media, with the 
hashtag “Ceasar photos,” raising awareness in the international community  (Hanano, 
2013). 
 
Nationally, these events marked the breaking point of the Syrian youth, who did not see 
any other choice than to take up arms and throw themselves into this unfair fight. They 
wanted to fight against Assad and his inhumane regime. Inexperienced, untrained, poorly 
equipped, yet highly motivated and self-appointed ‘commanders’ formed ad-hoc 
neighbourhood military brigades to lead non-state fighters into battle. Thousands of 
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young men were ready to fight in support of the revolution. This study assessed whether 
the SMB, as an Islamic social movement, identified its duty to fight or aid the fighting on 
the ground in Syria. The SMB leaders have highlighted repeatedly their desire for a 
peaceful approach to the situation. However, the situation of their country folk obviously 
had an effect on them. Quite reasonably, many young Syrians with nothing left to lose 
other than their lives fought as part of rebel groups. Most of these fighters joined the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA), which was formed as a joint-resistance group from a large 
number of moderate non-state brigades. 
 
These fighters need to be empowered and represented diplomatically by an opposition 
force. The exiled SMB members would make an ideal group for this purpose, as they 
contain amongst them a large number of Syrian intellectuals who have, first-hand, 
experienced the repression of the Assad regime. However, as the SMB was not part of 
the armed resistance, questions were raised as to how they would represent it 
diplomatically. Al-Bayanouni, the leader of the SMB, who himself had experienced life 
in one of the regime’s prisons, addressed these concerns when he said that: “the SMB, 
who experienced decades of the regime’s repressions, the Hama Massacre, with its 
30,000 deaths in 1982, the oppression of human rights, and the torture of uncountable 
thousands of SMB members and affiliates in prisons in the famous ancient place of 
Tadmour (Palmyra) for decades, did ask the people in 2011 to stay away from weapons, 
fearing that this inequality could develop into a disastrous outcome for the Syrian 
society” (Al-Bayanouni, London, personal communication, 2014). 
 
Interviews with SMB executives have shown that the SMB was discussing these 
important issues during the early stages of the uprising. However, the executive board of 
the SMB arrived at the unanimous decision that they should not bear arms. As explained 
by the leadership, the SMB actively warned the youth not to fight. Despite this, it 
became clear that the SMB’s warnings were being drowned in the sea of anger 
emanating from the protests. After the Assad regime sent armed forces to attack peaceful 
demonstrations, the situation changed, as explained by Al-Bayanouni:  
 
“People have been forced to pick up arms to defend themselves. 
At this moment, we have not been able, as an organization 
(SMB), to demand from the youth not to do so. We do know, 
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however, that the regime is trying to push people into responding 
militarily. With the revolution becoming more and more armed, 
the SMB has to reach out to those who we think are genuine 
people and who are keen on the independence and stability of our 
country.” (Al-Bayanouni, London, personal communication, 
2014) 
 
Some SMB members posed the idea of forming an independent SMB-backed military 
force. Al-Bayanouni mentions that these issues were seriously discussed and debated. 
Eventually, the leadership decided not to take arms and to focus on peaceful solutions 
and unarmed resistance. This option seemed, to the SMB’s leadership, completely in line 
with their ideology as an organization. Qatari-based Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, a 
contemporary, well-known Islamic thinker and member of the Egyptian MB mentioned, 
when describing the organization’s “balanced ideology”, that: “It is an ideology that 
reflects an intermediate, balanced attitude of an evenly balanced Ummah that is far from 
being extremist or negligent” (Al-Qaradawi, 2000:135). 
 
The SMB strongly believes that its position is an advisory one; its leadership mention 
that they are a social movement, not a militaristic one. One interviewee respondent 
rationalized the organization’s views by underlining that: “The SMB does share some 
goals with armed groups, such as the toppling of the dictatorship. However, the SMB 
disagrees with any group that wants to enforce their views with guns” (Haffar, Istanbul 
3.4.2014). Thus, the SMB does not have an armed brigade. However, their support for 
Syrian rebels is worth acknowledging and understanding. For ordinary Syrians, and 
many intellectuals, it is unclear to what extent, and in what manner, the SMB support 
armed resistance groups in Syria. The exact level of support, and the recipients of the 
support are difficult to pinpoint because the support is given by individuals, and not by 
the SMB as an organization. Additionally, the nature of the Syrian crisis means that 
fighters form, leave, and change associations regularly. 
 
Although the SMB are not officially involved in armed combat, interview analyses 
suggest that it is backing the NSA (an established alliance of non-state armed groups), 
who are fighting the regime and intending to “liberate the country from dictatorship.” 
However, “these groups are the moderate ones that oppose and fight extremism” (Al-
Baker, Gaziantep 2014; Younis, London 15.10.2014). The SMB and NSA are very 
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different organizations, and this is evident through the differences between the NSA’s 
quick decision-making and the SMB’s much slower and more calculated approach 
(Ismael, Istanbul 2014; Sabbagh, London 2014).  
 
Al-Bayanouni has advised that SMB members and affiliates be conscious of not only the 
regime’s fighter, but of mainstream Islamic groups who see the SMB as a competitor, 
leading them to not accept any intermixing with the organization (Al-Bayanouni, 
London, personal communication, 2014). Eye-witnesses have reported that groups such 
as Al-Nusra and DAESH have openly fought SMB members (Anonymous Interview, 
Killis, 2014). These groups have shown their hatred of SMB members and affiliates by 
seizing them on several occasions in Syria(Fares, Gaziantep, personal 
communication,2014). Some observers feel that the SMB gained influence within these 
groups, pulling their members away from extremist ideologies and activities (Othman, 
Istanbul, 2014). This is supported by other observations, such as the one made by Dr. 
Rasheed, a Syrian political scientist who mentioned that the SMB has built a strong 
relationship with most moderate brigades working to overthrow the Syrian regime 
(Rasheed, Gaziantep, personal communication, 2014). 
 
The SMB occasionally supports and endorses rebel group who adhere to international 
law whilst fighting. To find out which groups fit this criterion, the SMB uses civilian 
reports that describe the activities of groups, especially the reports of civilians fleeing 
Syria (Diarbakkerli, Gaziantep, personal communication, 2014). Some observers claim 
that the SMB does not transparently admit to all of its involvements with rebel groups. 
They recall statements made throughout the revolution that, in their opinion, are often 
contradictory and confusing.  
 
Executive SMB members such as Al-Droubi and Al-Bayanouni have repeatedly stressed 
that the SMB does not back any armed group, maintaining a safe distance from all 
groups. However, in other cases, some SMB leaders appear to have announced their 
willingness to support certain groups. For example, one interviewee mentioned that, in 
one instance, an SMB leader stated on social media that the organization was supporting 
a certain armed group. Therefore, some analysts have suggested that the SMB does 
support some groups, despite them not wanting to admit it. Despite the efforts of 
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analysts, such as Charles Lister, who try and map out combatants, the exact positions of 
the SMB are unclear due to the changing dynamics of the Syrian conflict. It seems as if 
there are some fighting groups with ideologies similar to those of the SMB, but they 
seem to be limited in their military power. In any case, the SMB is adamant that it is not 
intending to support any extreme groups, and that if any groups that have their backing 
do become extreme, they will lose the support of the SMB. 
 
Nabil Kassis Al-Khouri mentions that the Wa’ad party contains rehabilitated fighters that 
it attracted by teaching them their democratic ideologies and solutions (Al-Khouri, 
Gaziantep, personal communication,2014). Syria’s changing dynamics makes 
pinpointing an exact stance of the SMB, the Wa’ad party, or even the Syrian regime very 
difficult. However, a few points have become clear, including: 
 
1- Armed groups with ideologies similar to those of the SMB may have close 
relations with their members, but they cannot be considered as being SMB-
affiliated groups. Fighters from these groups may be receiving financial aid from 
individual SMB members, but they are not receiving funding from the SMB as an 
organization. The groups excluded from this aid are of two types: (1) Salafi 
Jihadi groups that oppose the SMB, and (2) secular or ethnicity-based groups 
whose ideologies are incompatible with those of the SMB. 
 
2- The SMB had more influence over fighters before the arrival of extremist groups. 
However, it appears that the SMB has regained some of its influence by 
consulting and offering programs of support to the rebels. 
 
3- The SMB, in effect, have constrained armed resistance groups. This reflects the 
SMB’s humanitarian agenda. Post-2011, this meant that the SMB’s position was 
that of a socio-political organization, and not that of a militaristic political group. 
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter focussed on the SMB’s domestic responses to the Syrian uprising. Human 
rights organizations have documented the extreme challenges facing the Syrian people 
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during this crisis. This chapter analysed the SMB’s solidarity with their fellow Syrian 
people, as well as their commitments and aid programs post-2011. The SMB has 
centralized its headquarters to Turkey in an effort to coordinate its responses to the 
Syrian crisis (see Chapter 7). This has allowed the SMB to gain ideological ground in 
Syria. 
 
The SMB’s internal networks that have been functioning for over 30 years – including 
throughout the SMB’s time in exile – proved effective yet again. SMB members have 
integrated and worked with Syrian communities for humanitarian purposes. The SMB 
eventually officially endorsed these efforts, which were possible because of the long-
lasting relationships that have existed between SMB members and the rest of the Syrian 
population. The increased focus on the Syrian crisis has led to an increased focus on the 
SMB. Analysts from across the world have assumed that, as the best-organized socio-
political actor amongst the opposition forces, the SMB would be a key agenda-setter 
within the region. This evaluation is based on the observation that SMB members have 
played a significant role in organizing conferences to gather oppositional forces (see 
Chapter 7). However, the SMB has faced immense challenges in the volatile post-
uprising environment of Syria. 
 
Individual SMB members have shown their determination to work for a large number of 
social projects. They have taken on social duties to support and alleviate the suffering of 
the Syrian population. By establishing humanitarian NGOs, SMB members and affiliates 
have gained the praise and recognition of the Syrian population and global organizations, 
such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The 
SMB has not received any state funding, unlike many other international organizations 
carrying out humanitarian work. Despite this, the SMB have not claimed responsibility 
for the noble efforts of its members, these efforts have been linked with the SMB 
through the Syrian people personally knowing, either directly or indirectly, the aid 
workers and their allegiances. 
 
Interviews with a number of Syrian teachers who had served under the regime’s 
educational program showed that the SMB began to recruit new members in refugee 
communities in rebel-held regions in border cities. SMB members have stated that this 
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recruitment is due to the Syrians witnessing their work and the community support they 
offer, seeing in action the ideologies of the SMB. The success of SMB members in local 
council polls, whilst substantial, pales in comparison to the success in elections of their 
counterparts in other Arab states. The SMB’s competitors rely on long-existing 
relationships for their support, something which is not very available to the SMB, who 
have been exiled for so long. To gain further support, the SMB needs to make more 
evident its services to the Syrian population. 
 
The SMB is generally recognized as being a grassroots socio-political movement and so 
it needs to demonstrate its understanding of gender equality. SMB leaders stress that the 
‘Sisters’ within their organization form an important pillar of it. They state that SMB 
leaders have repeatedly contacted potential female members, inviting them to join the 
organization’s activities and make improvements. The female section of the SMB 
historically did just that. The SMB leadership has stated that, in order to increase female 
participation within their organization, they have made a number of attempts to increase 
female contribution in its decision-making processes. Currently, the outcomes of these 
efforts remain inadequate. SMB executives mention that more effort needs to be made to 
solve this issue. However, in the current political climate, this does not seem to be the 
organization’s top priority. The humanitarian and other socio-political efforts of the 
SMB have served to improve its reputation amongst the Syrian population after it was 
labelled by the Assad regime as a group of terrorists who were acting as henchmen for 
Zionist and Western imperialism (Blanga, 2017) . 
 
Shedding light on the pasts of SMB members has allowed for a better understanding of 
why the organization’s democracy and human rights discourse is so well-respected by 
Syrian intellectuals. It is largely thought of as being a responsible organization that is 
able to bear significant responsibilities. This analysis has also shown that the SMB needs 
to rebuild trust amongst Syrians who feel that almost all of the organization’s members 
left Syria after the 1982 Hama Massacre, living wealthy lives abroad whilst the rest of 
the Syrian population suffered at home. These perceptions have been fed by the Assad 
regime. SMB leaders have seen these perceptions as being unjustified and untrue, they 
feel the SMB members have also faced struggles outside of the country. Nevertheless, 
they appreciate that these views exist, and that they may affect the SMB’s ability to 
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mediate affairs if the chance ever arises. To counter these perceptions, SMB leaders have 
tried to use their long-existing relationships as evidence of their connection to the Syrian 
people. 
 
This research has also aimed to explore whether the SMB has been directly involved 
with the fighting in Syria. This is a significant issue, as the fast-changing circumstances 
in Syria have made identifying allegiances and levels of support difficult. The interviews 
with SMB members have made clear the fact that no armed group in Syria is fighting 
‘under the flag’ of the SMB. However, there are fighters in Syria who are ideologically 
attracted to the SMB. These affiliates/newly-founded members have not received any 
official endorsement from the SMB, but they may have found shelter within the SMB’s 
re-established communities inside Syria. These communities have been established to 
support the non-state fighters’ families, helping them survive the crisis. Many starving 
Syrian families have received aid that was personally given by SMB members. 
 
The war in Syria is often referred to as being a proxy war. Thousands of foreign, highly-
trained fighters have entered the country, and are keen on fighting for economic, 
political, and/or ideological reasons (Bakker and Singleton, 2016). Amongst these 
fighters are Shia militants who are fighting to establish the “Shi’ist crescent” in the 
Levant (see Chapter 6). This is evidenced through the large numbers of Shia fighters 
who have brutally murdered Syrian civilians and destroyed their shelters across the 
country. They have added to the regime’s bombing of houses, schools, and even 
hospitals, some of which were being led by international medical staff, killing hundreds 
of thousands of people and displacing millions more (Casey-Baker and Kutsch, 2011).  
 
It is not just the Alawites and their allies who have been preventing any serious Sunni 
political organization from gaining power in the country. Al-Qaida, Daesh, and other 
similarly-minded groups have also been targeting the SMB. Generally, these groups have 
historically been averse to, what they consider, ‘moderate Islam’. These facts may have 
been part of the reason that the poorly-funded, and militarily-inexperienced SMB did not 
enter the battlefield. Since the beginning of the crisis, and in an effort to keep casualties 
at a minimum, the SMB’s leadership has stressed their desire to back peaceful resistance 
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only. After analyzing the facts, it seems that they have stuck by this, despite the claims 
of some critics. 
 
SMB members have improved their reputation amongst the Syrian population. The 
leadership now has to decide how to move towards building a sustainable legacy as an 
Islamic socio-political movement in a post-Assad era. Two questions remain, the first is 
whether the SMB’s leadership is able to repair the organization’s reputation after it was 
damaged by the Assad regime, and the second is whether the SMB will be welcomed by 
the Syrian population as a representative socio-political force in the future. The next 
chapter will analyse the SMB’s responses to, and dealings with, powerful global and 
regional forces.  
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Chapter 7: The SMB’s Organizational, Discursive, and 
Behavioral Responses to the Syrian Crisis: Regional and 
International Level 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter set out and evaluated the organizational, discursive, and behavioral 
responses of the SMB to the Syrian uprising at a domestic level. It was established that 
the SMB reemerged as a socio-political Islamic movement, and that it was able to gain 
newfound recognition within Syria after thirty years of exile. It was also demonstrated 
that the Brotherhood were faced with two interconnected issues. First, an overarching 
public stigmatization stemming from longstanding educational programs of the Syrian 
regime, and second, the existence of internal friction between the traditional-minded 
leadership and the new generation of members more oriented towards reform. 
 
The present chapter will examine the issues faced by the SMB at an international level. It 
will discuss the challenges faced by the Brotherhood in serving as an internationally-
recognized opposition group. In addition, correlation will be shown to exist between the 
decline of the political influence of the SMB, and the level of assistance provided by the 
international community in general. Thus, demonstrating that the fate of the Brotherhood 
is closely tied to that of the Syrian people. It will be shown that the ongoing conflict 
cannot easily be described as a ‘civil war’, and that the matter involves both young and 
inexperienced Syrian rebels acting in self-defense, as well as regional and international 
political actors engaged in a proxy war. 
 
This chapter will also assess the SMB’s organizational, discursive, and behavioral 
responses to the Syrian crisis at a regional and international level. It will illustrate that 
international recognition (or lack thereof) was largely determined by regional and 
international acceptance of the SMB’s legitimacy, despite their organization, discipline, 
and commitment on the ground. In particular, it will discuss how efforts by the SMB to 
organize a socio-political blueprint of a post-Assad Syria have been hindered by 
international actors. Thus, despite being heralded by certain international commenters as 
the best organized Syrian oppositional force (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2012a), the 
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SMB proved to be unable to attract a broad or significant amount international backing 
for its objectives. This chapter will conclude by examining why this is the case, 
including orientalist attitudes, questions regarding the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy, and reactions to the coup against the MB government in Egypt. 
 
To begin, Section 7.2 will analyze the international dynamics affecting the SMB from 
the perspective of the Syrian regime and their allies fighting on Syrian soil. The political 
and military contributions of Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah will be evaluated alongside 
their historical connection with the Ba’athist regime. Similarly, the section will evaluate 
the geopolitical interests of these allies as they currently stand, and their incentives for 
supporting Assad. 
 
Section 7.3 will review assessments of the Syrian conflict undertaken by nation states 
and non-governmental organizations. Attempts to prevent further escalation of the Syrian 
conflict by human rights organizations and pressure groups will be highlighted, followed 
by an evaluation of attempts made by other international actors. It will be shown that 
organizations and political figures who condemned the fighting and called on Assad to 
cease and desist nonetheless exacerbated the condition of the Syrian people. Failing to 
provide any concrete assistance to alleviate the situation spread confusion and 
uncertainty amongst the civil society. 
 
Section 7.4 will consider the role of the SMB within political opposition bodies and their 
engagement with the international community. It will highlight the crucial role that the 
SMB played in the initial stages of the conflict by forming political opposition bodies 
designed to fill the anticipated vacuum left by a post-conflict transition. It will be shown 
that the influence of the SMB decreased due to a number of smaller, heterogeneous 
oppositional groups joining opposition platforms at the behest of the West. This resulted 
in the SMB losing their position as the key player within the opposition force. This trend 
will be illustrated through critical examinations of the roles that the SMB held in major 
opposition bodies, including the Syrian National Council (SNC), the Syrian National 
Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (Al-Itilaf), and the Syrian Interim 
Government. 
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Section 7.5 will proceed to examine the SMB with respect to their relationships with 
regional and international actors. It will outline some of the interactions that the SMB 
had with states including Turkey, Russia, Iran, USA, as well as states from Europe and 
the Arabian Gulf. It will be shown that attempts by the SMB leadership to elicit promises 
of humanitarian relief and political pressure from these states were met with responses 
that reflected their own political interests. The experience of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, and the international reaction to their rise and fall from power, will be also 
be examined in this section. International opinions of the SMB will be shown to have 
been colored by the attitudes towards ideologically based Islamic dogmas formed as a 
result of the Egyptian MB. The section will conclude by showing that the SMB 
ultimately realized that they would never be accepted by world powers as Syrian 
opposition leaders – not at any stage of the Syrian revolution. This realization was 
shortly followed by the decline of their international political influence.  
 
7.2 The Syrian Regime and their Allies Fighting on Syrian Soil 
 
The response by the Assad regime to the Syrian uprising is important to consider as it 
sets the context within which the SMB re-emerged. The severity of the regime’s reaction 
proved to be disastrous for the Syrian population, and goes some way in explaining the 
role assumed by the SMB in an attempt to redress it.  
 
Whilst the protests remained largely peaceful, the media instruments of the regime 
vindicated the response by referring to a so-called threat of terrorism (Medvedev, 2011). 
However, the harsh response from Assad’s forces defied all international human rights 
and humanitarian norms (Rikken, 2016). Demonstrators were beat with cudgels, detained 
indiscriminately, and tortured regardless of age, gender, or level of participation (Black 
and Ali, 2011). In addition, the regime made use of helicopter squads and chemical 
weapons (BBC News, 2017). Utilized against urban and rural spaces alike. Residential 
locations were targeted with specially-designed barrel bombs throughout the uprising. 
 
Analysts forecasted that the Syrian conflict would “mark the beginning of the end for 
Bashar” (Hof, 2014). Others took steps to prepare for ‘the day after’ anticipating the 
needs and requirements of the country after the conflict was resolved. However, as time 
went on the conflict grew in complexity; more than 470,000 civilians were killed, and 
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over half of the population of Syria was displaced (Human Rights Watch et al., 2017). 
Publications were made by think tanks relating to the Middle East in an attempt to 
explain the situation on the ground. Certain researchers concluded that the Assad regime 
did not aim to “engage in meaningful political compromise of the kind that could re-
legitimize his regime internationally and domestically” (Lund, 2015).  
 
Whilst international researchers were evaluating the results of the Syrian conflict, the 
SMB were focused on its origin. They argued that the conflict was borne and driven by 
diverse foreign interests. Mulham Al-Drouby, and Executive member of the SMB, stated 
that “Syria has always been a geo-historic Euro-Asian cross-point of different ethnic and 
religious interests” (Al-Drouby, Vienna, personal communication, 2014). The 
implication of this statement is that the presence of a multitude of different stakeholders 
all vying to achieve self-serving agendas is one of the major reasons why the conflict has 
not come to an end. 
 
Identification of these stakeholders has been a gradual process. Those parties fighting 
alongside Assad, as well as statistical analysis of their involvement, has been determined 
periodically. The information unit at Al-Omran Centre, a think-tank based in Turkey, has 
gathered data in order to answer some of the questions posed by the wider international 
audience. In December 2016, the Centre published ten confirmed allies of the regime 
that had been surveilled fighting alongside Assad’s forces: 
1. Russian military experts handling and coordinating Russian airstrikes operated by 
military planes equipped with advanced technology;  
2. Fighters from the Lebanese Hezbollah Shia militias, fed and equipped by the Iranian 
Mullahs of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); 
3. The Fatmiyon Brigade Militants, who are recruited and trained Afghan Shia militias, 
also controlled by IRGC; 
4. Al-Nujaba, who are Hezbollah’s Iraqi Shia militias, controlled by IRGC; 
5. Bader Organization, who are a mix of Shia militias, controlled by IRGC; 
6. The Tiger Forces, who are local Syrian Alawite militias, trained and financed 
by IRGC; 
7. Al-Quds Brigade, who are locally recruited Syrian-Palestinian militias, trained and 
equipped by Russian military experts; 
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8. National Defense Forces, who are fighters assembled and located in Western Aleppo 
districts; 
9. Parts of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and  
10. Collaborating Kurdish tribes, including Jabhat Al-Akrad in Shekh Maqsod. 
This list is comprised only of those allies fighting in Aleppo and rural areas, and 
demonstrates the urgency of the need for Assad to use foreign fighters and associates. 
These groups became his partners and partook greatly in the response to the uprising. 
Given the regime’s strong dependence on foreign powers, it is important to understand 
the dynamics behind their involvement. The first part of this section will examine the 
relationship between Syria and Iran. In particular, it will address the Syrian Alawite 
minority’s longstanding sectarian association with the country. It will also explain how 
Assad was able to attain the support of the Hezbollah group, designated by many 
countries, including the US, as a terrorist organization. Finally, it will discuss the array 
of Shia fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan and their sectarian-driven motivations to 
invade Syria. 
 
The second part of this section will discuss the intervention of Russia and its military and 
political impact. It will show that the alliance between Russia and Syria was built upon 
decades of military support which has allowed Moscow to sustain a trade-off power 
balance to the NATO states. This discussion in turn helps to identify the international 
political dynamics that have existed throughout the Syrian conflict, and within which the 
SMB operated as an opposition force. 
 
7.2.1 The Shia Allies: The Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah 
 
Before the Syrian conflict became an armed struggle, Bashar Al-Assad had presented 
himself as part of the Sunni Muslim community by praying in public mosques, using 
Islamic terms in interviews, and legitimizing Sunni clerics (Khatib, 2011; Pierret, 2013). 
Afterwards, unable to withstand the rebels, most of whom were Sunni, and their 
Christian support, he utilized his previous connections with Tehran to obtain Iranian 
support against the rebels. 
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Iranian military squads, militias, and fighting groups are all fighting in Syria and have 
contributed to the survival of the regime (Rasmussen and Nader, 2016).  It can be argued 
that the primary motivation for these groups is sectarianism, and their Shia beliefs. Their 
presence has contributed to the transformation Syrian demography, which will be 
discussed further below. Nonetheless, by inviting Iranian-backed military advisers and 
granting free license for Shia fighters to assault the Syrian civil society, Assad had 
effectively dismissed any social contract that he may have had with the Syrian people. 
 
The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Syed Ali Khamenei, supported the uprisings of 
Sunni Muslims in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, as well as the Shia protests in Bahrain. 
These were heralded as “signs of the Islamic awakening” (Khamenei, 2012). Yet, in a 
seemingly contradictory manner, Iran is supporting a regime in Syria which has a 
constitutional secular character. In addition, in September 2011 Tehran hosted the 
ambitiously named “International Conference on Islamic Awakening” (Sayyas, 2012: 
268). During the event, Iran considered the Brotherhood’s democratic win in Egypt as a 
victory for the Islamic awakening (Khamenei, 2012).   whilst naming the Syrian peoples’ 
wish for freedom from tyranny as a terrorist action that ought to be fought against 
(Chulov and Wintour, 2016). 
 
Iran’s engagement in Syria is based on historical, and primarily sectarian, objectives that 
operate on three distinct levels. Firstly, in the short-term Iran sought to empower the 
ruling Syrian Alawite sect. This was achieved by providing high-profile military 
consultants to Syria, as well as high-ranked military leaders known as Iran’s elite Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). These personnel were provided alongside well-
equipped fighting battalions that engaged in battle against the Syrian rebels and civilians 
(Reuters, 2017). Sectarian militias, such as the Shia Hezbollah group, were also 
mobilized to fight as allies of the Assad regime. 
 
Secondly, Iran sought to displace Syrian Sunni Muslim from their homes as a medium-
term objective. According to witnesses and inhabitants, numerous areas in Damascus and 
its suburbs have been occupied by invading Iranian fighters and their families. Thus, the 
pre-existing wealthy and well-educated Sunni population of this ancient city has been 
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effectively replaced with foreign Shia families, mostly Asian and Iranian migrants 
(Chulov, 2017). 
 
Thirdly, Iran sought to empower the pre-existing, yet politically weak, Shia inhabitants 
of Sunni-ruled monarchies (such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) and Sunni-governed 
states (such as Yemen, wherein the Houthi Shia rebels are publically supported by Iran) 
(Saul et al., 2017). This was sought after as a long-term objective. Iran and Saudi Arabia 
have been engaged for some time in a political power struggle for religious 
predominance over the region. Similarly, Iran has demonstrated its intention to 
‘stabilize’ the Shia government in Iraq by undermining state institutions and Sunni civil 
society. Iranian militias made use of, and at times contributed to, the existing chaos in 
Iraq in order to access the open border to Syria and extend their sectarian mission. These 
militias have reportedly suffered very heavy losses, but have an unyielding determination 
to dedicate their life ‘for the higher cause’(Blair, 2016). 
 
International investigations into the assassination of the former Prime Minister of 
Lebanon, Rafic Al-Harriri, have led some to lay the responsibility at the feet of the 
Syrian Government and Hezbollah together (Fisk, 2015). The powerful presence of 
Syria’s military force and state intelligence within Lebanon has facilitated and largely 
supported by Hezbollah. The Iranian-backed terrorist group was able to build a state 
within the state, thereby undermining the paralyzed and dysfunctional governance 
institutions in Lebanon. When the Syrian uprising began, Hezbollah was amongst the 
first to provide the Syrian government with political and military support, dispatching 
troops all over the country (Nakhoul, 2013). 
 
It is worth noting that Iran’s political interest in Syria stems from its wider aim to affect 
the prosperity of its neighboring states. This aim has existed since the Iranian Revolution 
in 1979. Whilst it is neither necessary nor viable to engage in a discussion of the reasons 
for the Iranian ‘pan-Islamic vision’, it is sufficient to state the country aspires to a sphere 
of influence known as the ‘Shia Crescent’, comprising the Levant. This originates from a 
religious desire to fight against Sunni Muslims, and is sought after with a fervor that has 
lasted more than 1,400 years. Nonetheless, despite this impassioned and entrenched 
political interest that Iran has in Syria, Iranian support alone was not sufficient for the 
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Assad regime. A stronger ally was needed to assist in the battle against the Syrian 
people. 
 
 
7.2.2 The Russian Federation 
 
The Russian intervention in Syria started long before its military campaign began in 
September 2015. In the political arena, Russia vetoed several resolutions proposed by the 
UN Security Council to sanction the Syrian government and refer them to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) (Aljazeera News, 2017) They also provided several 
military advisors to Syria (The Telegraph, 2012). In terms of the Russian military 
campaign on Syrian soil, their contribution to Assad’s so-called ‘war on terrorism’ has 
been severe. Russian military jets invited by Bashar Al-Assad have targeted schools, 
hospitals, shelters, and civilian public spaces (Quinn, 2017). Their ongoing and 
uncompromising commitment to the regime’s cause has made it difficult to come to a 
political resolution of the Syrian conflict. Before venturing into an analysis of the 
underlying motives behind the Russian support, it is imperative to understand the 
historical and bilateral relationship between Russia and Syria. 
 
The Asia Minor Agreement of May 1916 can be said to be the originator of the present-
day conflicts in the Middle East (Wright, 2016). The ‘secret line drawn in the sand’ by 
British Diplomat Mark Sykes and his French counterpart, Francois Georges-Picot, took 
place shortly before the Balfour Declaration of November 1917. Together, this artificial 
foreign state-building, as well as the Zionist desideratum, ultimately resulted in the 
creation of a national home for Jews. After the Second World War, the empowered 
Israeli State was formed on Palestinian land on the 14th of May 1948. Israel was 
neighbored by a French-British pattern of Arab states, with some of whom (such as 
Egypt and Syria) they remained engaged in constant conflict (Adelson, 2012).  
 
After Syria’s independence from France in 1946, the people sought to empower a freely 
elected government. This was in an attempt to restrain the institutional and civilian chaos 
left behind by the French occupiers. The creation of Israel, too, remained a great concern 
for the Syrian people. Al-Bayanouni, leader of the SMB for fourteen years, stresses that 
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Syria has always been in a state of war with Israel. Severe military confrontations have 
resulted in heavy losses by Syria, whereas Israel has received much support from the 
West. Reparation fees from Germany, an active Israeli lobby in the USA, and numerous 
sources of financial support amongst Western supporters and advisors resulted in Israel 
becoming a remarkably well-equipped military power, with nuclear capabilities 
(McGuire, 1987). Thus, the newly-formed state has been able to outlive three wars with 
its Arab neighbors in 1948, 1967, and 1973. 
 
Notwithstanding the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, and the Jordanian-Israeli 
peace treaty of 1994, Israel and Syria were both involved in the Lebanese Civil War in 
1982. Syria occupied Lebanon from 1976 to 2005, whilst Israel were in occupation of 
South Lebanon in order to fence off the Hezbollah militia from the Israeli border (Sela, 
2007). Due to much political pressure brought about by regional and international 
accusations regarding the assassination of the then Lebanese Prime Minister, Syrian 
forces were compelled to leave Lebanon in 2005 (BBC News, 2005). 
 
After Hafez Al-Assad came into power following a military coup in 1970, he was well 
aware of the political situation and outstanding threats of the region. Perhaps the greatest 
danger facing his Pan Arabism ideology was the military might of the neighboring state 
of Israel. As the USA and Western democracies were building up Israel’s military 
power, it became imperative for Syria to obtain support from Russia. Ever since, Russia 
has had a foothold in Syria (Mercouris, 2017). 
 
Another threat to Assad’s rule, which history suggests was his primary concern, related 
to the confrontations brought about by the country’s population of Sunni intellects and 
civilians. In addition to questions surrounding the legitimacy of his rise to power 
(through military force), Hafez Al-Assad belonged to the Alawite sect. This 
underprivileged minority is found along the coastal line of Lattakia and the adjoining 
mountains. Many Syrians questioned the correctness of a minor ethic Shia sect to rule 
over the country in such a unilateral manner. Fearing domestic turmoil, Assad built a 
highly-functioning intelligence system (Mokhabarat) in order to suppress any opposition 
to his single-party policy. In so doing, he sought financial and technological support 
from powerful countries such as Russia. This Russian support continued after the death 
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of Hafez Al-Assad and after the assumption of power by his son, Bashar. Thus, both 
before and after the demise of the Soviet Union, Syria has provided a substantial 
foothold to Russia in the Middle East.  
 
Moscow and Damascus continued to maintain a special relationship even after the 
demise of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation provided counsel to the military and 
intelligence leaders of Hafez Al-Assad, and was able to use Syria as its access to the 
Middle East. Russian support in Syria extended to empowering Assad’s successor and 
son, providing the regime with heavy military equipment, surveillance software 
programs, and anti-terrorism support in order to stabilize Bashar Al-Assad’s rule over 
the Syrian people (Rubin Center, 2001).  More recently, Moscow has expressed an 
interest in developing stronger ties with Iran (The Washington Institute, 2017). “During a 
recent visit to Tehran…Putin announced that Russia would help Iran export enriched 
uranium and modify nuclear facilities at Arak and Fordo” (Bhutani, 2015). 
 
Despite the special relationship between Syria and Russia, analysts ruled out the 
possibility of any military entry of Russian forces on Syrian soil in response to the 
uprising. However, in September 2015 Putin intervened with aerial power, ostensibly in 
order to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Osborn and Stewart, 2015). 
At the time, ISIS was engaged in fighting against the rebels resisting Assad’s rule. It 
soon became apparent that ISIS was not, in fact, the target of Putin’s excessive military 
force. Rather, the aerial forces of Russia were directed against the opposition supported 
by Turkey and Saudi Arabic (Bhutani, 2015). In addition, it has been documented by the 
US-based organization, Human Rights Watch, as well as other NGOs and eyewitnesses, 
that Putin’s forces were also directed against civilian targets. Humanitarian shelters, 
medical centers, and civilian accommodation were bombed indiscriminately (Human 
Rights Watch, 2016). Russian intervention not only added to the dire circumstances and 
humanitarian crisis, but also exacerbated the displacement of hundreds of thousands of 
Syrian civilians. 
 
The Syrian Foreign Minister, Walid Al-Muallem, claimed that the Russian sponsorship 
of Syria exists “in accordance with Syria’s own criteria and tradition, based on the fact 
that it is a pivotal state in the region” (Syrian Observer, 2014). In essence, he stated that 
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Syria was permitting a Russian naval facility to be built on the coastal city of Tartus 
(Hume and Isaac, 2016). The base is ideally situated. It is close to Assad’s Alawite 
stronghold city of Lattakia (72km) and Russian jets can reach cities of strategic 
importance in a short space of time. In 1982, for example, Hafez Al-Assad bombed the 
city of Hama which had been strong in their support of the SMB. Hama is situated a 
mere 84km from Tartus, and can be reached by jet in 0.08 hours. Similarly, the city of 
Homs lies 78km away from Tartus. It represents another Sunni opposition city which has 
been heavily destroyed by Assad’s military forces since 2011 (BBC News, 2015) 
 
Regarding the Russian-Syrian relationship, it was suggested that “the dangerous game 
initiated by Hafez Al-Assad in 1970 continues and the Syrian player remains in position” 
(Syrian Observer, 2014). A revival of this ‘game’ could be evinced from the ongoing 
crisis in Syria, and the Syrian Foreign Minister, Muallem, was said to be “reminiscent of 
the Soviet…Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov” (Syrian Observer, 2014). These statements 
suggested to the SMB, who had entreated with Russia to stay out of the Syrian conflict, 
that Russia will provide support to Assad and contribute to the regime’s survival.  
 
To that end, the survival of Assad’s regime was a matter of priority for Putin. It was 
noted that Russia “has its only maritime military base in the Syrian city [of Tartus] over 
its only maritime military base in the Mediterranean, and is therefore regarded as the 
ultimate safeguard and guarantee against the resolutions of the World Security Council, 
despite the occasional human ailments of the lips” (Wimmen, 2012, 184). 
 
Other analysts recognized Russia’s political desire to retain a firm position within the 
region. In an address to the IDSA in 2013, Chairman of the Russian Council on Foreign 
and Defense Policy, Fyodor Lukyanov, “recalled Russia’s “mistake” in agreeing to the 
overthrow of the Gaddafi regime and asserted that the Russian stance on Syria was 
intended to disavow the Libyan precedent” (Bhutani, 2015). It is also worthy to note that 
Russia has maintained a dialogue with Israel with regards to the scope of its military 
intervention in Syria. It has been suggested that this in order to reduce the likelihood of 
any aggressive response by Israel to military action originating on Syrian soil (Bhutani, 
2015). Perhaps consequently, Syria has not suffered from any aerial attacks by Israel. 
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To conclude, the regime’s brutal military campaign has been undertaken alongside 
Iranian and Russian support. The international community has met the campaign with 
critical reactions, although these reactions have not resulted in any substantive acts. The 
next section will further demonstrate that the regime would be unable to withstand the 
international condemnation of their use of force were it not for the political support of 
their Russian allies. This is because Russia “sees Syria not just as an ally, but as part of 
the family…The Syrian-Russian relations are…excellent and special” (Syrian Observer, 
2014). 
 
7.3 The Relationship between Russia, Iran, and the SMB 
 
This section will provide a brief outline of the official political stances of the SMB 
towards both Russia and Iran. Both countries supported Assad and the government 
regime in Syria, but had a dynamic relationship with the SMB due to their other political 
alliances. Russia had a growing relationship with Turkey, who remained a close ally of 
the SMB and supported the Syrian opposition coalition, both politically and logistically. 
Similarly, Iran had a pre-existing relationship with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
before the military coup. Thus, it is important to carefully consider the nature of these 
relationships. 
 
Since the Russian military action in Syria began in 2015, the SMB has had a strained 
relationship with Russia. The SMB released a statement declaring that the “blatant 
aggression on our country and our people puts Russia alongside Iran in direct partnership 
with Assad’s criminal regime” (Ikhwan web, 2015). In this statement, the SMB called 
for allies within the Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as the 
entire international community, to put “pressure on the criminal regime and take real and 
direct political and diplomatic action” to resolve the conflict. 
 
Shortly afterwards, the Brotherhood released another statement wherein they affirmed 
that the Brotherhood “refuses ongoing endeavors to divide Syria under the auspices of 
the Mullahs of Iran, the Czars of Russia, and the criminal Zionists, with Arab blessing 
assisted by the heinous Al-Sissi” (Ikwanweb, 2015). The SMB continued to state that the 
Iranian-Russian invasion of Syria was not directed against ISIS, as claimed by 
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mainstream media. They claimed that the two states aimed “to suppress the real 
revolutionaries fighting Bashar’s sectarian repressive regime”, and suggested that the 
political position of the USA participated in the repression of the Syrian revolution. 
 
Due to Russia’s place amongst the forerunners of international politics, and their position 
in the UN, it is possible that the SMB may have to engage in dialog with the state. 
However, whether this will be directly or through affiliated groups remains to be seen. In 
any event, such a discussion will have far-reaching ramifications for the SMB, and may 
result in a political backlash from its followers and supporters on Syrian soil. 
 
Similarly, the SMB viewed Iran as a prototypical opponent of the Syrian revolution, and 
of the Islamic world in general. In 2012, Al-Drouby stated that the SMB had rejected six 
attempts made by Iran to engage in dialog through a Turkish intermediary. “We told [the 
Iranians] that we will not meet with them or negotiate with them before they stop 
supporting Bashar Al-Assad” (Miller, 2012). In addition, in May 2013 the Muslim 
Brotherhood stated that the national and community leaders of Iran should pay attention 
to the danger of the country’s “doctrinal” and “nationalistic” outlook, and avoid the 
pitfalls of sectarianism (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 2013) They asserted that 
“unless Iran abandons its attempts to dominate and agitate, and expressly abandons 
Assad and his circle, it cannot be a part of any political initiative”. 
 
However, the relationship between Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood had not been so 
strained before the Syrian crisis. The head of a research center within the Iranian Foreign 
Affairs Department, Mustapha Zahrani, stated that Iran believes in “Islamic democracy 
and in a moderate Islam: as do organizations close to the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey 
and in Egypt”(Dot-Pouillard, 2013). Upon the democratic election of President Morsi in 
June 2012, Iran applauded the appointment. However, in the following year President 
Morsi attended a conference wherein he criticized the military intervention carried by 
Hezbollah. This can be considered to be a turning point in the diplomatic relations 
between Iran and the MB. It was stated that the “relationship between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Iran has gone from mutual respect to mutual distrust, potentially 
fueling the further polarization between Sunni and Shia in the region” (Dot-Pouillard, 
2016). Thus, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the SMB did not always interact 
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with Iran in accordance with one another. However, following the military coup in Egypt 
and subsequent crisis in Syria, neither branch of the Brotherhood are on speaking terms 
with Iran. 
 
7.4 International Responses to the ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ 
 
The previous section outlined the true extent of the reliance that the regime had on its 
two main allies. Through Iranian and Russian support, Bashar Al-Assad has been able to 
forcibly overcome any obstacles concerning the legitimacy of his rule and authority over 
the Syrian people. The present section will evaluate the international responses to the 
actions committed by the regime in unison and cooperation with these allies.  
 
The Syrian opposition were not alone in expressing their outrage at the excessive use of 
force, continually rising death toll, and widespread destruction of Syrian infrastructure. 
The Syrian regime were seen using heavy artillery, including cluster and barrel bombs, 
as well as internationally prohibited gasses, military tanks, jets and helicopters against 
civilian targets. These actions were so grave that their effect was felt in neighboring 
countries, and many European nations as well. Before long, the international sentiment 
was voiced calling for an immediate end to the acts of violence, perpetuated mainly by 
the Syrian regime against civilians (Amnesty International, 2017). 
 
Therefore, it can be seen that the West was in accordance with the opposition, including 
the SMB, in their desire to see Assad removed from power. This is solely due to the 
deliberate actions of the regime. However, this ‘accord’ of the international community 
did not result in any final substantive outcome. It was reported by analysts that “even 
painful punishments, international abolition and limited military steps (such as the flight 
ban) [would] not take the Syrian regime off its course” (Wimmen, 2012: 84). Thus, the 
opposition and external actors in the EU and the USA were faced with a dilemma. Assad 
seemed committed to his cause. Despite international condemnation, reported 
numerously in prominent international publications, the regime persisted in their crimes 
against humanity. 
 
7.4.1 Human Rights Bodies, Humanitarian Organizations, and other NGOs 
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Syrian NGOs were formed in relation to the crisis in order to administer day-to-day 
issues involving the provision of healthcare and access to justice. These organizations 
used any avenue available to them to report evidence of humanitarian crimes committed 
by the regime to international human rights organizations and leaders of democratic 
states. As discussed in Chapter 5, members and affiliates of the SMB took an active role 
in participating or initiating NGOs for the purposes of raising awareness of the situation 
on the ground and performing rescue missions. This was achieved despite considerable 
limitations on their financial and logistic capabilities.  
 
Humanitarian organizations such as Save the Children, Oxfam, and Doctors Without 
Borders took a huge interest in the crisis. The extensive media attention, which has 
persisted now for several years, remains largely unsuccessful as an intervening agent. 
Nonetheless, the media coverage has caused the atrocities committed in Syria to reach 
people from all over the world, and the level of censure directed towards the regime’s 
actions has grown in accordance with the exposure. It is within this context that the SMB 
partook in activities and dialogues with a sense of urgency. The following examples will 
serve to showcase the complexity of the Syrian crisis, and will introduce the analytical 
paradoxes that resulted from the competing interests of state actors. Persistent throughout 
is the fact that, whilst parties have grave concerns regarding the actions committed by 
the regime, concrete responses combatting these actions have failed to materialize. 
 
The first international organization to consider is the United Nations. It is remarkable 
indeed that this all-inclusive, intergovernmental organization was rendered powerless in 
the case of Syria. Its numerous offices in human rights and humanitarian aid all 
expressed the dire need for a response to the heinous crimes committed in Syria, 
including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA). UN 
reports evaluating the situation on the ground, through mechanisms such as the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry, gathered evidence about the crimes 
committed on Syrian soil. Many of the results identified the regime as the main 
perpetrator of excessive acts of violence. Yet, whilst the UN had a general impetus to 
take action, Ban Ki Moon, the Secretary General of the UN, described in 2015 the lack 
of feasible solutions as an “international impotency to stop the war” (McGreal, 2015). 
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UN officials stressed the severity of the Syrian crisis several times over. In 2015, the 
Secretary General stated that “Syrian civil society has to carry on the heaviest burden 
ever happened to people since the genocide in Rwanda decades ago” (Ban Ki Moon, 
2015) (McGreal, 2015). Adama Dieng, Special Advisor to the Secretary General on the 
Prevention of Genocide, issued an urgent statement wherein he expressed deep concern 
regarding the political and social consequences of the crimes committed by the Syrian 
Government. He stated, “I reiterate the calls of the international community for the 
Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court and 
stress the importance of taking steps now to facilitate future transitional justice processes 
in Syria to reduce the risk of retribution, promote reconciliation and provide all 
communities with a sense of justice and dignity” (Dieng, 2012) reported by (United 
Nations News Service Section, 2012) .  
 
A proposed ‘wake-up call’ initiated by the UN was launched in order to provide 
protection for Syrian civilians under the “Responsibility to Protect” program. This was 
vetoed by Russia, leading to a sentiment that the UN, at least on an organizational level, 
felt that they did not have a responsibility towards the protection of the Syrian people. 
Analysts and political observers alike have discussed the extent to which this sentiment 
negatively impacted the situation on the ground. On military intervention of Western 
states, Wimmen opined that “a direct and massive intervention in Syria still remains 
excluded, not only because of the Russian and Chinese veto in the World Security 
Council, but also because it seems that the foreign actors are not prepared to bear the 
associated costs and risks to take such a step. Once again, the international community 
must recognize the impact of humanitarian norms [caused by] the military resistance and 
violent regime” (Wimmen, 2012: 184). The Commissioner of the UN Human Rights 
Council, Vitit Muntarbhorn, as well as the Arab League Secretary General, Nabil Al-
Araby, also called for an end to the violence. 
 
The relationship between the SMB and the UN was colored by the Brotherhood’s status 
as a faith-based organization. During an interfaith conference sponsored by the UN, it 
was stated that “the UN and religions share a common concern for human dignity, justice 
and peace” (Grills, 2009: 505). Jean Ping, acting President of the 59th General 
Assembly, considered the value of ‘faith and beliefs’ and the vital role that it can play in 
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a peacekeeping process. He stressed that “the UN General Assembly recognizes the 
important of engaging religious communities” (Grills, 2009: 505). It was to these 
principles that Al-Bayanouni and other SMB leaders appealed. They argued that the 
importance of peacemaking in the case of Syria is in perfect alignment with the ideology 
that the Brotherhood was founded upon (see Chapter 4).  
 
In October 2012, the SMB issued a blueprint for the formation of the Syrian state, widely 
published in its political manifesto. The primary intent was to reach the Syrian people, 
and to position themselves for candidacy of the Syrian government (see Chapter 5). In 
addition, the plan for the new Syrian society was to reach a wider audience: Western and 
democratic rule makers. The idea was that a comprehensive strategy proposed by the 
SMB would send signs to powerful international actors, such as the UN, that the SMB 
could be recognized as a potential partner. However, the Brotherhood came to realize 
that they had never been seriously considered by any of the world organizations as one 
of the influential peacekeeping bodies. 
 
The absence of faith-based organizations in facilitating the peacemaking process seems 
to be a trend in the arena of international politics. Yet, with the increasing number of 
conflicts that are ethnic or sectarian in nature, analysts and researchers are beginning to 
reconsider the role of such organizations. It has been noted that “there is tension between 
recognizing the intensity of religious involvement in a number of contemporary 
conflicts, and finding appropriate ways of addressing those conflicts”(Harpviken and 
Røislien, 2010). In terms of reliability and commitment, an organization formed on the 
same premise as the parties in a conflict would be better suited to find workable 
solutions. The approach of the SMB has been to take political action informed by their 
faith-based ideology. It is worth considering why this approach, or that of faith-based 
organizations generally, have not been pursued by the UN. 
 
In any event, initiatives and effective approaches require financing. Any kind of faith-
based peacebuilding that takes place must be backed by sustainable and continuous 
financial and logistical support. As global financers did not invest in the Syrian civil 
society, for a number of reasons mentioned previously, newly initiated NGOs and the 
SMB had to rely heavily on private donations. These are usually directed towards some 
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immediate response mission, and tend to fund specific endeavors rather than general 
efforts of the organization. This is so despite the fact that it was shown by analysts that 
the involvement of faith-based organizations led to improved healthcare in poor areas 
and conflict regions.  
 
A consultation undertaken by the World Bank, ‘Voices of the Poor’, found that 
impoverished persons “often trusted religious institutions based around ashrams, shrines, 
mosques, and churches more than governments to address their needs” (Grills, 2009, p. 
509). Similarly, it was found that in relation to political parties, Islamic-based 
movements were considered to be “the leading voices of opposition and [an] important 
player within domestic politics” (Hashemi, 2013). Thus, there are many indicators to 
conclude that the inclusion of the SMB to roundtable discussions would have had a 
positive impact on the peacemaking process in Syria. 
 
The next organization to consider is the internationally recognized NGO, Amnesty 
International (AI). AI was one of the first organizations to draw attention to the 
conditions of detainees held in the regime’s facilities. They published reports 
condemning the injustices suffered by Syrian rebels in governmental prisons, and in 
2011 claimed that they had proof of atrocious crimes committed by the regime. In July 
2011, AI reported that the regime had a “violent crackdown [against] peaceful protests” 
in the northern town of Tel Kalakh, in which demonstrators called for the release of 
political prisoners. Subsequently, AI issued a report in February 2017 entitled ‘Human 
Slaughterhouse: Mass Hangings and Extermination at Saydnaya Prison, Syria”. 
Saydnaya is a military prison belonging to the Syrian government, the kind of which 
survivors have detailed torture and mass killings of detainees taking place (Amnesty 
International, 2012), In one such facility, identified members of the SMB had been 
detained as political prisoners and tortured before they were released. AI recognized the 
release as a positive step (Amnesty International, 2001). 
 
Another NGO to evaluate is Human Rights Watch (HRW). This US-based organization 
has previously stated that the Syrian government has shown “no qualms about shooting 
dead its own citizens for speaking out”. In addition, they have said that the actions 
committed by the regime “could qualify as crimes against humanity”. In relation to the 
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Muslim Brotherhood generally, HRW has drafted a signed statement against their listing 
in the USA as a terrorist organization. They state that “terrorist designation would harm 
USA groups [and] stifle democracy abroad” (Human Rights Watch, 2017).  On the SMB 
in particular, HRW have reported the torture and detention of thousands of members 
during Assad’s first ten years in power – “many of whom subsequently disappeared” 
(Human Rights Watch et al., 2010). 
 
Both AI and HRW have reported on the massacres committed in Hama. It is worth 
noting here that Al-Bayanouni had previous experience of the brutal capabilities of the 
Assad regime from the 1980s. Consequently, in 2011 the SMB had been warning the 
young and zealous Syrian youth, cautioning them against entering into the uncertain 
fighting ground. Al-Bayanouni anticipated that Assad would follow the example of his 
father: fiercely combatting opposition, meeting dissension with lethal force, and staining 
the modern history of Syria with yet another dark milestone (Al-Bayanouni, London, 
2014; Al-Bayanouni, London, 2017). 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have also appealed to the Syrian 
authorities and members of the opposition. In January 2012, the ICRC called for a daily 
cessation of fighting in order to deliver humanitarian assistance. They also appealed to 
all parties of the conflict to distinguish between civilians and combatants at all times, and 
to have full regard for international humanitarian law. In September 2012, the President 
of the ICRC, Peter Maurer, travelled to Syria in order to upscale the efforts of the 
organization and its affiliates. 
 
By 2014, a third of the entire Syrian population had become refugees, the largest number 
since the Second World War. Many of those unable to flee were subjected to famine and 
death. Whilst the UN has stopped counting at 100,000, there have been more than 
470,000 civilian casualties since the crisis began, with the figures rising on a daily basis. 
This has been confirmed by Human Rights observers on the ground, international 
organizations, and political analysts and commentators. 
 
This section has reviewed the responses of some of the prominent NGOs and 
international organizations to the Syrian crisis. The atrocities committed by the regime 
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against the Syrian population, and against members of the SMB, has been well-
documented by these organizations. The following section will consider the responses 
from Western States. 
 
7.4.2 Responses from Western States 
 
Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, strongly condemned the regime for their brutal response to the 
Syrian protestors. This was echoed in the responses of many European state leaders. In a 
joint statement issued in August 2011, the Prime Minister of the UK, the President of 
France, and the German Chancellor all demanded for Bashar Al-Assad to step down. 
This high-profile statement also condemned the crackdown unequivocally and called for 
an end to the violence.  
 
The US Secretary of State, John Kerry, as well as President Obama both placed the 
blame for the Syrian crisis at the feet of Bashar Al-Assad. In July 2015, in direct 
response to the violence committed during the ‘bloodiest day of the uprising so far’, 
President Obama warned that Assad was “on the wrong side of history and his people. 
Through his own actions, Bashar Al-Assad is ensuring that he and his government will 
be left in the past, and that the courageous Syrian people who have demonstrated in the 
streets will determine its future. Syria will be a better place when a democratic transition 
goes forward”. Whilst he did not explicitly call for the resignation of Assad, President 
Obama went on to say that the USA would increase its efforts on the international stage 
to “isolate the Assad government and stand with the Syrian people”. 
 
It is important to highlight that the statements of political leaders and their expressions of 
intent do not necessarily indicate that the state has not supported the regime, directly or 
indirectly. For instance, the German government received a list from the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) naming German companies that had 
supplied Assad, and others, with the chemicals used in chemical weaponry. This list has 
since been classified by Germany, due to the fact that the release of “state secrets” would 
violate the German constitution, and might “significantly impair foreign policy interests 
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and thus the welfare of the Federal Republic of Germany” (Latsch, Schmid, and 
Weigerfer, 2015).. 
 
7.5 The Role of the SMB Within Political Opposition Bodies and their Engagement 
with the International Community 
 
The previous section evaluated the international responses to the actions committed by 
the regime. Invariably, human rights organizations, political leaders, and internationally 
recognized NGOs have all condemned and criticized the actions of the Syrian 
government. Some have gone so far as to report evidence of crimes against humanity, or 
to call for the resignation of Bashar Al-Assad. The present section will consider the role 
of the SMB within political opposition bodies. It will demonstrate that their engagement 
with the international community through official opposition bodies has proved to be 
unsustainable, yet SMB members have still played key roles in uniting the different 
Syrian opposition groups. Further, it will analyze how the SMB acts in the political arena 
as a Sunni Islamic organization, drawing on the tense relationship it has with the Alawite 
regime. 
 
The political history of Syria provides that there has been little room for the development 
of any organized opposition. The totalitarian rule imposed by the regime subjected any 
opposition to severe repression and brutality (Khatib, 2011; Lefèvre, 2013; Pierret 2013). 
Thus, it was noted that “the opposition parties in Syria lead a shadowy death without a 
real potential for political mobilization” (Wimmen, 2012: 181). Undeterred by the 
oppression, and despite operating from exile, the SMB existed as the largest and most 
organized Syrian opposition group. 
 
In 2011, the SMB demonstrated its organizational ability by bringing together different 
opposition groups who had been forced into exile. This effort intended to shape the 
Syrian opposition, and draw attention to the plight of the Syrian people. The SMB were 
resolved in setting aside ideological differences from amongst the opposition groups in 
order to meet the needs of the Syrian civil society. They intended to support the 
demonstrators calling for freedom and political agency, and form a political body which 
would protect their right to determine their own destiny. As a longstanding and 
experience political entity, the SMB were well aware of the need to form an all-inclusive 
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political body that would be accepted by the Western world. It was very clear to the 
SMB that, without such acceptance, it would be impossible for the exiled opposition to 
sustain and support the efforts of the revolutionaries inside Syria. 
 
In the effort to form a political body that could exercise legitimate authority over the 
Syrian people, the SMB financed their efforts solely through personal resources. This 
decision was taken in part due to the urgency of the need and the limited amount of time 
available. However, in addition, the decision was a cautious measure taken to avoid the 
possibility of any accusations of political biases. By remaining entirely independent, 
there could be no doubt as to whether the newly formed political body had their political 
agendas compromised or influenced by any states or international organizations who had 
financed them (Al-Drouby, Vienna, 2014). 
 
From Istanbul in April 2011, the gathered Syrian opposition made its public 
announcement demanding the reformation of the Assad regime. The political appeal had 
no impact on the regime, who continued to meet out brutal acts of violence and persisted 
in their oppression. However, the opposition decided to meet again in Brussels to 
demand that the Ba’ath party facilitate a true democratic transition in Syria (Al-Drouby, 
Vienna, 6.2.2014; Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014). In September 2011, the ‘Syrian 
National Council’ was formed. 
 
International analysis and media reports described the SMB as the best-organized 
political faction within the Syrian National Council (SNC) (Lefèvre, 2013; Teitelbaum, 
2011). Lefèvre remarks that, although Hafez Al-Assad had shattered the organization 
within Syria in the 1980s, they were still considered as an influential organization in the 
eyes of their associates. Thus, it was a natural and logical process for the different Syrian 
opposition groups to band together under this initiative to present a strong, unified front 
against the regime. It was hoped that the SNC “would gain widespread international 
recognition as the country’s sole legitimate representative [and serve] as a single point of 
contact for the international community” (BBC News, 2013b). 
 
However, before long the deep-rooted ideological differences between the gathered 
members of the opposition started to surface. This was especially apparent between the 
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faith-based groups and the leftist nationalist forces, in particular the National 
Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC). The NCC was formed in June 
2011 as a political alliance between three Kurdish parties and 16 small left-leaning 
groups, as well as numerous independent political activists. The bloc is chaired by the 
leader of the Democratic Arab Socialist Union, Hassan Abdul Azim, and voiced 
objections to what they felt was an ideological domination of the SMB within the 
opposition’s alliance. This was denied by the Brotherhood, who referred to the shared 
aim of the alliance to set clear definitions of a future pluralistic government after the fall 
of Assad (Boehmer, 2012; Al-Bayanouni, London, 2014).  
 
Thus, it became clear that uniting the Syrian opposition under the umbrella of one 
political body presented challenging problems. The multitude of actors who considered 
themselves to be representatives of different groups within Syria were unable to agree on 
who best represents the voice of the Syrian people. The SMB were faced with 
challenging questions. Namely, how can it consider itself a representative of the Syrian 
people in light of its absence from the political arena for more than three decades? These 
fractures from within the opposition alliance was a cause for concern for the wider 
political community, who were now faced with three competing oppositional political 
bodies: the Syrian National Council, the Syrian National Coalition of Syrian Revolution 
and Opposition Forces (Al-Itilaf), and the Syrian Interim Government. These three 
oppositional bodies will be discussed in turn in the following sections.  
 
7.5.1 The Syrian National Council 
 
The idea behind the establishment of the SNC was to form an inclusive political 
oppositional body that represents the majority of the Syrian people. It was set up by a 
coalition of groups and individuals, including signatories of the Damascus Declaration in 
2005. It consisted of five members from the Muslim Brotherhood and the tribes, five 
independent political activists, four Kurds, four liberal secularists, one Christian, and one 
Assyrian (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2012b) . 
 
The main goal of the SNC was to operate together “to overthrow the regime using all 
legal means” (SNC, 2012). Though the Free Syrian Army were not included in the 
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formation of this political assembly, the Syrian fighters inside Syria were said to support 
the idea of the SNC (BBC, 2013). This is despite the fact that the SMB refused to take 
part in any violent or lethal activities inside Syria, due to their previous experiences of 
the catastrophic brutality that the regime is capable of in retaliation (Al-Droubi, 2014; 
Al-Bayanouni, 2014). 
 
By initiating the SNC, the SMB were presented with an unprecedented opportunity to be 
a part of the political future of Syria. Moreover, having been accepted and welcomed by 
the Turkish government, the SMB and other opposition forces were able to enjoy the 
ability to act within the political sphere without fear of persecution. Disapproval came in 
the form of political analysis, for example a public accusation levied against the SMB 
that they had “stolen the revolution” (Hassan, 2011). Nonetheless, the Brotherhood 
managed to stand out in terms of political strength and influence, and worked towards 
demonstrating their evolution from an Islamic social movement to a capable political 
actor. 
 
In 2012, the SNC sought domestic and international recognition. They expressed their 
intent to the Syrian people by presenting a program for a transitional period, and 
requested the international community to support their proposal. The plan rejected any 
calls for ethnic segregation and strongly underlined the national unity of all components 
of the Syrian civil society. In addition, it iterated the need for national independence and 
sovereignty, rejecting any foreign military intervention. Due to the complexity of the 
different fighting groups on the ground, there was no general consensus of the legitimacy 
of the SNC on Syrian soil. The different groups, with their diverse ideological beliefs, 
could not all agree to have the SNC as their appointed representatives. As a result, the 
SNC actively sought external recognition, expecting that international legitimacy would 
boost its credibility within Syria (Strashun, 2013: 14). The alliance began to organize 
and participate in international conferences in Europe and North America, and advocated 
for their cause at universities and public institutions (Al-Drouby, Vienna, 6.2.2014). 
 
The efforts achieved early results, with the alliance coordinating with Berlin in 2012 to 
hold a workshop at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project intended to 
outline the intentions and governance structure for ‘the day after’ in a free Syrian state. 
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Executive members of the SMB were welcomed alongside the other oppositional 
representatives of the SNC by Germany’s high-profiled expert in state constitutions (Die 
Welt, 2014; SWP, 2014). The finalized document consisted of 120 pages detailing the 
vision for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well as the entitlement for all 
groups of the Syrian society to be represented in the upcoming state building process.  
 
Numerous publications demonstrated the impact that the SMB has on the finalized 
document. In his analysis of the vision for a pluralistic and democratically-led Syrian 
state, Boehmer entitled his paper, “What the Muslim Brothers Want for Syria” (Die 
Welt, 2014). However, the new alliance’s diverse political interests coupled with 
increasing fragmentation on Syrian soil caused the SNC to suffer criticism from the 
international community. In particular, disapproval expressed by acting Secretary of 
State, Hillary Clinton, proved to be fatal for the alliance. The USA declared that the SNC 
“could no longer be viewed as the visible leader of the opposition”, and the political 
power of Washington DC was felt the world over. Western nations no longer trusted the 
alliance to distribute any contributions for humanitarian assistance (Strashun, 2013: 16). 
Consequently, the position for political representation of the Syrian people opened up to 
smaller and less experienced opposition forces. 
 
7.5.2 The Syrian National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces 
 
In 2012, following the international denunciation of the SNC, members of the opposition 
alliance united under a newly established and widened umbrella organization: the Syrian 
National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, or Al-Itilaf. Al-Itilaf had 
a profound effect on the influence enjoyed by the SMB, and reduced their political 
impact within the Syrian oppositional body. 
 
The coalition was founded in Qatar in 2012 and comprised of 150 members. The 
assembly was attended by a number of representatives of the numerous political 
opposition groups, including nationalists, secularists, liberals, Christians, Muslims, 
Kurds, and independent political actors. In addition, organizations and councils operating 
within Syria, as well as members of the moderate, non-state fighting brigades, were 
included in the coalition. Whilst the ideological differences remained between these 
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different oppositional bodies, they were all in agreement that Bashar Al-Assad and his 
regime must be replaced by a pluralistic, democratic political system. 
 
The acting Imam of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, Moaz Al-Khatib, was appointed 
as President of Al-Itilaf. Al-Khatib was a soft-spoken, moderate Muslim, and was 
chaired by two internationally renowned Vice-Presidents. The first, Suhair Al-Atassi, 
was a secular female activist who descended from the prominent Homsi Atassi political 
family. She earned her reputation from her involvement in the so-called Damascus 
Spring by demanding that Bashar Al-Assad change the repressive politics of his late 
father. Political analysts were quick to dub her as the “First Lady of Post-Assad Syria”, 
and wrote that she “might have to put up a fight against some bearded men from the 
opposition” (Haaretz, 2012). The SMB referred to their public declaration of the vision 
of a future Syria, wherein it is stated that the organization has no objections against 
females or secularists. It states that the SMB has always recognized all Syrians as mutual 
partners in the united fight against the repressive regime (Al-Bayanouni, 2014). 
 
The second Vice-President elected was the businessman-turned-dissident, Riad Seif. Seif 
had demonstrated his political capabilities in his formation of the Forum of National 
Dialog in the early 2000s. Thus, in the newly formed oppositional alliance the SMB held 
no senior position. Instead, leadership was given to independent political actors who had 
affected the political landscape of Syria after the exile of the Brotherhood in 1982. After 
their brief return to influential power immediately following the uprising, the SMB 
found themselves adhering more and more to the will of the new oppositional body. 
Eventually, in an attempt to mitigate any lasting damage to the reputation of the 
Brotherhood, Al-Bayanouni decided to resign rather than to compromise on the founding 
principles of the SMB. 
 
By broadening the opposition bloc, Al-Itilaf was able to achieve what the SNC had 
previously sought: international recognition of their legitimacy. Whilst satisfying the 
criteria imposed by the USA (see 7.5.1), the fractures that existed in the formation of the 
SNC persisted in Al-Itilaf. The variety of political groups, exiled dissidents, grassroots 
activists, and armed militants were unable to agree on how best to overthrow the Syrian 
regime (BBC, 2013). International media attention and political commentary about Al-
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Itilaf focused on how divided the coalition had become. Not only in terms of their 
difference of opinion on how to proceed, but also with regards to the issue of the “future 
Syria”. The coalition was unable to agree on the constitutional form of a post-conflict 
Syrian state. 
 
Once again, commentators identified the profound discord existing within the opposition 
coalition (Hassan, 2014; Landis, 2014; Rosiny, 2013; Sahloul, 2014; Shanahan, 2013). 
The lack of any clear organizational structure and poor coordination between local 
committees were also criticized. Local coordination committees tended to act in isolation 
and actively resisted the influence of other bodies within the coalition (Wimmen, 2012: 
181). Nonetheless, at all times, and for all Syrian political opposition groups, the need to 
build an alternative government remained the primary objective to work towards. 
 
7.5.3 The Syrian Interim Government 
 
The Syrian Interim Government was formed in March 2013 by Al-Itilaf. With 
headquarters in the Turkish city of , the opponents of the regime were well situated to 
interact with the international community as well as the people of Syria. Recognizing the 
importance of proximity, a ‘twin’ headquarter was established in the northern city of 
Azaz in Syria.  
 
The decision was made to establish between ten and twelve acting ministers, who were 
to be nominated by an elected Prime Minister. An independent candidate, Ghassan Hitto, 
was elected as the first Prime Minister by a narrow margin (Barnard, 2013). Again, there 
were no SMB members appointed to any of the ministerial offices. However, SMB-
affiliated post-holders were appointed, as well as junior consultants from the second and 
third generations of the Brotherhood. Nonetheless, due to the seemingly inevitable 
internal conflicts, the first interim government dissolved in July 2013 with the 
resignation of Hitto, just four months after its formation. 
 
To conclude, despite the pragmatic approach of the SMB following the 2011 uprising, 
the Brotherhood has been unable to affect any lasting influence on the political landscape 
of Syria. They have been forced by political necessity to remain a marginal influence 
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within the Syrian opposition, which has only been possible at all due to its extensive 
network and organizational apparatus. The next section will evaluate the effectiveness of 
this network, looking at the relationships existing between the SMB and regional and 
international actors. 
 
7.6 The SMB and Regional and International Actors 
 
At the end of the twentieth century, there were many examples of religious resurgence in 
the Arab world (see Chapter 4). It has taken a number of decades for the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood to advocate for a plural democratic society. Branches of the 
Brotherhood, such as the Jordanian and SMB, have been impacted by the democratic 
awakening taking place in the Western world since the Second World War (Khatib, 
2011; Pierret, 2013). Prominent Islamic scholars, such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, have 
opined that the essence of Islam is compatible with modern democracy (Al-Qaradawi, 
2002). 
 
However, for the SMB a belief in the essence of democracy must be coupled with a 
trustworthy partner from the democratically ruled countries. They sought to establish 
diplomatic relationships with powerful democratic states in order to safeguard and 
support their commitment towards the Syrian civil society. The following sections will 
demonstrate how these efforts descended into a defensive battle, wherein the SMB were 
forced to prove their intentions, value, and political proficiency. It will evaluate why the 
formation of the so-called ‘Friends of Syria Group’ (FOS) did not provide the anticipated 
outcomes hoped for by the SMB. Whilst the initial response to the FOS was widespread 
support and international acclaim, the group became increasingly less responsive over 
time, often completely ignoring political actions and statements. 
 
7.6.1 The Friends of Syria Group 
 
The Friends of Syria Group was established in Tunisia in February 2012 (Carnegie 
Middle East Center, 2012). President Barack Obama initiated the group in response to 
the vetoes issued by Russia and China in the UN Security Council, and comprised of 
more than 70 nations. Their sole purpose was to present initiatives and methods to end 
the bloodshed taking place on Syrian soil.  
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The early activities of the FOS proved to be influential. In their second meeting in April 
2012, the group recognized the SNC as the legitimate representative of the Syrian 
opposition, and of the Syrian people (Al-Jazeera News, 2012). The morale of the Syrian 
opposition was greatly boosted by this recognition. Subsequently, in June 2012 over 100 
countries joined delegates at a high-profile meeting in Paris. Foreign ministers and senior 
diplomats in attendance all backed the legitimated Syrian opposition and provided 
financial and logistical support, including communication tools and other administrative 
apparatus (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2012). In the fourth meeting in December 
2012, the group swelled to 114 states and 15 internationally recognized NGOs (Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office and The Rt Hon William Hague, 2012). 
 
The SMB was still considered by some analysts to be the primary voice in the political 
agenda setting (Khatib, 2011; Lefèvre, 2013; Pierret, 2013). However, time would tell 
that the Brotherhood had already seen its political zenith in terms of its official efforts 
towards a democratic state of Syria. In February 2013, the President of the SNC, Moaz 
Al-Khatib, held an official meeting with the US Secretary of State, John Kerry. Just two 
months later in April 2013, the number of nations represented at the meeting in Turkey 
was just eleven. As to their effect on the situation on the ground, the FOS proved to be 
just as ineffectual as the UN. 
 
Neither the state-centric UN nor the FOS group have been able to provide even a partial 
resolution to the Syrian conflict. Political risk analyst, Primoz Manfreda, examined the 
“pros and cons of intervening in the Syrian conflict”. He concluded that the powerful 
friends of the Syrian opposition would not interfere in Syria. He mentioned that “talk of 
intervention in Syria resurfaces whenever a new massacre of civilians by Syrian 
government forces hits world headlines, but there’s little appetite in Western capitals for 
the huge risks involved in a direct military intervention in the Syrian conflict”(Manfreda, 
2017).The maximum support offered by the members of the FOS group was political and 
financial support of the SNC, and legitimization of the group as the Syrian opposition 
body. 
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However, in July 2013 the Muslim Brotherhood would suffer badly following the 
military coup in Egypt. President Morsi and hundreds of members of the Brotherhood 
were arrested following a statement by General Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi, labelling the 
Brotherhood a terrorist organization. This announcement was followed by Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE, severely limiting the freedoms of members of the SMB who had been 
travelling and acting openly up until this point in time. The relationship between the 
SMB and European countries, such as the UK and Germany, was also affected by this 
announcement (see 7.5.4). 
 
The plight of the SMB was exacerbated in June 2017. Newly elected President of the 
USA, Donald Trump, made his first visit to the King of Saudi Arabia, Salman Al-Saud. 
Shortly afterwards, the state of Qatar was accused of destabilizing the region by 
sheltering members of a terrorist organization. In doing so, the Muslim Brotherhood 
were put on a level with ISIS and Hamas, diplomatic ties with Qatar were abruptly 
severed by neighboring states in the Gulf region, as well as from the FOS group. 
 
In isolation, Turkey as a member of the FOS group continues to work towards the fall of 
Assad and call for the dignity of the Syrian people. This seems to go against the political 
interests of the group, and Turkey continues to host SMB members. This unique 
relationship between Turkey and the SMB will be considered in further detail in the next 
section, before evaluating other diplomatic relationships. 
 
7.6.2 The Relationship Between Turkey and the SMB 
 
The Turkish government demonstrated an immediate acceptance to the SMB’s political 
engagement, enabling the organization to establish their headquarters in Istanbul. The 
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) had a good historical relationship with the 
SMB, with both entities having a foundation rooted in an Islamic identity. Few political 
analysts have considered the relationship between Turkey and the SMB (Gurpinar, 
2015). Whilst Turkey’s role in the Middle East has raised doubts as to the intentions of 
the Turkish government, the SMB remained grateful for the opportunity to engage in 
political activities from a centralized Turkish hub. Commentators have noted that 
President Erdoğan had a close relationship with the Brotherhood in general, having 
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initiated cooperation between Turkey and the Egyptian and Palestinian branches of the 
MB (Bhutani, 2015). Whilst these relations broke down following the coup in Egypt, the 
general sentiment from within Syria is that Turkey seems to have their best national 
interests at heart. Thus, the nation acts as a source of moral as well as material support 
for the Syrian people (Bhutani, 2015).  
 
Al-Droubi and leading SMB executives have stated that they consider the example of 
Turkey provides the ‘model character’ of governance. It is a highly functional, 
democratic, pluralistic state with a freely elected government. It has moved away from 
the so-called “Kemalism”, identified by a visible show of military power and excessive 
coups (such as in 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1997). That the SMB has benefited greatly from 
Turkish support cannot be understated. The centralization of the Brotherhood’s activities 
has allowed members to effectively participate inside of Syria in the areas under 
opposition control. Leaders of the SMB living in Western countries and elsewhere are 
able to travel freely and meet in Turkish forums to discuss political developments and 
coordinate their efforts. Entry into northern Syria is achieved by passing through the 
frontiers officially at different border crossings. In this instance, the SMB were able to 
adopt positions of political influence. SMB members joined the locally established 
councils to provide the Syrian population with administrative support (see Chapter 5). 
 
7.6.3 The Relationship between Arab Gulf States and the Muslim Brotherhood 
 
The shifting political landscape within Egypt had a profound effect on the Syrian crisis, 
both in terms of how the crisis was perceived by the Egyptian population, and in the 
power relations operating in the region. Upon the election of President Morsi, the mood 
within the SMB was understandably buoyed (The Guardian, 2012). As the dictatorship 
was toppled, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was accompanied with a 
growing sympathy, due to the years of repression it had suffered previously (Alrajjal, 
2013). 
 
The Islamic political solution was gaining attraction as an alternative form of leadership, 
mainly due to the brutality and cruelty suffered at the hands of previous dictatorships. In 
particular, the Muslim Brotherhood were seen as bastions of the political ideal, an 
 196 
embodiment of the model character of governance as seen in Turkey. Many predicted 
that this form of leadership would also gain traction in the Arab world (Kirişci, 2013). 
Sunni Islamic parties similar in essence to the Muslim Brotherhood were gaining power 
and influence, and talks of an ‘Islamic arc’, stretching from Tunisia to Syria, were 
popular in 2012. 
 
These talks stopped abruptly following General Al-Sissi’s rise to power (Weaver and 
McCarthy, 2013). Not only did the previous regime regain power in Egypt, it set out to 
destroy the political opposition root and stem (Human Rights Watch et al., 2015). A 
powerful coalition of Gulf States supported the Egyptian efforts, including the 
‘conservative mastermind’ of the Arab world, Saudi Arabia, and the ‘financial 
powerhouse’ of the operation, the UAE (Steinberg Guido, 2014). Upon analysis of the 
events immediately preceding and following the Egyptian coup, it seems likely that the 
Gulf coalition were made aware in advance of the operation. A public declaration of 
substantial financial support to the new military rulers in Egypt effectively signified the 
defeat of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and demonstrated the coalition’s eagerness 
in that regard (Nordon, 2013).  
 
Despite the substantial political and financial support, the Egyptian military rulers were 
confronted with enormous economic challenges, too great to be overcome by an infusion 
of cash (Ali, 2016). There were no sustainable funding options available, and the 
contributions made by the Gulf coalition were having adverse effects on their economies 
(Harb, 2017).In addition, the coalition had to prepare for the possibility of the USA 
increasing imports of oil and gas from Iraq and Iran. Thus, budget constraints and 
redefined priorities affected the amount of monetary support that the Egyptian regime 
could receive (Westphal et al., 2014). Consequently, it affected the magnitude of the 
opposition to the Brotherhood. 
 
Another factor that may determine the conclusion to the combined efforts against the 
Muslim Brotherhood is the ideological impact it has had on their host communities. 
Following the large-scale migration of MB members into Gulf States, their ideological 
teachings spread amongst the region and generated allegiance to and sympathy for the 
organization. Over the years, the organization remained politically weak in the Gulf 
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region whilst their ideas spread, influencing generations of students (Steinberg, 2014). 
Movements emerged such as The Islamic Awakening, or Sahwa Al-Islamiya, which was 
premised upon comparable features of the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, there 
remained an excellent example of the capabilities of the MB in the Tunisian branch, 
namely the Ennahda Party (Wolf, 2017). Thus, whilst governmental efforts were 
directed against the MB generally, the organization enjoyed backing at the grassroots 
level in terms of financial, ideological and social support. 
 
This governmental enmity directed towards the MB stems from the perceived threat it 
poses to the Gulf States (Reuters, 2012). It has been suggested that the antagonism is 
somewhat surprising, given the support that members received during the 1950s and 
1970s in their flee from persecution (Alexander and Doge, 2017). The relationship was 
first tested in 1990, when prominent members of organizations affiliated with the MB 
supported Saddam Hussein following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. 
 
Subsequently, in 2001 the Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Nayef bin Abdul 
Aziz Al-Saud, called the MB responsible for the emergence of ‘Islamist terrorism’ 
(Steinberg, 2014)This was received as a personal slight against the Brotherhood, rather 
than an official diplomatic stance. However, animosity towards the MB grew in Saudi 
Arabia until the coalition was formed to avert the strategic threat posed by the 
Brotherhood. Successful revolutionary campaigns were a major cause for concern to the 
Gulf monarchies (Gause, 2015). In addition, the Brotherhood presented an ideological 
challenge to the religious legitimacy of the Gulf States, such as the close relationship 
between the Al-Saud family and the reformation of the Wahhabi movement (Durie, 
2013). 
 
The perceived threat to the monarchy may have been overestimated by the Gulf States. 
In the early 1960s, the Gulf monarchies were challenged by the Arab nationalism and 
socialism propagated by the second President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. The 
monarchies in Iraq, Yemen, and Libya all fell in the years 1958, 1962, and 1969 
respectively, with a military coup attempt also taking place in Saudi Arabia in 1969 
(Shlaim, 2003). In addition, the ‘Arab Cold War’ took place as a direct effect of Egypt’s 
regional policies. Thus, heavy fighting took place in Yemen between the opposing camps 
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backed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Gregory, 2014). For the Gulf States, the parallels 
between the crisis of the 1960s and the MB were clear: The Brotherhood represented an 
ideological movement, originating from Egypt, with a revolutionary, republican, 
transnational potential.  
 
These fears were deeply held, despite the fact that the only organized MB group in the 
region was found in Kuwait. In Bahrain, some members of the MB held parliamentary 
seats and supported the state in their domestic and foreign policy. In Saudi Arabia the 
MB were banned, however the education system had been heavily infiltrated by 
members of the Brotherhood, which is a similar situation to the MB in the UAE. The 
following sub-sections will summarize the MB-related presence in members of the Gulf 
coalition, as presented by (Alexander and Doge, 2017). 
 
7.6.3.1 Saudi Arabia 
 
“The Brotherhood’s ideas spread to Saudi Arabia when Egyptians fleeing Nasser’s 
clampdown took up teaching jobs in the kingdom’s new public-school system. Its 
supporters were allowed in by King Faisal in the 1960s, who used them to counter the 
Arab nationalism of Nasser. But Saudi rulers later grew concerned that Brotherhood 
ideas would undermine their absolute monarchy. Tensions heightened as Brotherhood 
supporters criticized the American military presence in the kingdom requested by King 
Fahd after Iraq invaded Kuwait. They backed protests and demands for political reforms. 
 
In 2014, Saudi Arabia declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization and has provided 
economic assistance to Egypt’s Al-Sisi as he cracked down on the group. Saudi [Arabia] 
and three neighbors cut off most economic and diplomatic ties with Qatar [in June 2017], 
in a move designed to punish the country for its ties with Iran and support for Islamist 
groups, including the Brotherhood.” 
 
7.6.3.2 The UAE 
 
“Islah was formed in the 1970s by exiled Egyptians and Emiratis who had studied in 
Egypt. It gained importance, but relations with the government cooled over the next 
twenty years amid fears of Brotherhood influence in schools and courts. A crackdown 
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was launched in 1994. This stance hardened after the Arab Spring. The group was 
banned in 2014 for alleged ties to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and it was designated a 
terrorist group. Islah denies any formal link to the Brotherhood but says it shares some of 
its ideology.” 
 
7.6.3.3 Bahrain 
 
“The MB is represented in parliament through Minbar. Minbar’s roots date back to the 
1940s but it didn’t emerge as a political group until the 1980s. It has stood by the ruling 
family during political crises and helped unite Sunni Islamists in the Shiite majority 
country.” 
 
7.6.3.4 Kuwait 
 
“Building on an earlier presence, Brotherhood supporters set up the International 
Constitutional Movement (representing the MB in parliament) after Iraq’s 1990 invasion 
of Kuwait was defeated. It severed ties with the Egyptian organization for not having 
sufficiently backed their country’s liberation. Over time, the ICM became focused on 
gradual political reform, pushing for powers to be transferred from the royal family to 
elected lawmakers. After boycotting parliament for four years in protest against a change 
in the electoral law, ICM fielded candidates in elections in 2016, winning four seats in 
the 50-member assembly. Kuwait joined other Gulf countries in providing financial and 
diplomatic support to Egypt following the ouster of Morsi.” 
 
7.6.4 The Future of the SMB in the Gulf Region 
 
The crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf region is unlikely to signify the 
end of the MB generally, nor that of the SMB. This is largely due to the powerful 
support the organization has found in Qatar. The financial and political support offered 
by Qatar has rendered a coordinated approach between the GCC countries impossible. 
The region lacks coherence in their MB-related policies due to Qatar’s alliance with the 
Brotherhood and their unwillingness to follow the example of Saudi Arabia and the 
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UAE. Commentators have noted that this guarantees that containment of the MB in the 
Gulf region will be difficult (Trager, 2017). 
 
Prior to the fall of Egypt, Qatari wealth had contributed massively to the rise of Sunni 
Islamic powers in the region. The Ennahda Party in Tunisia, the MB in Egypt, Al-Sallabi 
and Belhadj in Libya, and Hamas in the Gaza strip had all benefitted from the financial 
support of Qatar (Roberts, 2017). Thus, that Qatar would provide political support for 
‘moderate Islamic movements’ in Syria was entirely foreseeable. The Qatar-based media 
network, Al Jazeera, covered the Syrian crisis extensively from its very beginning. The 
channel actually received criticism for a lack of neutrality, being described as a 
“mouthpiece for the Muslim Brotherhood” (Rogers, 2017). In addition, notable leaders 
linked with the MB, including Khaled Mashal, Ali Al-Sallabi, and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi 
were all housed by Qatar over a number of years. The political backlash of these actions 
has led some analysts to suggest that the country has “punched above its weight” 
(Hiltermann, 2017).  
 
Political asylum for Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, described as the spiritual leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, has been enabled the Egyptian religious scholar to promote the cause of the 
Brotherhood, and their ideology, in Qatar and abroad (Brown, 2017). Following the Arab 
Spring in 2011, Qatar stood squarely behind the MB in North Africa and the Levant. 
Political capital was used to promote the Brotherhood’s ideology, as well as weaponry, 
finances, and military training throughout the uprisings (Ulrichsen, 2014). The 
disproportionately large influence that Qatar has had on regional and international 
politics has been recognized in numerous articles discussing the ‘small state, big 
influence’. 
 
Through cooperation with Turkey in the Syrian crisis, Qatar has provided support to 
insurgents on the ground (Al-Haj, 2017). With strong diplomatic relations with Islamic-
orientated governments, such as Turkey and Tunisia, Qatar has maintained allies beyond 
the GCC countries. This has proved to be politically invaluable as the Syrian crisis has 
progressed. Initially, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were in agreement in their strategies 
relating to the Assad regime, as they both shared an anti-Iranian foreign policy 
(Steinberg, 2014a). However, with the fall of Morsi in Egypt and the developments of 
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the Syrian situation, Qatar now stands alone in the Gulf region, cut off from diplomatic 
relations with their neighbors. There is now much pressure on Qatar to adopt new 
policies relating to the Muslim Brotherhood, in accordance with the momentous changes 
in the political landscape. 
 
In conclusion, the preeminence of the Muslim Brotherhood was cut short in Egypt, and 
the fate of the organization consequently remains uncertain. Their historical position as a 
favorable alternative to oppressive regimes may indicate a reactionary comeback for the 
Brotherhood. However, this remains conditional upon international recognition, which 
must begin with a recovery in their diplomatic relationships with the Gulf coalition. This 
will be a reversal of the current policies in place for most countries in the region, 
including Syria. Qatar and Turkey remain the closest allies to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and suffer from political censure as a direct result of their association. The future of the 
SMB, which has been shown to be closely tied with the future of the Syrian people, 
relies greatly on their support. 
 
7.6.5 The Relationship Between the USA and Western European Democracies, and 
the SMB 
 
The relationship between the SMB and the democratic states of the West has been 
greatly impacted by the historical development of Western politics. The separation of 
church and state, or the historical rejection of religious interference with politics, has 
made it a challenge for the SMB to achieve general acceptance in the West. The values 
at the core of the organization are openly Islamic in nature; it is the quintessential 
political body founded upon a religious ideology. This is in direct conflict with the 
“enlightenment liberalism [at the core of western organizations] that considers religious 
influence as inappropriate in secular policy” (Grills, 2009: 512). Some commentators 
have gone so far as to state that faith-based organizations cannot seriously engage in 
dialog with western secular states due to incompatibility (Grills, 2009). 
 
Certain historians have suggested that the development of democracy requires a hostile 
and rigid separation between religion and state. This has been rejected as a misreading of 
European history. A close study of the religion-state relations in Europe shows that “no 
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Western European democracy now has a rigid or hostile separation of church and state in 
contemporary societies” (Sephan and Linz, 2013). Nonetheless, whilst that might 
presently be the case, there still is much progress required “in terms of developing the 
necessary religious sensitivity among [western] diplomats and sensible modes of 
involvement for religious actors” (Harpviken and Roislien, 2008: 352). 
 
The reason why the SMB could not easily be accepted in the West is also colored by the 
historical religious conflicts between Islam and Christianity. Many historical studies in 
Europe view the Islamic religion, societies, and political movements as a monolithic 
threat to the West. Their historical refusal to participate in the democratic process has 
caused the European intelligentsia to develop an “establishment” perspective, 
antagonistic towards the religion (Hashemi, 2013: 75). Hashemi notes that “Islam does 
not mandate or prefer a particular political system. In the Quran, the idea of mutual 
consultation (Shura) is praised, and in classical jurisprudential theory, governance should 
be based on a civil contract (Aqd) between the ruler and the ruled, while a pledge of 
support (Bay’a) from influential members of the community should be obtained” 
(Hashemi, 2013: 72). This is in accordance with the ideology of the SMB (see Chapter 
4). 
 
In addition, the emergence of extreme Islamist groups may have affected the perception 
of the SMB. Whilst the Brotherhood had often promoted the peacemaking potential of 
the religion, the increase in Islamic terror groups since the declaration of the ‘War on 
Terror’ by the Bush administration caused considerable challenges for the organization. 
The criteria used by Western countries in the classification of Islamic organizations as 
‘moderate’ or ‘extreme’ lacks clarity or coherence. “It seems that the claims and 
pretensions of group religiosity are always to some degree political” (Haynes, 1998: 5). 
The general perception of Western countries towards Islamic movements is that they are 
“authoritarian at best, totalitarian at worst, with a proclivity towards violence, terrorism, 
and a hidden antidemocratic agenda” (Hashemi, 2013: 76). 
 
Al-Bayanouni explained that the SMB leaders were concerned about the political 
dynamics from an early stage. As the crisis in Syria gained international interest, so too 
did the position of the SMB, who emerged as the primary political voice for the Syrian 
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society after their long absence in exile. The need to go public was clear. The SMB 
intended to raise international awareness about the situation on the ground and the 
brutality of the regime (Al-Bayanouni, London, personal communication, 2014). 
 
Executive members of the SMB took part in scheduled interviews, public fora, political 
journals and TV programs broadcasted in English and Arabic. They also attended 
political conferences and participated in international think tanks. The expressed their 
deep concerns about the potential escalation of the situation in Syria, drawing upon their 
experiences in Hama in 1982 (see Chapter 4). In the opinion of the SMB leadership, 
every single potential avenue for attaining a peaceful solution ought to be pursued. The 
held that supporting the fighting on the streets of Syria would result in disastrous 
consequences for the Syrian people. 
 
This prediction proved to be true. As the protests and demonstrations turned into an 
armed struggle, the SMB refused to support the emerging fighting groups such as Al-
Nussra and, later, ISIS (Salem, London, 2014; Waleed, London,2014; Al-Bayanouni, 
London, 2014). Conversely, these fighting groups rejected the SMB entirely, considering 
them to be disbelievers that should be fought against. An anonymous interviewee 
witnessed members of these fighting groups actively searching for SMB members 
engaged in humanitarian relief work, intending to ‘destroy’ them (anonymous 
interviewee , 2014). The intent of the SMB was evinced in their actions. They continued 
to avoid supporting any of the groups engaged in the fighting within Syria, and publicly 
advocated for a multi-ethnic, multi-faith, democratic state of Syria (Al-Bayanouni, 
2014). 
 
There are three factors of ‘religion’ that can be said to determine its effectiveness in a 
peacemaking process: its normative aspect, its relationship to identity, and its 
organizational function (Harpviken and Roislien, 2010: 351) (Peter and Ortega, 2014). 
The contention that the religion of Islam is incompatible with democracy stems from the 
critique that its normative aspect, that is, it’s essential core, contradicts democracy. This 
is based on two false premises. Firstly, that democracy is only possible in one form and, 
secondly, that Islam can only be expressed in one way (Esposito, 2013). “In a 
governance environment where faith-related issues are increasingly prominent, such 
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moves to address this duality will allow faith-based organizations and multilateral 
organizations to substantively and more effectively work together to advance human 
development” (Grills, 2009: 517). 
 
Nonetheless, the prevalent sentiment from Western thinkers is that strong religious 
organizations have a negative influence and generally undermine political and economic 
development. Their existence “prevents rational dialog and conflict resolution” 
(Harpviken and Roislien, 2010: 352, 365). However, it has been noted: 
 
 “Religious organizations derive potential legitimacy from their 
larger ritual role within society. Hence, they are well positioned 
to serve as agents of conflict transformation, with a potential for 
communication both with their own grass roots and with the 
broader public” (Harpviken and Roislien, 2010: 352, 365).  
 
This indicates that there were certain potential avenues for the SMB to attain recognition 
on account of their situational positioning, however it would have required much time 
and effort to overcome the strong anti-Islamic stance that dominated in the West. 
 
This was evinced in the investigation of the MB in the USA and member states of the 
European Union. The political distancing was increased following the military coup in 
Egypt. The support received in from the Gulf coalition and Western states seemed to 
indicate an international consensus against President Morsi and, by extension, the MB. 
However, executive members of the SMB, including Al-Bayanouni, opined that the 
situation of the Egyptian MB and the SMB remained mutually exclusive. Due to the 
separate political situations in Egypt and Syria, and the fact that the SMB were merely a 
part of the Syrian opposition and not the sole political influence, there still could be hope 
for Western support for the organization (Al-Bayanouni, London, personal 
communication, 2014). This was reflected in the political commentary of the time. 
Observers questioned whether the situation in Syria, and the involvement of the SMB in 
international politics, could “lead to changes in the Western evaluation of political 
Islam”(Peter and Ortega, 2014). 
 
The interviews have shown that in the opinion of the SMB, Western states could have 
officially recognized the Syrian interim government in exile as a transitional solution 
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towards establishing a future governance based on a pluralistic democracy. However, by 
welcoming the so-called ambassadors of the Syrian opposition, the Western states 
claimed to have discharged their duty and legitimized the coalition. However, they did 
not extend the same recognition to the interim government. 
 
Executive members of the SMB, including leaders such as Al-Droubi and Al-Bayanouni, 
went on to present the political vision of the Brotherhood and express their concerns 
regarding the situation. These discussions took place through public speeches made in 
panels, at conferences, and in public events (Lefèvre, 2012; Al-Droubi, Vienna, 2014). 
These were organized and attended in regional areas and on the international stage. They 
stressed the unity of Syria and underlined the intent of the SMB to move towards a 
pluralistic state, wherein the Syrian people could elect their representatives by ballot. 
Thus, they stressed clearly and publicly that the organization’s Islamic ideology is in 
perfect alignment with democratic values (see Chapter 5). 
 
This could be evinced in the success that the MB and affiliated groups achieved in the 
democratic elections in Syria’s neighboring countries. Political candidates and parties 
won major victories by the ballot box within the Arab world, including Egypt and 
Tunisia. However, there remained a noticeable reluctance by Western democracies 
towards political Islam, even where the Islamic movements are democratically elected. 
 
The issue for the SMB in attaining recognition from Western democracies did not lie in 
their lack of elected representation. Western powers had shown in their legitimization of 
the opposition coalition that winning an election is not the sole provider of legitimacy. 
Rather, their issue was rooted in their Islamic ideology. “The establishment perspective 
argues that democratic elections that bring illiberal Islamists to power are a setback for 
political development. They warn against the ‘tyranny of the majority’ and argue that the 
goal in the debate on Islam and democracy should be liberty for Muslim societies, along 
the lines that exist in the West, not mere elections” (Hashemi, 2013: 77). Thus, it seemed 
as though the source of legitimacy for the SMB would be found in widespread public 
approval, achieved by engagement in meaningful discussions. 
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There is a definite lack of coherence with regards to which political Islamic movement 
can receive acceptance within the West. Commentators have theorized that recognition is 
not always based on the organization’s ability to prove that they are following a 
‘moderate’ Islam. Rather, the criterion is largely based on whether or not the Islamic 
organization can be considered “strategically useful” (Ramadan, 2001: 274). The West 
are willing to turn a blind eye towards a dictatorship or traditionalist government, so long 
as this fit with their strategic goals (Ramadan, 2001). Thus, public declarations of their 
democratic aspirations and repeated examples of ‘moderateness’ will not suffice for the 
SMB if they do not adhere to the West’s criteria of strategic utility. With the prevalent 
anti-Islamic sentiments currently existing within Western politics, this seems highly 
unlikely. 
 
The contradictory approach taken by Western countries with regards to their support for 
moderate Islamic governments caused confusion with many of the youth inside Syria, 
who refused to let their nation adopt secularism. Hashemi notes:  
 
“For a generation of Muslims growing up in the postcolonial era, 
despotism, dictatorship, and human rights abuses came to be 
associated with secularism. Muslim political activists who 
experienced oppression at the hands of secular national 
governments logically concluded that secularism is an ideology 
of repression” (Hashemi, 2013: 82).  
 
Thus, the civil population of Syria was generally averse to a political intervention by the 
West. It was perceived that external influences on the political development of the 
Middle East had impaired its progress. According to this historical perspective, the West 
justified the underdevelopment of Middle Eastern politics by playing down the colonial 
history and placing undue attention on the internal factors impeding democratization 
(Hashemi, 2013: 77).  
 
Given that the SMB were not able to fit within the West’s political ideology or its 
strategic aims, the Brotherhood needed to find support from elsewhere. In particular, the 
organization needed to find a base from which it could operate in order to coordinate the 
efforts of its members and provide a headquarters for the leadership. Without the strong, 
longstanding relationship between Turkey and the SMB, it would have been difficult for 
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the organization to affect any meaningful change (see 7.5.2). Turkey risked international 
censure for their continued support of the SMB, and stood beside the organization 
despite the growing sentiment of mistrust directed towards the Brotherhood.  
 
It is worth noting that, whilst the SMB were exiled in Western countries prior to the 
uprising, they felt that were not successful in rallying support from within those 
countries. However, having acquiring citizenship of those countries, members of the 
organization were able to travel freely without visa restrictions. Thus, their presence in 
the West had enabled them to travel to different countries and present their ideology 
freely without fear of repression or detainment. 
 
 
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter demonstrated that the fate of the SMB will be determined by a balance of 
factors, including domestic, regional, and international diplomatic relations. The quick 
response of the SMB to the Syrian crisis earned them favor amongst the Syrian 
population. This was also due to their lasting reputation as a political organization in the 
years before their exile. The subsequent complexity regarding the conflicting Syrian 
opposition parties foreshadowed a larger fallout between the SMB and the international 
community at large. If not for strong alliances with Turkey and Qatar, the political 
situation of the SMB would be dire indeed. 
 
Whilst political analysts anticipated a resurgence of the SMB after three decades of exile, 
the organization proved unable to navigate the turbulent politics on the international 
stage, and could not expand their operations at a sustainable rate. Deep-rooted issues 
existing in their political opponents meant that the Brotherhood were unable to secure 
their influence over the opposition or gain any traction in UN-based organizations. They 
were forced by political necessity to downscale their activities and step down from any 
official positions of power. The organization has left out of the peacemaking processes 
and initiatives led by the United Nations. 
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It has been shown that the reasons for this lack of political progress was separate from 
their capabilities. Measures and propositions introduced by the SMB proved to be 
effective, and the Syrian civil population was initially content for the Brotherhood to 
represent their political efforts. Rather, the political area was wrought with both domestic 
and international opponents. The FOS group stretched the resources of the combined 
political opposition group ideologically led by the SMB, the SNC, by recognizing and 
supporting the larger coalition, Al-Itilaf. Legitimacy for Al-Itilaf was sanctioned the FOS 
group and internationally recognized NGOs, and contributed to fall in political influence 
of the Brotherhood. The gradual decline of political power resulted in the leadership of 
the SMB officially stepping aside, with residues of political influence held by certain 
members of the organization and affiliate groups. 
 
The magnitude of the shifts in power in the international arena caught the SMB by 
surprise. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood moved from prominence to international 
exile almost overnight. At the same time, members of the exiled Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood suddenly found their host countries in the Gulf region calling for their 
arrests as members of a terrorist organization. Similarly, extreme fighting groups 
operating within Syria disavowed the SMB and actively worked towards the demise of 
their humanitarian aid workers. Their status as an Islamic socio-political movement 
compelled them to take action in the Syrian crisis, but numerous severe challenges 
greatly limited their ability to do so. 
 
By utilizing their organizational apparatus, the SMB were able to arrange conferences in 
Turkey and Brussels aiming to redress the Syrian situation. The Brotherhood worked 
towards implementing a democratic, pluralistic government system, relying on their pre-
existing global network to succeed in its political activities. Whilst all members of the 
opposition coalition were united in their desire to see the end of the Assad regime, there 
were strong disagreements as to the best way to bring that end about. In addition, 
differences of opinion regarding modes of governance for ‘the day after’ caused the 
opposition coalition to splinter deeply. The SMB leaders eventually acquiesced to the 
demands and political pressures, though not without suffering some disrepute by their 
once ardent supporters. 
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The combined Syrian opposition looked to powerful international actors to contribute to 
the resolution of the Syrian crisis. To that end, neither the UN, the Arab Gulf states, nor 
the Western democratic states were able to provide a substantive solution to the complex 
situation. Vetoes in the UN Security Council prevented any concrete action or 
commitment by the United Nations. Regional neighbors in the Arab Gulf states were 
involved in crises of their own, and only a few states remained focused on their 
commitment to resolve the Syrian situation. Western democratic states broadened the 
political spectrum of the legitimized opposition, increasing the representation of Syrian 
society, as well as increasing the internal discord and political conflicts within the 
coalition. The lack of unity amongst the Syrian opposition caused their efforts to be met 
with disappointment, which is reflected at the public assemblies taking place 
internationally. 
 
This disheartening political activity has been coupled with an anti-Muslim Brotherhood 
sentiment in international publications, and political policies in Western democracies and 
Arab Gulf states alike. The international recognition of the SMB as legitimate political 
actors seems unlikely. Oftentimes the SMB has simply been ignored by potential 
political partners, as well as by media networks. This political isolation naturally resulted 
in a decrease in the influence that the SMB enjoyed, and can be said to stem from the 
dramatic events taking place in the Egyptian military coup in 2013. Despite the hopes of 
the SMB leadership, their fate has been closely tied with that of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood. The international sentiment shared around the globe is that Islamic 
activists, such as the SMB, are not a suitable political alternative to despotic regimes. 
 
Stigmatization of faith-based ideological movements has been prevalent in the historical 
development of Europe, as well as in the recent history of the Arab Gulf region. This has 
been exacerbated by the emergence of Islamic terror organizations intent on establishing 
a ‘global Caliphate’. These actors validated the preexisting fears of the Islamic religion 
and social movements. Organizations with an open connection to the Islamic tradition 
thus came under scrutiny. It was assumed that such organizations, including the SMB, 
maintained a hidden antidemocratic agenda. This is so despite clear and frequent calls 
made by the SMB regarding the compatibility between Islam and democracy. 
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Due to the clarity of their message and the reality of their intent, it took some time for 
the SMB to understand how precarious their position had become. Members of the 
organization had peacefully integrated into their host countries whilst in exile, and their 
proposal for the future of the Syrian state was clearly a pluralistic democracy. Thus, the 
Brotherhood had doubts regarding the true intent of the governments of the USA, 
Germany, and the UK, all of whom had called for investigations into terrorist activities 
of the MB. The outcome of these investigations was admittedly in favor of the MB. 
However, that they had taken place at all was indicative of the growing tendency to keep 
Islamic-based organizations and a distance, and set a border between faith-based 
organizations and secular political entities. 
 
Despite repeated demonstrations of their cooperative behavior, the SMB were not 
granted the opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of its political program. On the 
contrary, the SMB were granted assurances from political parties that were subsequently 
reneged. In 2011, the SMB met with the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov. 
Lavrov assured the SMB that Russia would not participate whatsoever in the military 
action within Syria. In 2015, Russian military jets were witnessed attacking rebel-held 
cities, destroying residential accommodation and civilian targets indiscriminately. There 
is a stark contrast in the strict adherence to the promises given by the SMB, who were 
met with international censure, and the blatant dishonesty of Russian politics, who 
remain legitimized actors with veto powers in the UN. 
 
The SMB was better suited to avoid developing any diplomatic relationship with Iran. At 
the bare minimum, the antidemocratic state of Iran was not able to misrepresent 
themselves to the Syrian oppositional bodies. The country, whose leadership consists of 
fanatic Shia Islamists, has been an open supporter of the Syrian regime since the start of 
the crisis. Tehran provided support to the government forces in the form of military 
consultancy and financial contributions. Many fighting groups, including Shia militias 
from Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq, were trained and funded by Iran. The country had 
a vested interest in the destabilization of Syria, and aimed to achieve a number of short-
term, medium-term, and long-term objectives by their involvement in the conflict. This 
was anticipated by the SMB due to their knowledge of Iran’s previous involvement in 
the destabilization of Iraq, and duly avoided. 
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In summary, this chapter has evaluated the SMB’s organizational, discursive, and 
behavioral responses to the Syrian crisis at a regional and international level. It has 
demonstrated that the Brotherhood directed all its efforts towards finding a resolution to 
the Syrian conflict, whilst seeking international recognition and legitimacy for the 
coalition of political opposition bodies. The organization faced many internal challenges 
in its attempt to unify the opposition, and the external pressures brought on by the 
overwhelming majority of international actors proved too much for the SMB to 
overcome. 
 
The following chapter will elucidate the broad themes presented by this research. A 
precise analytical evaluation of empirical data and political theory will contribute 
towards an overarching conclusion. It will provide clarifying insights into the present 
situation of the SMB, and evaluate the future of the organization as a socio-political 
Islamic movement. These conclusions will be drawn by looking at the evolution of the 
SMB throughout the Syrian crisis. The years of exile, the re-emergence and political 
zenith, and the subsequent decline of influence will all be considered in greater detail in 
order to better understand the political actions and reactions of the organization. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This research assessed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s post-2011 evolution within the 
wider context of the on-going Syrian revolution. The rise of MB-affiliated parties and 
individuals following the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 piqued the attention of politicians and 
academics alike. Research surrounding the topic has begun to grow exponentially, 
particularly surrounding the question of why Arab societies have been attracted to and 
are voting for decade-old Islamic social movements. The question grows ever more 
pertinent considering the movements’ history of repression. Other than exceptions such 
as Jordan or Kuwait, the ruling governments have banned and subjugated these 
movements, leading them to operate in the shadows of civil society. Countries such as 
Egypt and Tunisia continue to fear the existence of said Islamic social movements. 
 
The Syrian people, in particular the youth, demanded dignity, freedom of speech, and 
justice. Though the protests were expected following the uprisings in neighbouring 
countries, the response of the Assad regime turned the potentially peaceful uprising into 
an era of unprecedented grief for the entire Syrian population. The SMB’s absence in the 
public sphere for three decades followed by its rapid rise to the spotlight makes it a truly 
remarkable case. While some researchers have briefly outlined the SMB’s history and 
others have noted their role in the current conflict, no research has thus far mapped the 
organizational historical path alongside the individual engagement post 2011. 
 
By clarifying the SMB’s approach to the political arena as the dominant agenda-setting 
oppositional party, this research aimed to fill the gaps in our understanding of the 
evolution of an Islamic social movement that had been exiled and faced with immense 
challenges throughout the Syrian revolution. Whether the SMB would ever play an 
important role in Syria’s future was also discussed. By linking the past with the present, 
and assessing three of the movement’s fundamental traits (i.e. ideological foundation, 
individual engagement, and organizational structure), the socio-political aims and 
activities of the organization have been analysed. 
 
Members of the SMB experienced fear following the 1980 death penalty legislation, but 
its leaders managed to keep the organization alive and well-equipped to tackle socio-
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political issues, even if this was carried out from exile. This research aimed to assess the 
hypothesis that post-2011, it has been the functioning network involving the older 
generation’s wisdom, the younger generations’ vitality, and the organization’s 
ideological drive that has allowed the SMB to thrive in this precarious situation. These 
traits may help the SMB go forth and realize their dream for a democratic Syria. How the 
organization as a whole, and its members individually, recognize and deal with 
opportunities during this dramatic political environment has also been analyzed. 
Additionally, this research aimed to assess how the SMB’s leaders have performed when 
dealing with their new challenges, and how their actions – or lack of actions – have 
affected the fate of the ideologically Islamic organization post-2011. 
 
For its data, this research heavily relied on more than 40 interviews conducted in a 
number of Turkish cities, such as Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Killis. The interviewees 
included many SMB members (including SMB executives), SMB affiliates, and former 
Ba’athist activists. Therefore, the research benefited from the sources’ proximity to the 
SMB organization. Further interviews were conducted in London, Oxford, Manchester, 
Leeds, and Vienna. All interviews were carried out in a respectful, honest, and trust-
based manner. This research benefits from inside knowledge regarding the SMB’s 
internal structure and its socio-political outlook. This was gained from participation and 
observation at conferences, debates, and meetings regarding the SMB. 
 
Politicians and analysts were taken by surprise with the Arab Spring. The new dynamics 
in Arabia have highlighted the need to take a deeper look at political Islamic movements 
in general, and the MB in particular. Analysts have explored why the MB and its affiliate 
groups have become so popular, gaining the trust of a large number of people across the 
Arab world, something evidenced by the success of the MB in Egypt and Tunisia. The 
MB then, again, gained the attention of the world as its fate in different countries panned 
out in distinct ways. In mere moments, Egypt’s MB were taken from a position of power 
and their members were imprisoned by the bloody military coup of 2013. This was just 
one year after the Egyptian people went to ballot boxes to choose their first 
democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi. 
 
A corrupt military court outlawed the MB and sentenced hundreds of its members with 
 214 
the death penalty. The injustices did not stop there; the coup brutally ended the calls for 
democracy in Egypt, something the youth fought for in January 2011. In contrast, the 
Tunisian MB went on to gradually progress politically. The Tunisian MB-affiliated 
political party evolved to become an internationally recognized, influential political actor 
after the return of the organization’s exiled leader. The varying outcomes of these 
organizations suggest that they are not homogenous affiliates of the same organization, 
with its headquarters in Egypt (as was assumed by many researchers in the past); rather, 
they are individual organizations with unique dynamics and contexts. 
 
This research has focussed primarily on the SMB’s evolution as a Syrian Islamic socio-
political movement. It has explored the SMB’s significance by highlighting on its post-
2011 internal relationships and actions that have led to the internal challenges it currently 
faces. In-depth analyses show that these challenges have opened other avenues for 
activities, which can be claimed to be SMB-related, without officially being SMB 
activities. These activities were viewed by Syrians as being SMB-related activities, 
leading to a positive effect on the image of the SMB in rebel-held regions and within 
refugee camps in neighbouring countries. 
 
It is important to assess the state of Syria since the peaceful calls for reform in March 
2011 turned into a multifactorial, international humanitarian crisis. Foreign troops and 
high-tech military equipment has been despatched by the Syrian regime’s allies to 
strengthen Assad’s military force against his own people. Currently, according to 
Amnesty International, over half a million Syrians have been killed and hundreds of 
thousands of the regime’s opponents have been imprisoned and/or tortured (Amnesty 
International, 2016). Amnesty International state that in the regime’s Saydnaya prison 
alone, over 13,000 opponents of the government have been hanged (Amnesty 
International, 2017), and millions have been displaced from their homes (Dhala, 2016). 
 
To analyze the post-2011 evolution of the SMB, it has been necessary to revisit the 
history of the MB and the founding of its ideology by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928. This 
helped explain why, since 1945, the SMB has faced immense challenges in Syria. The 
socio-political MB’s broad ideology attracted many intellectuals and highly-influential 
individuals. The SMB housed a number of strong, effective critics of the Syrian regime. 
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The SMB was thought to be the Ba’athist regime’s most active opponents, leading the 
regime to repress and exile the organization’s members. Growing tension between the 
regime and the SMB since the 1970s and early 1980s led to the death penalty being 
legislated against all SMB members. 
 
The regime’s brutality reached its pre-2011 climax on the 2nd February 1982 during the 
Hama Massacre in which the regime killed over 30,000 people, most of whom were 
young men. Tens of thousands of SMB prisoners have been imprisoned for decades 
without trial at Tudmor (Palmyra), which, according to testimonies from the 
interviewees, is amongst the most miserable and cruel of prison settings. This east Syrian 
city gained notoriety for the shocking torture of its Syrian SMB (and SMB-affiliate) 
prisoners. 
 
In the early 1980s, after being outlawed by Hafez Al-Assad, a number of SMB members 
decided to keep the organization alive whilst in exile. In the neighbouring Arab states, 
the brothers aimed to integrate wholly within their host countries. SMB families attended 
local schools and universities, and they ran local businesses. Some SMB members 
travelled to Western states where they obtained residence permits and, eventually, 
citizenship to secure their living there. After explaining these matters, this research 
showed how the SMB maintained its status as an opposing force against the regime 
despite its members living in exile across the globe. 
 
A number of SMB executives acknowledged the political reality surrounding them and 
the public desire so loudly stated during the Arab Spring. They used this opportunity to 
modify the uprising and carry it to Syria. They called for the opponents of the Syrian 
regime to assemble and take essential steps towards uniting as a political force, 
demanding the resignation of Bashar Al-Assad and the realization of a new democratic 
and pluralistically governed Syria. A multi-ethnic group of Syrian representatives, as 
well as intellectuals from inside and outside of Syria, attended regime opponents’ 
assemblies in Istanbul and Antakya in 2011, and a follow-up conference in Brussels. At 
these events, the SMB was able to demonstrate its organizational skills. On 23 
November 2011, the Syrian National Council (SNC) was launched. 
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Through public statements and interviews, the SMB presented the agenda of the 
organization within this new political setting. The SMB incorporated its ‘Vision of a 
Future Syria’ agenda within this plan, showing its commitment to long-standing 
ideological and ethnical diversity within Syria. The diversity of the groups led to 
differences in opinions regarding tackling the political challenges that lay ahead. 
Eventually, however, this multi-ethnic group stood defiantly against Bashar Al-Assad, 
who responded with aggression and violence against his people’s peaceful resistance. 
 
Having entered the political arena, the SMB faced a number of international challenges, 
which its leaders needed to deal with constantly. Whilst sustaining itself as an opposition 
force amongst other opposition forces, the SMB’s leadership acknowledged that it had 
previously closed the doors to newcomers by operating somewhat undercover and 
having a strict membership program. This analysis has shown that many junior SMB 
members have shown themselves to be capable of organizing and leading humanitarian 
efforts to help the Syrian people. These efforts have bettered the SMB’s public image as 
a socio-political organization. However, despite these efforts, the organization has not 
reached a high level of political recognition internationally. Much of the organization’s 
work to demonstrate its vision and passion to the international community has backfired. 
This was the case for the ‘Friends of Syria’ group, which was affected by the USA’s 
foreign policy. 
 
Governmental allies of the group affirmed its status as an opposition group against the 
Assad regime. Some went a step further and recognised its members as ‘diplomatic 
representatives’ of the opposition’s interim government. However, these encouraging 
initial reactions towards a clean break from the status quo changed the dynamics in 
Syria, limiting the SMB’s international influence drastically. Two major reasons for this 
have been mentioned. The first is that the SMB found itself amongst growing political 
intolerance from other opposition groups; the groups, including local tribes, made 
increasingly unreasonable demands of the SMB, calling for rapid solutions to each and 
every issue that arose. The second is that, internationally, the Syrian National Council, 
formed by the SMB and other members of the FOS (SMB being the most dominant), was 
controlled irresponsibly by the FOS. The FOS made financial contributions a 
prerequisite to joining. Eventually, over 400 representatives from the different groups 
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joined together to form the Syrian National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and 
Opposition Forces. This was quickly understood to be a poor move with destructive 
consequences, as the inexperienced assembly was not able to speak coherently and put 
forth its message. 
 
The SMB was losing its active members in the confused and disorientated assembly. The 
organization was effectively being side-lined as a minor contributor. The leaders 
acknowledged their changing political circumstances and the risks of this; it seems that 
they had learnt from the MB’s actions in Egypt. Al-Bayanouni, the organization’s most 
high-profile member, eventually moved away from the assembly. Through this action, he 
made clear his concerns about the declining political strength of the organization. 
 
Though the SMB’s leadership have shown their intention to enhance the status of the 
organization to that of an international political force, this analysis has shown that 
throughout the revolution, these leaders have not been able to portray the organization as 
a reliable political force within the international arena. After the initial wave of 
enthusiasm for democratic change in Syria subsided, and after Assad’s Shia fighters 
heightened the battle in Syria, Western states began considering opposition groups as 
potential allies in a future democratic Syria. These actions unveiled the historical ‘clash 
of cultures’ (or religions), as developed by Orientalists and ingrained in Western thought. 
They showed how these stances still exist, for example, with their perceptions of Islam 
and democracy, despite their acknowledgement of ‘moderate’ Islamic groups. Over the 
past decades, the SMB has repeatedly made clear (through published statements) its 
intentions of fighting for a future democratic Syria governed by Syrians. They also made 
clear their intentions to return home when the time was right. They have remained weary 
of being ‘too’ public, however, because of the Syrian regime’s historic assassinations of 
its members. 
 
To secure social engagement and family lives whilst in exile, SMB members have 
maintained their networks. They showed that they were able to build upon the 
organization’s social and educational programs. Generally, much of the international 
community were annoyed by the success and potential of this Islamic organization, 
which was working to strengthen the opposition to the Syrian regime. In 2011, the 
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opportunity arose for the SMB to be, once again, acknowledged as an Islamic social 
force in Syria. The rapid rise to prominence of the MB provided the leaders of the SMB 
an opportunity to re-emerge as a key socio-political actor both domestically and 
internationally. However, the SMB faced immense challenges that were not faced by 
other MB groups. They became aware that they would not be able to fulfil their political 
goals whilst under the authority of the repressive, one-party Ba’athist government. 
 
SMB executives also appreciated the fact that the time had come to establish functioning 
headquarters. Therefore, the leader of the SMB took the pragmatic decision to use 
neighbouring Turkey for this purpose. Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World 
War I, Turkey has considered itself to be secularly ruled. However, since the ruling AKP 
party’s ideologies, and those of the public, conform to the ideologies of other moderate 
Islamic groups, Turkey has proved to be a relatively safe place of refuge for the 
organization. Istanbul was chosen as the location for the SMB’s headquarters because of 
its historical significance to the Turkish people and its government. The leaders felt that 
the SMB would be able to coordinate its activities from Istanbul, and they thought that 
the establishing of headquarters there would increase its international recognition as an 
Islamic social movement. 
 
SMB members also created their own political groups. By launching a political party, 
something which has been an aspiration of many members, the leaders demonstrated 
their desire to stand up for justice for all Syrians. To some critics, the SMB’s move to 
join Syrian intellectuals with different ideologies and religious beliefs in the Wa’ad 
(Promise) party has come as a surprise. Nevertheless, in Istanbul on 8 March 2014, the 
Wa’ad party was introduced as Syria’s first independent political party. The SMB went 
further and reiterated that the party’s constitution was built upon both democratic and 
Islamic values, welcoming all interested Syrian activists to join. 
 
However, due to its significantly Islamic blueprint, and the Islamic maxims under which 
the party operates, political observers tended to consider the party as being an arm of the 
SMB. After scrutinizing the party’s constitution and analysing in-depth interviews with 
all members of the party’s founding group, this study has found that the Wa’ad party’s 
entry requirements and vision differ significantly from those of the much stricter and 
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more ideologically-based SMB. The analysis has shown that the Wa’ad party is, in fact, 
much more open to the general population than the SMB, which aims to recruit, solely, 
moderate Sunni Muslims. This is evidenced by the fact that the Wa’ad party’s Christian 
deputy eventually became its leader. 
 
This analysis also showed that the SMB’s efforts put into creating the Wa’ad party 
during such a precarious and challenging time (but at a safe distance away from the 
Syrian ground) added to the SMB’s claim of legitimately pushing for a democratic Syria. 
Legitimization by the Syrian people is the necessary aim of the SMB if it is to position 
itself as a long-standing Islamic organization within Syria. However, the sustainability of 
the SMB’s position was affected by two major occurrences. First, General Al-Sisi carried 
out a military coup in June 2013 against the first freely elected president of Egypt, 
Mohammed Morsi. President Morsi’s connection with the MB unnerved many Arab 
countries; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates followed Al-Sisi in blacklisting 
the MB as a terrorist organization. The SMB’s leaders did not acknowledge their links to 
the MB in Egypt; the SMB was not officially blacklisted at any stage by these Arab 
countries. According to the SMB, their members have proven over a number of decades 
that they adhere to a moderate Islamic ideology. However, despite their efforts, the 
blacklisting of the MB meant that the SMB were limited in their national and 
international action radii. 
 
The second factor affecting the sustainability of the SMB’s position was that, seemingly, 
many Western powers were generally against Islamic movements gaining political 
power, perhaps due to the media coverage of Daesh’s cruelties. The SMB tried to 
emphasise that they too had been attacked by Daesh, who saw their movement as being 
too moderate. Many right-wing politicians aimed to evoke provocative reminders of the 
historic battles between the Christians and Muslims, framing the current situation as an 
extension of them. Political analysts, former Middle East diplomats, and state agencies 
analysing the MB on behalf of governments, such as the UK, aimed to link the MB with 
terrorism. In the case of Britain, this was not successful (Foreign Affairs Committee - 
House of Commons, 2017). 
 
Regarding the occurrences on the ground in Syria, the SMB did not support armed 
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confrontation with the regime’s highly-equipped military forces. They chose to remain 
peaceful and use other means at their disposal. The SMB refused to recruit fighters or 
finance brigades. The SMB leaders tried to ‘play it safe’ with the Hama Massacre of 
1982 still in mind. In their opinion, any physical clashes with the regime’s forces would 
be disastrous for the highly motivated, but untrained and loosely assembled, rebels. The 
SMB intended to reach a nonviolent solution. Due to this and the decades-long 
propaganda of the regime, they began to lose the trust of many political activists and 
rebel fighters. Additionally, the SMB and its affiliates were being targeted by extreme 
Salafi groups like Daesh on one side, and Shias such as the Iraqi and Iranian militia 
groups on the other. 
 
Internally, the second and third generation SMB members, who have been brought up in 
exile, have been demanding reforms. Here, the organization’s lack of a charismatic, 
masterminding, genius leader who could unite and reform the organization, opening the 
doors of decision-making to all members, became obvious. Post-2011, the leaders of the 
SMB were not prepared for reform. The old guard did not provide room for major 
organizational reforms of its hierarchical system. Retrospectively, it is clear that such 
reforms should have taken place during the height of the SMB’s power, because at that 
time, it was recognized as being a powerful, intellectually-driven, and politically-
competent opposition force. Simply put, two primary factors prevented the SMB from 
uniting. The first was – like it was for the MB in Egypt – the generational gap between 
its members. The second was the decades-long differences between the Damascene, 
Hama, and Aleppo factions that hindered a smooth reform of the organization’s decision-
making process. Being in exile made it difficult to alleviate pressure rapidly and to make 
the daring ‘correct’ decisions in the heat of the conflict. Instead, the leadership aimed to 
gather its members around the metaphorical flag of the SMB. They thought that, to 
overcome the upcoming challenges, they ought to stick to the same strategies that have 
proven successful for them in the past. They chose to postpone the necessary structural 
changes to a more peaceful time. 
 
This analysis showed that although the leaders of the SMB did not reform the 
organization during the crisis, they did support the numerous ideas of SMB activists. The 
SMB maintained its ideology as a grassroots Islamic socio-political movement by 
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supporting Syrians in need. The SMB’s leader emphasises that the organization has been 
more than happy to allow its members to provide humanitarian relief and/or join other 
political groups that are doing so. Many SMB members have offered great amounts of 
physical and financial support to humanitarian and socio-political causes. This analysis 
showed that although this was done on a small scale, it was appreciated by a large 
number of Syrians. Previous relationships and allegiances allowed the Syrian population 
to see that, although these aid workers were not officially operating as part of the SMB, 
they were connected to it and supported by it. 
 
Since the start of the uprising, the SMB leaders have been acutely aware that the 
organization’s future rested upon whether the Syrian people viewed it as a trustworthy 
socio-political actor. As a socio-political grassroots movement, the SMB was active 
inside Syria. The ad-hoc relief and education they provided served as proof of their 
sincere care for the Syrian population. SMB members formed many NGOs to provide 
this relief within opposition-held regions in northern Syria and small parts of southern 
Syria. Well-known and respected SMB members/affiliates were chosen to hold high 
positions of authority in local councils in rebel-held areas of Syria. SMB members 
travelled continuously from Turkey to Syria throughout the crisis. Over time, and with 
sustained effort, the SMB empowered the Syrian communities with their moderate 
Islamic ideology. The risks endured by SMB members throughout their relief work were 
personal risks they took. Risking their lives to help their brethren, the SMB gained huge 
public support. 
 
This research fits in with other studies on Islamic social movements. Extensive analyses 
published over the last decade have shown changes in behaviour of various MB-
affiliated political parties. These studies generally explore this topic by analysing Islamic 
movements in relatively stable conditions and with relatively intact administrative 
institutions around them. This study on the SMB does not fit into that criterion. 
Therefore, case-based analyses have been carried out to help elucidate the details of the 
SMB’s networks and its members’ actions in such a precarious situation. 
 
A comparison with the well-known American Civil Rights Movement (CRM) was made 
to relate the similarities between the two. Members of both were passionately demanding 
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dignity and justice. Many critics may see the two movements as being very dissimilar. 
However, the SMB’s battle against mistrust, hate, and, often, murder has made their fight 
for freedom resemble that of the CRM. Comparing the two broadens the theoretical lens 
through which the SMB is analysed. The comparison helps show how the SMB could 
effect change by recognizing opportunities and handling upcoming challenges in a 
hateful environment. Leaders of both the CRM and SMB have been lauded by both their 
countrymen and many of the intellectuals within their societies for their ideology-based 
movements. Both movements struggled for dignity and justice against their governments, 
resulting in them having to make huge sacrifices, including the loss of lives. 
 
After being exiled and stripped of their Syrian residency, the SMB emphasized its 
passion for free speech and equality. The short analysis of the CRM showed that many 
CRM members had similar grievances to those of SMB members. For the CRM, it 
became clear decades later that if it was not for the endurance of these sufferings, which 
reached their climax with the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., equality for 
African-Americans in the USA would not have been won. Barack Obama would not 
have won two consecutive elections. All of the successes of the CRM would not have 
panned out the way they did had charismatic and brave voices not resisted oppression 
and dreamed for justice. 
 
This research has aimed to analyse the many facets of the SMB’s evolution throughout 
the Syrian crisis. Discovering whether this evolution brings joy, like it did to the 
Tunisian MB, or sorrow, like it did to the Egyptian MB, was not the focus of this 
research. This research has managed to portray effectively the ideology-based drive and 
moderate Islamic beliefs of the SMB. It has shown that, despite internal disagreements 
regarding the organization’s hierarchy and structure, all SMB members need to unite and 
focus on advancing towards their socio-political goals. Whether their ideology can hold 
the group together is still unclear. The upcoming epoch in Syrian history could bear the 
evolution of the SMB. It should be borne in mind that a movement’s evolution is not 
instantaneous; rather, it develops gradually over a prolonged period of time. The success 
and failure of any grassroots movement relies heavily on geopolitical changes and 
domestic opportunities. 
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The SMB should be credited with resisting against extreme repression and violence for 
over 80 years. Taking this into consideration, future research may explore what it takes 
to make an Islamic social movement more politically integrated than others, despite large 
amounts of repression and the lack of state backing. Currently, the on-going Syrian crisis 
makes searching for an answer difficult. 
 
Lastly, our concern for the Syrian population should be made clear. The significance of 
Syria geopolitically has led to it suffering from brutal bombardment by the Syrian 
regime, foreign fighters, and Daesh who all have multiple interests in the region. The 
Syrians have peacefully resisted, and now they have also shown that they are brave 
enough to fight for dignity, freedom of speech, and justice with their bodies on the line. 
SMB members are Syrians and so the future of their organization is necessarily linked 
with that of the Syrian people as a whole. At present, Syria is facing the worst disaster 
the world has seen for a long time. 
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Appendix1 Sample of Interview Questions 
 
1. What is your opinion/ view on the newly established political party established by the 
SMB and its promises? What tools does the SMB, in your view have available to deliver 
these promises to the Syrian Civil Society? 
2. Do you see areas of agreement and disagreement with the armed groups fighting 
against Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, still staying in 
exile?  
3. How do think would the SMB handle concerns seen by the Western Democratic 
countries regarding domestic issues in Syria that might be controversial such as human 
rights, democracy, women’s empowerment and transitional justice? 
4. And how would the SMB handle concerns seen by the Western democratic countries 
regarding regional and foreign relations such as the relationship with Israel?  
5. Do you believe that the SMB will have a chance to win the majority of votes (like 
what happened in Egypt) if democratic presidential/ parliament elections took place? 
How do you think the SMB could benefit from the Egyptian example, to avoid mistakes 
done by them?  
6. In case they would win through democratic elections, do you believe that there will be 
an opportunity that the SMB will work closely with other parties in Syria, such as 
Liberal/Secular parties and those formed by Christians, Kurds, Alawits?  
7. What would be the biggest challenge that any democratically elected SMB party, 
which could participate in future governance process, would face?  
8. What role, and opportunities do you think; younger SMB members and female 
activists have in shaping the decisions within the organization?  
9. The SMB leadership has been accused, by some Western and Arabic critics of 
adapting their strategies and rhetoric to changes in the political environment in which 
they operate. Supposed this statement is true, how is this managed, in your opinion, by 
the SMB? And how do they react to the past charges of political opportunism? 
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Appendix 2  
1 a Oath/ pledge of SMB membership 
ﻊﯿطأ و ﻊﻤﺳأ نا ﻰﻠﻋ و ،ﻦﯿﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﺔﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﻲﻓ ﺎﺼﻠﺨﻣ ﺎﯾﺪﻨﺟ نﻮﻛأ نا ﻰﻠﻋ ﮫﻗﺎﺜﯿﻣ و ﷲ ﺪﮭﻌﺑ ﻚﻌﯾﺎﺑأ  ﻲﻓ
أ ﻰﻠﻋو ﮫﻠھأ ﺮﻣﻷا عزﺎﻧأ ﻻأ ﻰﻠﻋ و ،ﻲﻠﻋ هﺮﺛأ ﻰﻠﻋو ،ﷲ ﺔﯿﺼﻌﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻻا هﺮﻜﻤﻟا و ﻂﺸﻨﻤﻟا و ﺮﺴﯿﻟا و ﺮﺴﻌﻟا ن لﺬﺑأ
ﻞﯿﻛو لﻮﻗأ ﺎﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﷲ و ﻼﯿﺒﺳ ﻚﻟذ ﻰﻟا ﺖﻌﻄﺘﺳا ﺎﻣ ﷲ ﻞﯿﺒﺳ ﻲﻓ ﻲﻣد و ﻲﻟﺎﻣو يﺪﮭﺟ 
"ﺎﻤﯿﻈﻋ اﺮﺟأ ﮫﯿﺗﺆﯿﺴﻓ ﷲ ﮫﯿﻠﻋ ﺪھﺎﻋ ﺎﻤﺑ ﻰﻓوأ ﻦﻣ و ﮫﺴﻔﻧ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺚﻜﻨﯾ ﺎﻤﻧﺈﻓ ﺚﻜﻧ ﻦﻤﻓ " 
ﯾﺮﺤﺗ و ﻢﯿﻈﻌﻟا ﻚﻨﯾد ةﺮﺼﻨﺑ ﺎﻨﻨﯿﻋأ ﺮﻗأ و ﺎﻨﺘﻛﻮﺷ ﻮﻗو ﺎﻨﺗدﺎﻗ دﺪﺳو ﺎﻨﺗﻮﺧأ كرﺎﺑ و ﺎﻨﺗﻮﻋد ﺮﺼﻧا ﻢﮭﻠﻟا ﺮﺮﯿﺳﻷا ﻰﺼﻗﻷا  
مﺰﻌﻟا و ﺪﮭﻌﻟا اودﺪﺟ 
ﺪﻤﺤﻟا wو ﺮﺒﻛا ﷲو 
 
I pledge allegiance by the covenant of Allah to be a faithful soldier for the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and to listen and obey in times of hardship and wellness, in health and 
sickness, while never disobeying the orders of Allah, raising orders above my personal 
interests, and spending my money, efforts and blood in service of Allah according to my 
ability and Allah is the witness of all that I say.   
"So, he who breaks his word only breaks it to the detriment of himself. And he who 
fulfils that which he has promised Allah - He will give him a great reward. "Oh, Allah 
grant our movement victory, and bless our brothers and guide our leaders and grant us 
strength and comfort our eyes by seeing the victory of your great religion (Deen) and the 
liberation of the captive al Aqsa. Renew your promise and determination. Allah is Great. 
Praise is to Allah  
 
2 a Testimonies regarding daily obligatory morning chant at Syria’s schools  
 
ﺧﻹا ﺔﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟ ﺾھﺎﻨﻤﻟا ﻲﺣﺎﺒﺼﻟا فﺎﺘﮭﻟا: ﺪﺳﻷا ﻆﻓﺎﺣ رﻮﺒﻘﻤﻟا ﺪﮭﻋ ﻲﻓ  ﺔﯾرﻮﺴﻟا سراﺪﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻦﯿﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮ  
 
ﺬﺧأ ﻢﺗ ﻟا مﺎﻈﻨﻟا سراﺪﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻲﺳرﺪﻤﻟا ﻢﯿﻠﻌﺘﻟا ﻢﮭﯿﻘﻠﺗ ءﺎﻨﺛأ ﻢﮭﺘﻟﻮﻔط ﻲﻓ هوددر صﺎﺨﺷأ ﻦﻣ فﺎﺘﮭﻟا اﺬھ ﺺﻧ ﻦﻣو ، ﺪﺋﺎﺒ
:  ﻢﮭﺘﻘﻓاﻮﻣ ﺬﺧأ ﺪﻌﺑ ﻖﯿﺛﻮﺘﻟا بﺎﺑ ﻦﻣ ﻦﯿﺼﺨﺷ ءﺎﻤﺳأ  ﺮﻛﺬﻧ صﺎﺨﺷﻷا ءﻻﺆھ 
 ةرﻮﻨﺣ نﺎﻤﺜﻋ ﺪﻤﺣأ– ﻟاﺮﻤﻌ :50  زاﺰﻋا ﺔﺳرﺪﻣ ﺮﯾﺪﻣ : ةرﻮﺜﻟا ﻞﺒﻗ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا ،  مﺎﻋ  
ةرﻮﺜﻟا ﺪﻌﺑ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا. ﺔﯿﻛﺮﺘﻟا ﺲﻠﻛ ﺔﻨﯾﺪﻣ ﻲﻓ سرﺪﻣ :  
 
 عﺮﻗأ ﺪﯿﻟو ﺪﻤﺤﻣ– ﺮﻤﻌﻟا :36  نﺎﺘﯾﺮﺣ ﺔﯾﻮﻧﺎﺛ ﻲﻓ يﻮﺑﺮﺗ ﮫﺟﻮﻣ : ةرﻮﺜﻟا ﻞﺒﻗ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا ، مﺎﻋ  
ةرﻮﺜﻟا ﺪﻌﺑ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا. ﺔﯿﻛﺮﺘﻟا ﺲﻠﻛ ﺔﻨﯾﺪﻣ ﻲﻓ سرﺪﻣ :  
 
 042 
  :  ﻧﺺ اﻟﮭﺘﺎف
  .اﻟﻌﻤﯿﻠﺔ ﻋﺼﺎﺑﺔ اﻹﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﯿﻦ ى ﻟﻺﻣﺒﺮﯾﺎﻟﯿﺔ واﻟﺼﮭﻮﯾﻨﯿﺔ واﻟﺮﺟﻌﯿﺔ وﻧﺴﺤﻖ أداﺗﮭﻢ اﻟﻤﺠﺮﻣﺔﻋﮭﺪﻧﺎ أن ﻧﺘﺼﺪ -1
  .ﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻮن    ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ أﺳﻮد   و ﻣﺎﺿﻲ ﻣﺸﺒﻮهﻗﺎﺋﺪﻧﺎ ﻟﻸﺑﺪ اﻷﻣﯿﻦ ﺣﺎﻓﻆ اﻷﺳﺪ       اﻹ -2
 
 ﻣﻼﺣﻈﺔ:
ظﻠﻤﮫ ﻟﺨﻮف ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم وﺑﻄﺸﮫ وﻟﻘﺪ ﺗﺤﺪث اﻟﺸﺨﺼﯿﻦ اﻟﻤﺬﻛﻮرﯾﻦ اﻋﻼه أﻧﮭﻢ ﻛﺎﻧﻮا ﯾﺮددوا اﻟﮭﺘﺎف اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺑﺎب ا
ﻒ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﻘﻮم ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﺈن ﻟﻢ ﯾﺴﺘﺠﯿﺒﻮا أو ﯾﺨﺎﻟﻔﻮا ﻗﺪ ﯾﺴﺠﻨﻮا أو ﯾﺤﺮﻣﻮا ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮظﺎﺋﻒ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ) ﻋﻠﻤﺎ أن اّﻟﯿﺎت اﻟﺘﻮظﯿ
ﺋﻒ وﯾﻼﺣﻖ أﺳﺎس اﻹﻧﺘﻤﺎء ﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﺒﻌﺚ اﺑﺘﺪاًء ﺛﻢ اﻟﻤﺆﯾﺪ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم ﺛﻢ اﻟﺤﯿﺎدي اﻹﯾﺠﺎﺑﻲ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم وﻛﺎن ﯾﺤﺮم ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮظﺎ
ﺎﻓﺎت ﻟﻘﻨﺎﻋﺔ ﺘﮭﻢ ﺑﺈﻧﺘﻤﺎﺋﮫ ﻟﻠﺠﻤﺎﻋﺔ إﻧﻤﺎ أﯾﻀﺎ أﻗﺮﺑﺎﺋﮫ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪرﺟﺔ اﻟﺮاﺑﻌﺔ أﯾﻀﺎ (  وﻟﻢ ﯾﻜﻦ ﺗﺮداد ھﺬه اﻟﮭﺘﻟﯿﺲ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻣﻦ ﯾ
ﮫ ﺳﻨﻮات راﺳﺨﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﻮﺳﮭﻢ ، وﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﺤﺮﯾﺮ ﻣﻨﺎطﻘﮭﻢ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺜﻮرة اﻟﺴﻮرﯾﺔ و اﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﮭﻢ اﻟﻰ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺤﺮﯾﺎت ﺣﺮﻣﻮا ﻣﻨ
ﯾﻦ ﻋﺎدوا  ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﮭﺠﺮ اﻟﻰ وطﻨﮭﻢ وظﮭﻮر ﻣﻦ ﻛﺎن طﻮال ﻓﻲ ظﻞ ﺣﻜﻢ ﻋﺎﺋﻠﺔ اﻷﺳﺪ واﺧﺘﻼطﮭﻢ ﺑﺄﻓﺮاد اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﺬ
دات اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺔ ﻣﺘﻮاري ﻣﻨﮭﻢ ﻋﻦ أﻋﯿﻦ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﯿﻦ اﻟﻈﺎﻟﻤﺔ واﻟﻤﺘﻌﺴﻔﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ أﺷﮭﺮھﺎ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﻓﻲ وﺟﮫ أﻓﺮاد وﻗﯿﺎ
  ﮭﻢ .، اﻛﺘﺸﻔﻮا زﯾﻒ ھﺬه اﻟﮭﺘﺎﻓﺎت  وﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﺘﮭﺎ ﻟﻠﻮاﻗﻊ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻲ واﺳﺘﻄﺎع اﻟﻨﺎس أن ﯾﻠﻤﺴﻮا ھﺬه اﻟﺤﻘﯿﻘﺔ ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴ 
أي  اﻟﺬي ﯾﻨﺺ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺤﻜﻢ ﺑﺎﻹﻋﺪام ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﺘﻢ ﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺔ اﻹﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﯿﻦ وﺑﺄﺛﺮ رﺟﻌﻲ ))  91/01/94ﻗﻢ ﻮن رﻗﺎﻧ
 ﻗﺒﻞ ﺻﺪور اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن وﺑﻌﺪه (( .
 
 dassA la zifaH fo are eht gnirud sloohcs nairyS ta dias tnahc BM-itna gninrom ehT b2
 rieht gnirud tnahc eht gnis ot desu ohw elpoep morf nekat saw tnahc eht fo txet ehT
  :edulcni elpoep esehT .sloohcs emiger gnidnetta nehw doohdlihc
 
 oppelA ,zazA ni lapicnirp loohcs a eb ot desU .dlo sraey 05 :aruonaH namhtO demhA
 .1102 erofeb
 ,natiraH ni lapicnirp loohcs hgih a eb ot desU .dlo sraey 63 :aruqA deelaW demmahoM
 1102 erofeb oppelA
 
 :tnahc fo txeT
 
 ot dna tsinoisserger ,msinoiZ ,msilairepmi tsniaga kcab thgif ot esimorp eW ●
  .BMS eht ,loot lanimirc rieht yortsed
 tsap suoicipsus a dna yrotsih krad A :BMS ehT .dassA zifaH ,reverof redael ruO ●
 
 
  :etoN
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The above two people mentioned that they chanted out of fear of the regime’s brutality, 
as if they did not chant along they would be imprisoned and lose their jobs. The 
recruitment process was based on affiliation with the Baath party, then those who 
expressly support the regime, then those who are slightly more neutral. Anyone who had 
an affiliation with the SMB was persecuted to their 4th degree relatives. After the areas 
where the above people are from have been liberated, and after they mixed with exiled 
SMB members who returned to their homeland, they discovered how fake these chants 
were through their personal experiences.  
Law number 49/10/19 imposes the death sentence on anyone who belongs to the SMB, 
and is applied retrospectively. 
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Appendix 3 List of Interviewee  
Note: I respected numerous respondents’ wish to withhold their names and meeting place 
while still fearing that the Syrian’s moukhabarat will take severe action against their 
entire families inside Syria (particularly in Aleppo, Idlib and Lattakia; as countless cases 
had been unveiled by international human rights organizations during the revolution. 
 
1. Abdulhay, Mohamad 
2. Al Abdullah, Osama  
3. Al Bakr, Mustafa  
4. Al Bayanouni, Ali Sadr Eldin 
5. Al Daher, Arwa Salim 
6. Al Drouby, Molham 
7. Al Omar, Mohamed 
8. Al Rawi, Fateh 
9. Al Shaik, Mohammad 
10.  Al Shami, Ahmed Yousef 
11.  Al Soufi, Khitam 
12.  Aqqad, Mohammed 
13.  Aqqad, Sadad  
14.  Assem, Moussa 
15.  Dada, Mohamed Wael 
16.  Diar Bakerly, Abdulrazak 
17.  Fares, Obaida  
18.  Freej, Abdualsalam 
19.  Haddad, Ahmed  
20.  Haffar, Mohammad 
21.  Hanoun, Abdul Alim 
22.  Hanoura, Ahmad Othman  
23.  Immam, Mohamad Farouk 
24.  Ismail, Ahmad 
25.  Kamel, Ahmad 
26.  Khassis, Nabil 
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27.  Najjar, Ghassan 
28.  Najjar, Yassein 
29.  O., Sawssan 
30.  Othman, Othman  
31.  Rasheed, Mohammad 
32.  Rihawi, Adel  
33.  Sabagh, Nour 
34.  Salim, Zuhair  
35.  Sarmini, Mohammad 
36.  Toma, Anas 
37.  Usman, Mahmoud 
38.  Waffai, Sa’ad 
39.  Waffai, Yasser  
40.  Waleed, Mohammed Hikmat 
41.  Younis, Mohammad 
 
 
 
